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ABSTRACT
In 1895, George Pierce Baker published The
Principles of Argumentation, the first modern textbook
on argument.

The major contributions of that work were:

a commitment to a "practical" argumentation independent
of the strictures imposed by law, Formal Logic, and
rhetoric; a comprehensive system of analysis; and an
unparalleled method of brief-drawing.

Subsequent texts

applied Baker's systems of analysis and brief-drawing to
the "spoken debate."

These works, however, reemphasized

relationships between argumentation and its parent dis
ciplines, appropriating rules of evidence, concepts of
burden of proof and presumption, and procedures for
arguing a "case" from law; rules for arrangement, style,
and delivery from rhetoric; and the deductive syllogism,
Mill's canons of induction, and fallacies from Formal
Logic.
Two works published in 1917 firmly entrenched the
"standard tradition."

Baker's most famous student, William

Trufant Foster, revised an earlier edition of Argumentation
and Debating which set out traditional principles in a
comprehensive, teachable fashion.

James M. O'Neill,

meanwhile, incorporated detailed original source materials
iv
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and advocated a "game" approach to debating in his revision
of Craven Laycock and Robert L. Scales's Argumentation and
Debate.

The ramifications of that legacy are immeasurable.
Attacks on the "standard tradition" were not long

in coming.

Influenced by developments in sociology,

psychology, educational philosophy, and, to a lesser
extent, logic, argumentation and debate writers began to
re-examine the philosophical bases, the subject matter, and
the structural forms of their discipline.

Debating, the

most persistent form of the forensic, came under fire.

At

issue were format, standards of judging, and ethical
questions.
In response to criticisms arising from these
reassessments, writers updated bibliographies, incorporated
revised treatments of the proposition (particularly its
classification), introduced stock issues analyses, and
expanded the scope of argumentation to include discussion,
attention to audiences, and balanced rhetorical constructs
which emphasized persuasion.

Such notions of a broad

philosophical base for argumentation persisted until
c. 19 55, after which treatments of discussion reverted
almost solely to separate texts, attention to audiences
waned, and persuasion was more often considered subsidiary
rather than integral to argumentation.
Though contemporary writers have retained much
traditional theory— specific modifications occurring pri
marily in the area of proof— their texts reflect diverse
v
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philosophical predispositions toward the nature and end of
argumentation.

The inquiry-advocacy distinction, intro

duced by Richard Whately and popularized by Henry Lee
Ewbank and J. Jeffery Auer, provided terminology for, and
represents the polarity of, these approaches.

One branch

of theory perceives argumentation to be a form of inquiry,
its aim being critical decision-making.

The other deter

mines advocacy— with a view toward the proof of one's
case— to be the appropriate end of argumentation.

Douglas

Ehninger and Wayne Brockriede occupy one end of the
continuum; Arthur Kruger is at the other.

These philo

sophical approaches have influenced specific treatments of
the analysis, structure, and proof of propositions.

Though

such writers as Glen Mills and Austin Freeley have
attempted to minimize or perhaps resolve these differences,
synthesizing ideas from both points of view, the critical
underlying issue, the "proper" end of argumentation and/or
debate, is still very much in contention.
Much contemporary argumentation and debate theory
bears little resemblance to that "practical argumentation
for everyday life" envisioned by George Pierce Baker
seventy-five years ago.

Baker perceived no "academic"

debate geared to the demands of intercollegiate tournament
competition.

His commitment, rather, was to the discovery,

selection, and structuring of arguments for the everyday
affairs of men.

This study traces the developments which

vi
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resulted in, and the specific theoretical modifications
reflected by, that philosophical shift.

vii
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Man has engaged in oral argumentation probably
since he learned to communicate verbally.

Man's con

tentiousness gradually became more refined as he pursued
excellence, or in more practical terms, victory.

He

developed guidelines and set forth rules for arguing more
effectively.

"Precepts" dealing with eloquence,

addressed to various Egyptian kings, have come down to
us from as early as 2900 B.C.1

And rules for arguing

one's case were systematized by Corax and Tisias in the
fifth century B.C.

The sophists profiteered, while

Aristotle labored to discover "the available means of
persuasion."

Man has attended to theory as well as

practice in argumentation; to knowledge as well as
application; to academics as well as performance.
Academic debating traditionally has been a
part of higher education in America.

By 1642, debating

was an established part of the curriculum at Harvard
1Giles W. Gray, "The 'Precepts of Kagemni and P tah—
Hotep,'" Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXXII (December,
1946), 445-54.
1
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College.

David Potter has suggested that from 164 2 to

1900, four main currents in debating existed in the
colonial chartered colleges, which stemmed from the syllo
gistic disputation, the forensic disputation, the literary
and debating societies, and intercollegiate debating.

He

summarized these currents as follows:
The first major form of debating in the
American colleges was the Latin Syllogistic
Disputation. Imported along with most other
early academic ideas from the parent European
centers of learning, this medieval hold-over
flourished in our colleges until the middle of
the 18th century. Emphasizing formal logic as
its method of proof, Latin as its medium of
expression, the prescribed curriculum as its
source of subject matter, and the Bible as
interpreted by the reverend president or tutor
as its standard of truth, the Syllogistics
served as teaching, testing, and exhibiting
devices, and in the later years, according to
the students, as a means of academic punishment.
Influenced largely by student and public
interest in a form of debate which could handle
the vital questions of an awakening age, the
written English Forensic Disputation made its
appearance in the American Colleges toward the
middle of the 18th century. At first subservi
ent to the Latin exercise, it gradually dis
placed it both as a prescribed classroom and
as an exhibition device. Less formal in
nature, and with a relatively flexible method
ology, it allowed eloquent— if "canned"—
treatises on the pros and cons of . . . diver
gent topics. . . .
Although the forensic disputation lingered
on in some college curricula as an exercise in
composition, its popularity as a form of debate
declined seriously after the early decades of
the 19th century. . . .
David Potter, Debating in the Colonial Chartered
Colleges (New York: Columbia University Bureau of
Publications, 1944), p. 3.
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Even before the forensic disputation was
accepted by the college administrations, it
was a featured exercise in the literary and
debating societies which sprang up early in
the 18th century. . . .
An important contribution to debate
history was the society introduction of
extempore Disputes in the second half of the
18th century. . . .
By 1829 the societies were also experi
menting in still other types of debate. Par
liamentary debates . . . were commonplace. . . .
The societies were also changing the methods
of awarding decisions. . . .
By the time the Civil War broke out, how
ever, the majority of the societies were no
longer in a flourishing condition. . . . [They]
did not yield without a struggle. To enliven
the Halls, inter-society debates were initiated.
. . . It was not, however, until Harvard and
Yale engaged in their much publicized debate on
January 14, 1892 that this new addition to the
intercollegiate craze took root. . . .
As the contests gained in importance, they
were supplemented, as in the very beginning of
debating in the colonial colleges, by cur
ricular offerings in argumentation and debate.
The cycle was almost complete.-*
Historically, then, modern argumentation and debate
is the product of an evolutionary process, a logical exten
sion of our educational system; i.e., it has been "influ
enced and directed by the same forces which shaped the
contemporary course of higher education and cultural growth
in America."^

Modern argumentation and debate has operated

both within the framework of the academic curriculum and
outside it.

And, since 1895, writers in the field have

developed a relevant body of knowledge for the discipline.
3David Potter, "Significant Changes in Collegiate
Debating, 1748-1948," Gavel, .XXX (May, 1948), 73-74.
^Potter, Debating in the Colonial Chartered
Colleges, p. 120.
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Though certainly "breaking new ground," early
argumentation and debate theorists did not proceed without
direction.

They turned to rhetoric, philosophy, and law^

both for rationale and for methodology.

These disciplines

shared similar aims both with argumentation and among them
selves, though in varying degrees.

The discovery and/or

demonstration of truth was their universal aim.

They ques

tioned and sought answers about the proper relationship of
subject matter to form.
vehicle.^

Language was their common

And, with the possible exception of philosophy,

their effectiveness depended on a practical application of
theoretical principles. Argumentation appropriated spe
cific rules and strategies from these disciplines.

Rheto

ric provided a system of invention, rules of arrangement,
style, and delivery.7

Philosophical writings yielded a

theory of knowledge and a system of logical structure.

Law

^Ehninger and Brockriede listed psychology as a
major source, and omitted law. An interest in psychology
developed, however, in the "middle period." Douglas
Ehninger and Wayne Brockriede, Decision by Debate (New York:
Dodd, Mead and Company, 1963), p. 28. Mills suggested that
the tradition was primarily a rhetorical-dialectical one.
Glen Mills, Reason in Controversy (2d ed.; Boston: Allyn
and Bacon, 1968), pp. 22-24.
^Even philosophy was dependent.
moods of the syllogism.

See Aristotle's

7The elocutionary movement had appropriated
delivery from rhetoric and had set it up as a separate
discipline during the "early period" of this study, teach
ing it in schools of elocution or oratory. Classical
rhetoric, however, had considered delivery as a part of its
body of theory, a notion which regained favor during the
"middle period."

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

5

furnished not only specific rules of evidence, but it also
set out practical procedures for the carrying on of oral
argument.
The purpose of the immediate study is to trace the
development of argumentation and debate theory from 189 5
to 19 70.

Central to this task is an identification,

description, and analysis of specific principles or
hypotheses.

To this end the writer has examined argumenta

tion and debate textbooks and relevant journal articles,
particularly those published by the national speech associ
ation.

These materials provided the basis for identifying

the crucial theoretical issues and determining consequen
tial modifications; i.e., important additions, deletions,
and/or extensions.
This study is descriptive, historical, and
analytic in that it reports specific findings, treats
theoretical developments in terms of chronological periods,
and synthesizes trends in the development of argumentation
and debate theory.

It can serve, however, neither as a

checklist nor as an annotated bibliography of the available
literature in argumentation and debate, specific sources
being cited to introduce new developments in theory or to
substantiate trends.

This study investigates debating

practices, moreover, only as they affect or reflect theo
retical predispositions.

Though the research for this
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study was inductive, the writing is, of necessity, largely
deductive.
A review of the literature indicates that hereto
fore no study has attempted to trace in detail the develop
ment of argumentation and debate theory.

Certain theses

and dissertations have isolated segments of the problem,®
and some textbooks have attempted a synthesis of theory,
Glen Mills's Reason in Controversy, second edition,® being
the most comprehensive.

In general, those scholars who

have investigated argumentation and debating (theory and/or
practice) have approached it either from the historicalcritical perspective or in terms of quantitative
r e s e a r c h . P a u l J. Dovre and Kenneth Andersen reported
on the status of these studies in separate journal articles
in 1965 and 1966.^

Mills summarized the Dovre-Andersen

conclusions as follows:
Research which is historical-critical
describes, explains, and evaluates the phe
nomena. There have been histories of debate
. . . , studies of various theoretical
®Franklin H. Knower has compiled an index of gradu
ate work in the field of speech from 190 2 to current date,
which has been published in Speech Monographs, beginning
with Vol. II, October, 19 35, and in subsequent volumes.
®Mills, Reason in Controversy.
10Ibid., p. 25.
Upaul J. Dovre, "Historical-Critical Research in
Debate," Journal of the American Forensic Association, II
(May, 1965) , 72-79; Kenneth E. Andersen, 11Quantitative
Research in Debate," Journal of the American Forensic
Association, III (September, 1966), 112-15.
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constructs . . . , evolutionary studies in
concepts . . . , investigations of landmark
theorists . . . , textual criticisms. . . ,
studies of debaters . . . , and critical
analyses of debates. . . .

Quantitative research, including the
descriptive and the experimental, has been
in the minority in this field, but it is
growing. Descriptive studies have included
surveys of current practices in school
debating, tabulations of evidence used in
tournament debates, and content analyses of
transcribed debates. Experimental studies
have been concerned with the effectiveness of
evidence, the influence of arrangement upon
impact, factors in debate judging, effects of
debating upon critical thinking ability, and
other phenomena which can be controlled,
manipulated, and
12
m

e a s u

r e

d

.

In an article designed to "supplement Dovre's
article by focusing on historical research relating to
debate and forensic activities in American schools and
colleges,"

13

Lee R. Polk found that:

Research to date has taken the form of one
of the following three types of studies:
(1) chronologies of forensic programs at a
specific school or college, (2) chronologies
of state, regional, or national forensic
organizations, and (3) surveys of the use of
evidence in interscholastic and intercollegiate
debate tournaments.1^
Two works have been particularly valuable to this
study.

Arthur Kruger's A Classified Bibliography of
l^Mills, Reason in Controversy, p. 25.

l^Lee R. Polk, "Historical Research in Forensics:
Its Status and Guidelines for the Future," Journal of the
American Forensic Association, VII (Winter, 1970), 36.
14ibid.
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Argumentation and Debate 1 5 is a comprehensive, though
incomplete source book.

It provided a springboard for the

research and organization of this effort.

Also, a series

of articles published in the Quarterly Journal of Speech
by Edward Z. Rowell, "Prolegomena to Argumentation," 16
helped to place this study in perspective and to confirm
certain of its early, tentative conclusions, particularly
concerning the early period.
The plan of this study is as follows:

Chapter II

traces the evolution of argumentation theory from 1895-1917
in terms of the nature of argumentation, analysis, proof,
and the forensic itself.

This chapter incorporates,

insofar as possible, the sources of that theory.

Chapter

III synthesizes developments in the theory of the "middle
period," 1917-c. 1955, examining the same problem areas.
Chapter IV, using the same criteria, attempts to identify
and analyze trends in contemporary theory— after c. 19 55.
Chapter V includes a summary and conclusions drawn from
the study.
15Arthur Kruger, A Classified Bibliography of
Argumentation and Debate (New York: Scarecrow Press,
Inc., 1964).
"^Edward Z. Rowell, "Prolegomena to Argumentation,"
Quarterly Journal of Speech, XVIII (February, April, June,
and November, 19 32).
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CHAPTER II
THE STANDARD TRADITION— 1895-1917
It has been established that the practice of
argumentation is not a modern phenomenon.
strict sense, is its theory.

Neither, in a

The essential thrust of

classical invention was the proof of one's case."'’ British
classical rhetoricians, moreover, re-emphasized the close
relationship between rhetoric and logic. 2

Archbishop

Richard Whately, "the first modern to treat argumentation
3
as a separate discipline," wrote Elements of Logic and
Elements of Rhetoric^ which, numerous cross-references
suggest, were to be used as companion works.

Whately

For a review of the classical concept of proof,
see Lester Thonssen, A. Craig Baird, and Waldo Braden,
Speech Criticism (rev. ed.; New York: Ronald Press, 1970)
Clarence W. Edney, "English Sources of Rhetorical
Theory in Nineteenth-Century America," in A History of
Speech Education in America, ed. by Karl Wallace (New York
Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 19 54), p. 86. See also
Thonssen, Baird, and Braden, Speech Criticism.
3
Orville Pence, "The Concept and Function of
Logical Proof in the Rhetorical System of Richard Whately,
Speech Monographs, XX (March, 1953), 24.
^Richard Whately, Elements of Logic (Boston:
J. Munroe Company, 1854); Richard Whately, Elements of
Rhetoric (Louisville, Ky.: John P. Morton and Company,
1846) .
9
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wished to treat rhetoric of "argumentative composition
generally and exclusively. C l a r e n c e W. Edney concluded
that "Whately is largely responsible for initiating that
trend of theory which moved rapidly in the direction of a
rhetoric of argumentation and debate."*’ Aware of Whately's
treatment of rhetoric as "argumentative composition," and
granting his "landmark contributions to the theory of the
subject," Glen Mills nevertheless contended that "it would
be inaccurate to say that the academic subject of argumenta
tion dates from his work."^

Mills cited Rowton's How to

Conduct a Debate (c. 1840), Holyoake's Public Speaking and
Debate (1853), and McElligott's The American Debater (1855)
O
as "among the earliest specialized textbooks or manuals."
In addition to these prescriptive texts on oral argument,
English and American rhetorics appeared which treated
In the Editor's introduction to a recent edition
of Whately's Elements of Rhetoric, Douglas Ehninger sug
gested that "rhetoric emerges neither as a method for
probing judgments nor as an instrument for arriving at
collective choices and decisions. . . . Its chief business
is the justification and propagation of a priori truth."
Richard Whately, Elements of Rhetoric, ed. by Douglas
Ehninger (Carbondale, 111.: Southern Illinois University
Press, 1969), p. xi.
^Edney, "English Sources of Rhetorical Theory in
Nineteenth-Century America," p. 84.
7
Glen Mills, Reason in Controversy (2d ed.; Boston:
Allyn and Bacon, 1968) , p. 22.
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argumentation as one of the four processes of composition.
Marie Hochmuth and Richard Murphy noted thatr
Books such as those of Quackenbos1 Advanced
Course in Composition and Rhetoric and John
Franklin Genung's The Practical Elements of
Rhetoric/ and Adams Sherman Hill's The Prin
ciples of Rhetoric helped to establish new
categories of rhetoric: narration, descrip
tion, exposition, and argumentation.^
In 1895, Ginn and Company published George Pierce
Baker's The Principles of Argumentation, ^ "the first
modern textbook on the subject.

First not only in date

of publication, but also in prestige, Principles set forth
a practical approach for the argumentation of everyday
life.

The influence of the book was profound.

Edward Z.

Rowell observed in 1932 that "traditionally, the teaching
of argumentation in our colleges has followed essentially
the system developed in his classroom by Professor George
P. Baker in hie first years at Harvard." 12

Former students

q
Marie Hochmuth and Richard Murphy, "Rhetorical
Training in Nineteenth-Century Colleges," in A History of
Speech Education in America, ed. by Karl Wallace (New York:
Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1954), p. 172.
^George Pierce Baker, The Principles of
Argumentation (Boston: Ginn and Company,1895).
^Giles W. Gray, "Some Teachers and the Transition
to Twentieth-Century Speech Education," in A History of
Speech Education in America, ed. by Karl Wallace (New York:
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1954), p. 428.
12

Edward Z. Rowell,. "Prolegomena to Argumentation:
Part I. The Problem, Its Nature and Significance,"
Quarterly Journal of Speech, XVIII (February, 1932), 2.
Though agreeing that Baker was interested in demonstrating
"how to go about satisfying the demands of an argumentative
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Raymond Alden (The Art of Debate, 1900), and William T.
Foster (Argumentation' and Debating, 1908), acknowledged an
indebtedness to Baker.3-3

And, though Craven Lay cock and

Robert L. Scales neglected to mention their Harvard
colleague or his work, their own text (Argumentation and
Debate, 190 4), "consisted chiefly of restatement and fresh
illustration of the principles which Baker had laid
down."3-^

It has been suggested that their "oversight" was

"more regrettable . . . inasmuch as Laycock and Scales had
used Baker's book for the Dartmouth argument course during
the year previous to the publication of their own book."3-^
Such popular texts as J. H. Gardiner's The Making
of Arguments and George Pattee's Practical Argumentation
situation," Harry P. Kerr held that Baker's specific
methodology developed in response to certain philosophical
predispositions. "The problem for him was to shift the
student's attention from style to substance and structure."
Harry P. Kerr, "Baker's Principles of Argumentation,"
Speech Teacher, II (March, 1962), 121. Such convictions
had appeared two years earlier in Baker's Specimens of
Argumentation. George Pierce Baker, Specimens of:
Argumentation (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 189 3),
p . iv.
^Raymond Alden, The Art of Debate (New York:
Henry Holt and Company, 1900), p. viii; William T. Foster,
Argumentation and Debating (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1908), p. ix.
l^Kerr, "Baker's Principles of Argumentation,
p. 123; Craven Laycock and Robert L. Scales, Argumentation
and Debate (New York: Macmillan Company, 1904).
•*-3Kerr, "Baker's Principles of Argumentation,
p. 123. He further noted that: "One of their students
. . . either in 1903-04 when Baker's book was the text,
or in 1904-05 when their own book was used was James M.
O'Neill."
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also followed in the Baker tradition.'*'®

These works con

tributed little to the "development" of argumentation
theory, however, serving largely as restatements and/or
refinements of existing approaches.

Exceptions, of course,

will be duly noted.
Since the influence of Baker's work was so
pervasive, it seems appropriate to examine the standard
tradition of argumentation and debate theory within the
structural framework of The Principles of Argumentation,
specifically the 1895 edition and the 1905 revision with
Henry Barrett Huntington.17

The nature of argumentation,

analysis, briefing, and evidence occupied separate chapters
in both editions.
other topics.

Baker was less certain about organizing

In the first edition he included sections on

preparatory reading, the forensic itself, and persuasion.
The revision with Huntington incorporated preparatory read
ing into the chapters on analysis and evidence, and sub
stituted the term presentation for forensic, broadening
16 These texts were generally included in bibliogra
phies, the Ketcham and Pattee texts going through at least
one revision. Ketcham acknowledged the influence of
Raymond Alden. Victor A. Ketcham, Argumentation and Debate
(1921 rev. ed.; New York: Macmillan Company, 1914).
Pattee noted his indebtedness to Baker. George K. Pattee,
Practical Argumentation (1915 rev. ed.; New York: Century
Company, 1909). Gardiner1s work, moreover, showed the
influence of Baker's approach. J. H. Gardiner, The Making
of Arguments (New York: Ginn and Company, 1912).
17George P. Baker and Henry B. Huntington, The
Principles of Argumentation (rev. ed.; Boston: Ginn and
Company, 1905). The third edition (1925), written
exclusively by Huntington, is more properly considered in
Ch. III.
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the concept to include persuasion.

It is useful for this

study to lump these notions regarding presentation into
one category, the forensic, to use Baker's original label.
The Nature of Argumentation
Discontented with contemporary treatments of
argumentation as a form of composition, 18 and unwilling to
accept argumentation simply as an "off-shoot of logic," or
as an oral discourse limited by rules of evidence and legal
procedure,^ Baker sought "to expound simply and interest
ingly" the principles involved in "the argumentation of
everyday life."^®

He examined the nature of the discipline

primarily through defining it, assessing its ends, and
through determining its relation to other subjects.
See Kerr, "Baker's Principles of Argumentation,"
for a discussion of "shortcomings Baker found in contemporary rhetorics and his search for an acceptable alterna
tive." This is not to imply that Baker rejected contempo
rary rhetorics totally. Rather, citations in Principles
indicate that he leaned heavily on such works as John F.
Genung, The Practical Elements of Rhetoric (Boston: Ginn
and Company, 18 87), and J. B. Fletcher and G. R. Carpenter,
Introduction to Theme-Writing (Boston: Allyn and Bacon,
1893).
l^See W. C. Robinson, Forensic Oratory (Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1893).
^Baker, Principles, p. vi. Baker's insistence
on a practical approach was influenced by Robinson,
Forensic Oratory; Alfred Sidgwick, The Process of Argument:
A Contribution to Logic (London: Adam and Charles Black,
1893); Alfred Sidgwick, The Use of Words in Reasoning
(London: Adam and Charles Biack, 1901); Austin Phelps,
Theory of Preaching: Lectures on Homilectics (London:
Richard Dickinson, 1882) .
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Though Baker believed that practical argumentation,
11fundamental to all others . . . exists independent of the
rules which have been formulated to govern the handling of
evidence in courts, independent of legal procedure, and
. . . can be understood without any study of books of
Formal Logic,"

21

he investigated, nevertheless, the rela

tion of argumentation both to methods of arguing in law
courts and to Formal Logic.

Baker also claimed that

argumentation includes persuasive and rhetorical methods
as well as rules of evidence.

He detailed the relationship

of these divisions as follows:
Clearly, then, knowledge how to distinguish
good from bad reasoning, Logic, . . . is but
the warp which runs through the cloth of Argu
mentation; and knowledge of the rules of Per
suasion, of Rhetoric, and of Evidence are the
threads of the woof. Even as the warp mingles
with the woof, so it is by careful reasoning
that each of these special sets of rules is
applied to the case in hand.22
Conviction and Persuasion
In the 1895 edition of Principles, Baker defined
argumentation as "the art of producing in the mind of some
one else a belief in the ideas which the speaker or writer
91

Baker, Principles, p. vi.

99

Ibid., p. 20. In the preface to the 1905
revision of Principles, Baker and Huntington disclaimed
the need to include the "large amount of justificatory
and explanatory material" found in the first edition.
Baker and Huntington, Principles, p. v.
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wishes the hearer or reader to accept."23

Such a result,

he claimed, might be obtained either by
convincing the hearer or reader, through his
intellect, by the cogency of the reasoning
advanced; or . . . by bringing out forcibly
that in the ideas which will stir the emotions
of the hearer or reader sufficiently to make
him act as the speaker or writer desires. 4
Baker failed to acknowledge the influence of the prevailing
faculty psychology on his

w

o

r

k

.

Neither did other "early

period" writers, though they treated conviction and per
suasion separately both as ends and methods appropriate
2c
to argumentation.
Baker believed that "ideal argumentation would
combine perfection of reasoning, complete convincingness,
23Baker, Principles, p. 1.
24lbid.
25>rhe influence of faculty psychology on Baker's
approach is evidenced by the following distinctions: "He
who uses . . . only the appeal to the intellect . . .
employs the method of Conviction only. . . . He who depends
entirely on finding in his material what will excite the
emotions of his hearer or reader uses only the method of
Persuasion." Ibid.
2^The Baker-Huntington revision added the phrase
"and of inducing the other person, if necessary, to act in
consequence of his acquired belief." Baker and Huntington,
Principles, p. 7. Both Alden and Foster included the
notion of action as a proper part of argumentation. Alden,
Art of Debate, p. 5; Foster, Argumentation and Debating,
1908 ed., p. 85; 1917 rev. ed., p . 123. Though Laycock and
Scales defined argumentation in terms of belief, their dis
cussion of conviction and persuasion indicates that belief
results in action. Laycock and Scales, Argumentation and
Debate, pp. 1-3. In the 1917 revision, O'Neill also
included the concept. James M. O'Neill, Craven Laycock,
and Robert L. Scales, Argumentation and Debate (New York:
Macmillan Company, 1917), p. 1.

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

with perfection of persuasive power,"

27

though he did not

clarify the inherent relationship between these elements.
The Baker-Huntington revision, on the other hand, uncon
vinced of the validity of a dichotomy, emphasized that
"conviction and persuasion are not independent but com2Q
plementary" processes.
The authors explained as follows
For purposes of instruction it will,
however, be convenient to treat first the
principles which underlie successful convic
tion and then those which make for effective
persuasion; but a reader should never forget
that this separation is artificial and made
wholly for pedagogic reasons.^9
Alden called conviction and persuasion "the two
great divisions of a r g u m e n t . L a y c o c k and Scales and
Foster agreed that argumentation should include both
processes.^

Evidence does not indicate, however, that

these authors viewed a separation of the functions as
"artificial."

As Alden said:

These two elements, then, the power of
reaching the reason, and the power of winning
the disposition and moving the will, belong
side by side in all successful debate. It is
not that one part of a speech is given up to
the one, and another part to the other; but
27Baker, Principles, p. 7.
28
Baker and Huntington, Principles, p. 11.
29
Ibid.
30
Alden, Art of Debate, p. 5.
31Laycock and Scales, Argumentation and Debate,
p. 4; Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 1908 ed., p. 262
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that the whole, both in matter and manner, is
to be made to serve the ends of each.
Agreement on conviction and persuasion as essential
elements of argumentation was not universal.
Alden, Laycock and Scales, and Foster

33

Though Baker,

called for a broad

philosophical base for the discipline, the tendency per
sisted to restrict argumentation to matters of logic.

In

his text, The Essentials of Argumentation, Elias MacEwan,
for example, viewed argumentation as "the process of
proving or disproving a proposition."^

And in another

early work, A Course in Argumentative Writing, Gertrude
Buck examined the logical bases of argumentation in terms
of the prevailing S-R psychological theory.

Buck objected

that "the means to attain the end remains unspecified" in
32
Alden, Art of Debate, p. 6. Alden also discussed
the special characteristics of debate: "If argumentation
is the art of convincing others of the truth or falsity of
a disputed matter, debate may be said to be the art of
doing this under conditions such that both sides of the
case can be heard and that the advocates of each side can
reply directly to those of the other," p. 1.
33

Their definitions of argumentation paralleled
those found in the first edition of Baker's Principles.
See Alden, Art of Debate, p. 6; Laycock and Scales, Argu
mentation and Debate, p. 1; Foster's discussion followed
that found in the Baker and Huntington revision. See
Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 1908 ed., p. 85.
"^Elias J. MacEwan, The Essentials of Argumentation
(Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1898), p. 1. He
restricted his discussion, moreover, to an investigation of
the processes of reasoning. Alden included the "truth or
falsity" distinction of formal logic in his discussion of
conviction. Alden, Art of Debate, p. 1.
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both the Baker and MacEwan definitions, and he preferred to
delineate argumentation as
the act of establishing in the mind of another
person a conclusion which has become fixed in
his own, by means of setting up in the other
person's mind the train of thought which has
previously led you to this
c o n c l u s i o n . -*5

Formal and Applied Logic
In differentiating "Formal Logic" (logic treated
as a science) from "Applied Logic" (the reasoning of
"everyday" affairs), and in determining to "study Logic
only in its practical application in controversy of whatever kind," 36 Baker relied on the pronouncements of the
British philosopher Alfred Sidgwick.

In the preface to

The Process of Argument, Sidgwick had aimed for:
the extension of a knowledge of the more
useful parts of Logic. It is written for
those who are interested rather in the war
against fallacy than in the grammatical
inquiries which form so large a part of the
Logic taught in the text-books.3•
Baker quoted Sidgwick extensively to substantiate
his own position that a knowledge of Formal Logic is not
essential to careful study of argumentation. 38 Two objec
tions seemed particularly important to Baker:

that the

35

.
. . .
Gertrude Buck, A Course m Argumentative Writing
(New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1901), p. 3.
36
Baker, Principles, pp. 24-25.
37Sidgwick, Process of Argument, preface.
38
Baker, Principles, pp. 21-25.
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technical terms of Formal Logic are of little practical
use; and that the discipline gives little help in distin
guishing between sound and unsound

i

cited the work of W. Stanley Jevons,

n

f

40

e

r

e

n

c

e

.

Baker also

another philosopher

intrigued with how man "commonly" reasons.

Jevons' spe

cific methodology, more traditional than Sidgwick's, found
greater favor with Baker's followers, however, than with
Baker.
Legal Procedure
Though Baker contended that to assume argumentation
to be simply a legal method was to "mistake a species for
the genus,

he, nevertheless, admitted a close relation

ship between the disciplines.

His belief that "the special

knowledge necessary for a lawyer, depends upon, is sur
rounded by, knowledge of the universal methods of reason
ing"^ harkened back to W. C. Robinson's distinctions:
Every issue in a cause [in law] presents
two questions, either or both of which may be
disputed.
(1) What were the facts in which
the controversy originated?
(2) What are the
39 Sidgwick, Process of Argument, pp. 74-76,
199-200.
40W. Stanley Jevons, Elementary Lessons m Logic:
Deductive and Inductive (new ed.; London: Macmillan
Company, 1881).
41
Baker, Principles, p. 9.
^2Ibid., p. 11.
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rules of law by which, in view of these facts,
the issue is to be determined?^3
Baker further believed that
A complete treatise on Argumentation must . . .
include a chapter on rules of law, . . . but
it would be but a part of, and secondary to, a
treatment of those principles upon which
Argumentation universally depends.44
Though aware of argumentation's debt to other
disciplines, writers who followed Baker did not belabour
the point.4®

It was not, in fact, until the publication

in 1917, of James M. O'Neill's revision of Laycock and
Scales' Argumentation and Debate, that a full-fledged
attempt at comparisons appeared.

O'Neill not only dis

cussed specific sources of theory in an introductory
chapter to his work, but he also cited many "direct
quotations from recognized authorities” throughout the
text.4®

His summary chart follows:

4^Robinson, Forensic Oratory, sec. 60, cited by
Baker, Principles, p. 9.
44Baker, Principles, p. 11.
4®See Alden, Art of Debate, pp. vi-vii; Laycock
and Scales, Argumentation and Debate, p. vii; Foster,
Argumentation and Debating, 1908 ed., pp. 85-90.
AC

O'Neill, Laycock and Scales, Argumentation and
Debate, pp. x, 3-11.
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1. Law

2. Logic

3. Rhetoric 4. Oratory

Burden of
Proof
Presump
tions
Issues
Evidence
Briefing
Refutation
Procedure

Proposi
tions
Presump
tions
Issues
Evidence
Kinds of
Arguments
Fallacies
Refutation

Kinds of
Arguments
General
Principles
of Com
position:
Unity,
Coher
ence,
Emphasis,
Outlining
Sentence
Structure
Refutation
Persuasion

Voice
Platform
skill
Technique
of Debate
Oral Style
Persuasion

Having detailed the nature of argumentation both
by definition and by examining it in its habitat, Baker
listed three conditions necessary for successful argument:
"(1) What the question means; (2) What you believe about
it, and why; (3) How you are to state your case so that
47
(a) you shall convince, and (b) persuade."
Corresponding
to these three questions were Baker's three divisions of
argumentative composition:

analysis; study of the rules

of evidence; and rhetorical structure and persuasion, the
two parts of the third division.

It is with these topics

that the remainder of this chapter will be concerned.
47Baker, Principles, p. 30.
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Analysis
One of the most significant contributions of
Principles was its exposition of argumentative analysis.
For Baker, it was analysis which defined the question in
dispute and set out the work to be done.

Ten years after

Principles first appeared, Baker and Huntington revised
extensively Baker's original treatment of analysis.

As a

result of this "restating for greater accuracy and simplicity, 48 Edward Z. Rowell observed that "this feature
became one of the most valuable of the new discipline.
The 190 5 edition clarified the scope of analysis and, though
reducing the number, developed more fully its specific
"steps."

While the Alden, and Laycock and Scales texts

followed Baker's first probings, Foster benefited from the
clarifications and extensions, as well as from the per
spective, of the Baker and Huntington revision.
Baker delineated the nature of analysis in his
first edition as follows:
To find out what the real point in dispute
is, we must carefully examine the material we
can collect in regard to the subject, and by
placing on one side all the ideas upon which
our opponent admits his readiness to agree
with us; by excluding bit by bit all ideas
that must be admitted to be irrelevant; by
subordinating what is less important to what
48Baker and Huntington, Principles, p. v.
^9Edward Z. Rowell, "Prolegomena to Argumentation:
Part II. The Historical Roots of the Problem," Quarterly
Journal of Speech, XVIII (April, 1932), 243.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

is more so; reach the pivotal idea or ideas.
. . . The process by which we find these
natural inter-relations of the material—
what may be called the primary or inherent
structure— is again analysis.
Baker set out "five important steps" in analysis in the
first edition of Principles;

finding propositions;

defining them; determining a question's origin; dis
covering the "special issue"; and relating the central
idea to ideas essential to a case.5^

Baker and Huntington

refined and revised the categories in their 190 5 edition
and included:

phrasing the proposition; defining the

terms; finding the special issues; and constructing the
case. 52
The Proposition
For Baker, "the first work of analysis is to find
out what is the real point at issue, on what it is that
the basal difference of opinion rests." 53

Distinguishing

a term from a proposition, 54 he counselled that one should
cn

Baker, Principles, pp. 30-31.

^ Ibid., pp. 33-77.
CO

Baker and Huntington, Principles, pp. 14-60.
For similar statements of methodology see Laycock and
Scales, Argumentation and Debate, pp. 17-27; Foster,
Argumentation and Debating, 1917 ed., pp. 19-20; O'Neill,
Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and Debate, p. 21.
53Baker, Principles, p. 32.
^Relying on Jevons' idea that, "A logical term
may consist of any number of nouns, substantive or objec
tive, with the articles, prepositions, and conjunctions

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

25

"seek first of all to find whether what he or his opponent
wishes to treat argumentatively can be phrased as a
proposition."^
Though Laycock and Scales talked about "formulating
a proposition,"^ and Baker and Huntington substituted the
term phrasing for finding the proposition, neither discus
sion differed appreciably from Baker's earlier pronounce
ments.^

It was, rather, Alden's treatment of the

required to join them together," and following the reason
ing that, "When we join terms together we make a proposi
tion; when we join propositions together, we make argument,
or piece of reasoning," Baker contended that "when we join
the arguments, or pieces of reasoning together, we have
Argumentation." W. S. Jevons, Primer of Logic (New York:
Appleton and Company, 1878), pp. 12-15, cited in Baker,
Principles, p. 33.
^Baker, Principles, p. 39. Baker defined a propo
sition as "an assertion m regard to a term or terms,"
p. 33. Laycock and Scales made a similar distinction,
defining a proposition as "a statement that something is or
is not." Laycock and Scales, Argumentation and Debate,
p. 13. Whereas Baker was interested in both the analysis
for and o£ a proposition, most writers who followed him
treated the phrasing of a proposition as a step preliminary
to analysis. Though Baker and Huntington's approach moved
toward "phrasing," they, nevertheless, retained the organi
zational scheme of the first edition which placed finding
the proposition as the first step in analysis.
^They set out specific methodology which corre
sponded to Baker's "steps" for analysis: finding out what
is the real question at issue; "formulating the question
in words"; and "comparing the meaning of the statement so
expressed with the meaning of the real question in issue."
Laycock and Scales, Argumentation and Debate, pp. 17-27.
57They made some practical suggestions for choosing
a topic which they relegated to a footnote. Baker and
Huntington, Principles, pp. 19-20. They also suggested a
conference to determine agreement on the meaning of the
proposition, p. 404.
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debate proposition that presaged new developments in
theory.
Alden believed that the "subject for debate . . .
must be such that it can be reduced to the form of a
proposition; for a proposition is the only form of words
which has two distinct sides, an affirmative and a
rp

negative."

He further suggested that, "where accuracy

is demanded, or where a decision . . . is to be rendered,"
a stated proposition "is almost necessary." 59 Alden's
influence lay, however, not in any original theoretical
construct, but rather in the application of the concept
of the proposition (as developed by logic and rhetoric) to
debating.

His specific prescriptions for stating or

phrasing a proposition for debate, moreover, provided a
rationale for subsequent systems of classifying proposi
tions as well as criteria for "good" propositions.
Classifying Propositions
Though Alden had suggested the impossibility of
classifying debatable questions "in any thoroughly
systematic way," his own discussion of phrasing propositions
^Alden, interested in practical debating, took
"legal argument . . . as the basis for the general subject
of debate." Alden, Art of Debate, pp. vi, 10.
^ Ibid., p. 11. Laycock and Scales determined
that: "The proposition may be expressed or not as cir
cumstances seem to require." Laycock and Scales, Argumen
tation and Debate, p. 15.
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for debate foreshadowed later classification systems.®®

He

said:
The principal verb of the proposition will
state the affirmative; if a negative word is
added, it will state the negative. If the
question is one of pure fact, the verb will
commonly be the verb to be; if it is one of
theory or policy, the verb will frequently
be ought or some similar auxiliary.®^
James M. O'Neill recognized in 1917, that certain
writers in argumentation had begun to classify proposi
tions.®^

He cited specifically the works of J. H. Gardiner

and George K. Pattee.

Gardiner had distinguished proposi

tions of fact and propositions of policy practically, in
terms of "the different form and degree of certitude to
which they

lead."®-*

He had anticipated, moreover, a

third classification, questions of taste or value, when
he observed:

"Finally, there are the arguments of

®®Alden, Art of Debate, p. 30. Logic of course
had included detailed systems of classification. See
J. H. Hyslop, Elements of Logic (New ¥ork: Charles
Scribner's Sons^ 1901), p . 121.
®^-Alden, Art of Debate, p. 10.
62

O'Neill's observation that "A proposition of
fact aims at belief, a proposition of policy aims at
action," harkened back to questions of the philosophical
bases of argumentation; i.e., the inclusion of action
(persuasion) as an appropriate end of argumentation.
O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and Debate,
p. 19.
°~>Gardiner, Making of Arguments, p. 14.
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policy which deal with matters of taste and aesthetic
preference.1,64
Pattee made similar distinctions:
A common and convenient method of clas
sification divides propositions into two
groups: propositions of policy, and proposi
tions of fact. The first class consists of
those propositions that aim to prove the truth
of a theory, that indicate a preference for
a certain policy, for a certain method of
action. The second class comprises those
propositions that affirm or deny the occur
rence of an event, or the existence of a fact.
Propositions of policy usually, but not
always, contain the word should or ought;
propositions of fact usually contain some form
of the word to be. ^
O'Neill stated his own position as follows:
But since most arguments of policy rest
upon questions of fact, since many questions
can be so phrased as to fit either type with
out altering materially the nature of the
case, and since the work to be done in find
ing, phrasing, supporting, or attacking, is
practically the same for both kinds of proposi
tions, it is hardly worthwhile to try to make
much of this classification. It is wise,
Ibid., p. 23. Aware of the interrelationship of
the various kinds of propositions, Gardiner said: "In
practice these three kinds of arguments, which turn on
moral, practical, and aesthetic considerations, tend to be
much mingled. . . . Furthermore, one must never forget that
an argument of policy which does not involve and react on
subsidiary questions of fact is rare; and the questions of
fact must be settled before we can go on with the argument
of policy. . . . On the other hand, there are some cases
of questions of fact in which our practical interests
deeply affect the view which we take of the facts. . . .
Yet the distinction between the two main classes is a real
one, and if one has never thought it out, one may go at an
argument with a blurred notion of what he is attempting to
do," pp. 24-25.
^Pattee, Practical Argumentation, 1915 rev. ed.,
pp. 20-21.
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however, to decide, among other things, whether
we are arguing facts (as such) or policies,
before planning our argument.66
Characteristics of "Good"
Propositions
Alden had recommended avoiding propositions which
are obvious, which depend on ambiguous terminology, and
which are difficult to demonstrate or involve more than
one issue.6^

These suggestions, along with the following

prescriptions for wording a proposition, appeared in later
works as "characteristics" or "qualities" of "good" propo
sitions.

Alden advised that:

Propositions for debate should be worded so
that the affirmative will be under the first
responsibility of proof, should be as brief
as may be consistent with exactness, should
make the issues involved as distinct as pos
sible, and should avoid every appearance of
partiality.68
Foster's "requirements" of a proposition suggest
similar standards:
1.

The proposition should be debatable.

2.

The proposition should not employ ambiguous
terms.

3.

The proposition should not be too broad.

660'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and
Debate, p. 19.
c.7

Alden, Art of Debate, pp. 11-17. Alden noted
that some propositions have little interest for an
audience. See also Baker and Huntington, Principles,
pp. 398-401.
68Alden, Art of Debate, p. 22.
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4.

The proposition should embody one central

idea.

5.

The proposition should give to the affirmative
the burden of proof.

6.

The proposition should be interesting.

7.

The proposition for first practice should cover
familiar ground.

8. The proposition should be phrased briefly and
f:
i7
Q
simply.0
O'Neill's "desirable characteristics or qualities
of a good proposition," admittedly similar to Foster's
and Ketcham's 70 criteria, follow:

propositions for debate

are stated as an assertion? are single, unambiguous,
unprejudiced, brief, simple, concrete, and specific; place
burden of proof on affirmative; and are debatable and
71
interesting./x
Definition
Baker believed that central to determining whether
a proposition "phrased the matter really in dispute," is an
investigation of:
(1) What the terms in each proposition mean,
and hence the proposition as a whole; and
^Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 1908 ed. ,
pp. 3-12; 1917 rev. ed., pp. 3-11.
70 See Ketcham, Argumentation and Debate, 1914 ed.,
p. 12.
710'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and
Debate, pp. 27-31.
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(2) whether this meaning of the whole proposi
tion states the question calling for debate.
. . . When, then, the meaning of the terms of
a proposition, or of a proposition as a whole,
is not self-evident, definition is the second
important step in analysis.^
Baker relied on traditional rhetorical distinctions in
discussing this "step," his criteria for a "good" defini
tion^ not differing significantly from those included in
contemporary composition texts.^

Baker believed that:

In defining we shall be forced very often
to turn aside from the dictionaries and by
search in essays, books by specialists, in our
own experience, by careful examination of the
words, and by thought upon them, to reach
through analogy, exemplification, analysis of
the word, detailed description, iteration,
antithesis, their real meaning.75
Agreeing that "definitions should have reference
not to theoretical meanings, but to the meaning of the
words under the circumstances," Alden suggested turning to
"the sources, surroundings, and present conditions of the
subject discussed." 76

Meanwhile, Laycock and Scales

72 Baker, Principles, p. 40.
73 Baker included clarity, convincingness, brevity
and "should not . . . define in a circle, . . . beg the
question." Ibid., pp. 44-49. See Henry N. Day, Elements
of the Art of Rhetoric (New York: Barnes and Burr, 1850);
Adams Sherman Hill, The Principles of Rhetoric (New York:
Harper and Brothers, 1878).
7^Baker specifically acknowledged an indebtedness
to Genung's system of classification. Baker, Principles,
p. viii.
75Ibid., p. 59.
7^Alden, Art of Debate, pp. 33-34.
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devised specific methodology for "testing the meaning of
the proposition."

They advised:

First, find its ordinary acceptation. Second,
determine whether it may have any meaning that
is technical or in any way peculiar. . . .
Third, even after the definition is obtained
from a good authority, consider the questions:
Are the terms of this definition that I have
found exact? Are there any exceptions to the
general statement?77
"Defining the terms" received increased attention
in the 1905 revision of Principles of Argumentation.
Casting around for an alternative to dictionary meanings,
Baker and Huntington suggested defining from the history
of the question

and incorporated a study of the origin

of the question,7® the immediate cause for discussion,
7Q
and clash of opinion into this "safer method."
Though
77

Laycock and Scales, Argumentation and Debate,

p. 25.
78 In his first edition, Baker had contended that
"some study of the origin of the question" is involved in
defining the terms of a proposition, andcalled it the
"third, if subordinate, step in analysis." He elaborated:
"In accepting the definitions as not merely clear but as
satisfactory for our purposes, we test them, by examining
the origin of the question, to see whether the definitions
give to the proposition as a whole a meaning that phrases
the general question we wish to discuss." Baker, Prin
ciples , pp. 67, 70. This distinction was dropped as a
separate "step" in the 1905 revision. Foster, however,
treated the history of a question and its origin as sepa
rate steps in analysis, comparable to definition. Foster,
Argumentation and Debating, 1908 ed., pp. 18-24. He added
"the immediate cause for discussion" in his revision, 1917
rev. ed., p. 22.
7®Baker and Huntington, Principles, pp. 26-40.
They noted two other classes of topics, those on which
there is not much printed matter and questions not
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reiterating the criteria of the first edition, Baker and
Huntington clarified the relationship of definition to
argumentation as follows:
It is advisable to remember the essentials
of any good definition: clearness, convincing
ness, and as much brevity as the other two
qualities permit. The definition must be clear
and convincing, not merely to the writer but to
his audience; for the aim in any discussion is,
of course, to make the interpretation of the
question by opponent or audience coincide with
that of the writer.^0
Baker and Huntington also suggested that a preliminary
definition of terms helps rid the discussion of vagueness
and of technical terms and avoids confusion from
ambiguousness.
D1
Foster agreed that clearnessOJ- and convincingness
are essential in formal debate.

Believing, moreover,

that "a dictionary definition is at best but a nucleus or
discussed before. In the first instance, they pointed out
that if men known to hold opposing views on the questions
are interrogated, "immediate cause, origin, and clash will
promptly develop, and, as a consequence, the needed defini
tion." In the other case, Baker and Huntington pointed out
that "the chief difference between this kind of question
and the other two classes is that in it the definitions
used may not arise from the question itself," p. 37.
80

Ibid., pp. 37-38. Alden had earlier suggested
that "words should never be allowed to obscure the real
question." Alden, Art of Debate, p. 34.
81Foster listed six requisites of clearness in
definition: cover all cases included; exclude all cases
excluded; be simple; not employ terms to be defined; stated
positively; be as brief as possible. Foster, Argumentation
and Debating, 190 8 ed., p. 26. Foster deleted the last two
of these criteria in his revision, 1917 rev. ed., p. 29.
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core, which must be supplemented and amplified and
explained," 82 he offered the following "special methods
of definition":

etymology; authority; negation; exemplifi-

cation; and explication. 83
O'Neill isolated two purposes of definition in
argumentation:
It serves, first, to enable the writer, in the
beginning of his work in preparation, to find
out the real meaning of the question.
Secondly, it serves to make the meaning clear
to the reader or hearer.84
Satisfied with the sufficiency of Laycock and Scales's
distinctions for the first purpose, O'Neill nevertheless
advised additional methods of definition for the second.
He included authority, etymological derivation, context,
analogy, illustration, exclusion, and analysis. 85
Issues
Discovering Issues
Baker identified the fourth step of analysis,
®^Ibid., 1908 ed., p. 30.
Words in Reasoning, p. 42.

See Sidgwick, Use of

83For a discussion of these methods and their value
in definition, see Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 1908
ed., pp. 30-36. Foster relied on Genung's descriptions of
explication and exemplification. See John F. Genung, The
Working Principles of Rhetoric (Boston: Ginn and Company,
1901), pp. 565“, 578.
84O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and
Debate, p. 300.
85O'Neill included examples from speeches to demon
strate the various approaches to definition. See O'Neill,
Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and Debate, pp. 300-307.
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finding the special issue in a case, as follows:
In every case . . . there is one central
idea, or group of ideas, about which the
others centre. To prove this central idea,
or group of ideas, to be true or false, is
to win the case for the affirmative or the
negative. . . . That is the special issue
in the case. As we answer it affirmatively
or negatively, the case is settled for one
side or the other; on this question the
debate turns.86
One discovers issues, Baker further suggested, by settling
what facts are admitted by both sides, and by cutting out
extraneous ideas. ft7

ftft
Both Alden, and Laycock and Scales00

built on that analysis.

Insisting that "the work of

analysis clearly presupposes a full understanding of the
OQ
question on both sides,"
Alden enlarged the scope of
analysis to include
not only the questions, Just what does the
proposition maintain? and, What must chiefly
be shown in order to prove the truth of
88Baker, Principles, p. 70.
^ Ibid., pp. 74-77.
88Alden defined the "main issue" as "that which it
is chiefly necessary to prove, in order to prove the whole
proposition." He suggested that "it is found by discarding
all minor matters connected with the question, and fixing
the attention upon that which properly forms the central
portion of the argument." Alden, Art of Debate, p. 35.
Laycock and Scales suggested that ''the issues are the ideas
or matters of fact upon the establishment of which depends
the establishment of the proposition." Laycock and Scales,
Argumentation and Debate, p. 28.
agreed.
p. 42.

88Alden, Art of Debate, p. 42. Laycock and Scales
Laycock and Scales, Argumentation and Debate,
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it? but also, What objections are made to it?
and, How far are the objections significant?
Laycock and Scales, moreover, added to Baker's distinctions
those of certain other contemporary writers. Their disQ1
cussion of "stress of the controversy,"
for example,
92
reflected the influence of John Ward's System of Oratory,
while their treatment of "primary" and "subordinate" issues
came chiefly from Robinson's Forensic Oratory.93

From

these sources, Laycock and Scales derived a clear statement
^°Alden, Art of Debate, p. 43.
91 Laycock and Scales said: "In any discussion the
'stress of the controversy' inevitably falls upon the
proving or disproving of a few points, which are the centre
and soul of the question; whichever side wins in the
struggle over these points wins the whole contest. These
points are always the same in the same question: they
exist independently of the wills of the disputants; they
are to be discovered, not invented. These facts are the
issues." Laycock and Scales, Argumentation and Debate,
pp. 29-30.
92
Laycock and Scales cited John Ward's distinc
tions : "But in all disputes it is of greatest consequence
to observe where the stress of the controversy lies. For,
without attending to this, persons may cavil about dif
ferent matters, without understanding each other or
deciding anything." John Ward, System of Oratory (London:
J. Ward, 1759), cited in Laycock and Scales, Argumentation
and Debate, p. 29.
^ F o r the influence of Robinson see Laycock and
Scales, Argumentation and Debate, p. 30. Laycock and
Scales also investigated the relationship of subordinate
to primary issues ("issues are related directly to the
proposition; the subordinate issues, indirectly") and con
cluded: "In selecting the issues, then, points should be
chosen which are nearly equal in value to one another, and
which are of such a nature that all the evidence and argu
ments that it is desirable to use in the case can be
logically grouped around them," pp. 39-40.
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of methodology for determining the issues which emphasized
the "direct clash of opinion." 94
In their 1905 revision of Principles, Baker and
Huntington appropriated the term "clash in opinion" to
describe "the most essential part of analysis," that which
5
provides the special issues. 9 J
By . . . exclusion from the clash in
opinion, of all extraneous, admitted, waived,
and granted matter, the investigator reaches
a set of statements all of which directly or
indirectly are essential to the discussion of
the question.
From the clash, they reasoned, one "will find at least part
of the definition of terms; from it he will draw first, the
ideas essential in the case, and finally, the special issues
themselves." 97 Foster's discussion followed suit:
After the meaning of the proposition has
thus been set forth with clearness and pre
cision, and with satisfaction to the audience,
and after the extraneous matters have been
ruled out and the admitted matters stated, the
94 "To summarize, in finding the issues:
(1) put
aside all matters that are not related directly to the
proposition; (2) but be sure to understand the question in
all its phases and all its details; (3) know both sides of
the question thoroughly; (4) exclude all irrelevant matter
and all matter that each side can admit without damaging
its cause; (5) select the points on which there is a direct
clash of opinion between the opposing sides or which cannot
be admitted by the one side or the other; (6) discriminate
between the issues and the subordinate issues; (7) study
the origin and history of the question." Ibid., p. 42.
9^Baker and Huntington, Principles, p. 58.
96Ibid., p. 49.
^Ibid., p. 58.
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next step is the terse, impartial, and com
plete enumeration of the arguments which may
be held on the affirmative and those which
may be held on the negative. The Clash of
Opinion thus presented will reveal . . . the
issues of the proposition. The main issues
are the controversial points which, if proved,
directly support the proposition. The sub
ordinate issues are the controversial points
which, if proved, indirectly support the
proposition by directly supporting the main
issues.
O'Neill's revision of Laycock and Scales's theory
of issues, though subtle, was significant.

The issues,

O'Neill said,
are not simply "important main points," or
"points on which there is a clash of opinion."
They are the smallest possible divisions of
crucial points, each one of which the affirma
tive must establish in order to establish the
proposition. 9
O'Neill minimized "clash" as a method for determining
issues but continued to advise excluding unimportant and
indirect matter.
Stock Issues
Though the application of common questions to
propositions is not a new p h e n o m e n o n , t o suggest that
9 8Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 1908 ed.,
pp. 42-43. See 1917 rev. ed. for identical treatment,
p. 45.
99O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and
Debate, p. 43.
^^For O'Neill's system of finding issues, see
ibid., pp. 58-66.
■^^See historical background in Lenore Evans, "The
Development of the Concept of Analysis by Modern Writers on
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stasis in classical rhetorical theory is the same as stock
issues of modern argumentation and debate theory probably
is to overstate the case.

Modern stock issues have

operated in many cases not as a method for discovering
issues but, rather, ae the issues or at least the major
points in partition. 102

One of the earliest argumentation

writers to advocate applying stock issues to debate
propositions, J. R. Pelsma, implied such a position when
he suggested that analysis can be lessened by using a
special formula of standard issues.

He and Henry

Bainbridge G o u g h p u b l i s h e d separate, though similar,
such "formulae" in the November, 1917, issue of the Public
Speaking Review. Pelsma said:
When a proposition is up for debate, it
usually, if not always, rises from an attempt
to remedy some manifest evil; . . . It is
obvious, therefore, that those in favor of the
measure must establish two points, namely:
(1) That there are such defects or evils, and
(2) That the proposed measure will remedy the
defects or cure the evils. If these two points
can be established beyond a reasonable doubt,
he has gained his purpose; for pray, what else
is there to prove?
Argumentation" (unpublished thesis, Louisiana State
University, 1954), pp. 16-25.
10 2

For a discussion of the relation of the issues
to the partition, see section on Brief-Drawing.
10 3
J. R. Pelsma, "A Difficult Problem for the
Debater: The Special Issues," Public Speaking Review, III
(November, 1913), 1.
10 4Harry Bainbridge Gough, "Formulas for the
Special Issues," Public Speaking Review, III (November,
1913), 6.
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To some questions a third point is
manifest— the practicability. However, it
may be plainly seen that this point would
logically be included under our second
division; but at times it is advisable,
especially when there are three debaters on
a side, to make it a separate i s s u e . 1 0 ^
Pelsma outlined as follows:
The affirmative proves:
1. Cause for action, or
Evils in present system, or
Necessity for change.
2. Method of action, or
Remedy for evils, or
Feasibility of plan.
3. Best plan.
Practicability of method, and
The negative proves:
1. No adequate cause for action, or
Evils do not exist, or
No necessity for changes proposed.
2. Method not adequate, or
Evils incurable, or
Plan not adequate.
3. Method not practicable, or
Better plan.106
Gough's listing was similar:
A.

B.

Formula for the Affirmative
1. Is it (the proposed policy or
solution) necessary?
2. Will it be efficient (practical)?
3. Will it prove superior?
Formula for the Negative
1. Is the existing policy or condition

106Pelsma, "A Difficult Problem," p. 2.
10~Ibid., p. 3. Pelsma recognized, however, the
following limitations: "The issues enumerated above do
not carry equal weight in every question. The amount of
time placed on the various issues will depend on the nature
of the question. But if the proposition be a good debat
able one and be stated affirmatively, the outline suggested
can, with very little modification, be adopted in nineteen
out of twenty cases, and all minor points will fall logi
cally under one of the six special issues," pp. 3-4.
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2.
3.

inherently evil?
Could the evil be removed and the
present plan thus perfected?
Would the present policy or method
of treatment thus perfected be
superior to the one proposed by the
affirmative?*0 '

O'Neill was among the first to include stock issues
in a textbook on argumentation.

Recognizing the impossi

bility of finding formulae "that can be applied to all
different kinds of questions," 10 8 he, nevertheless, suggested
that stock issues might provide a "start" in analyzing
1no
propositions of policy.
O'Neill further considered it
"unsafe" to accept stock issues as "the exact issues."
Why?
First, because analysis may show a more
specific and concrete wording for these
general questions. . . . Second, and princi
pally, because on accurate analysis it may be
found that one of these questions . . . will
break up into say three questions, each of
which must be proved by the affirmative.^ °
107 Gough, "Formulas for Special Issues," p. 6 .
10 8

Pattee had drawn up separate lists of issues for
policy and fact questions. See Pattee, Practical Argumen
tation, 1909 ed., pp. 63-72; 1915 rev. ed., pp. 61-72.
l^o'Neill listed two stock issues: "(1) Is the
present unsatisfactory? Are there evils in the existing
situation? Is there a cause for action? Is there a
disease? Do we need a change? etc. (2) Is the proposed
action an improvement? Will it cure the evils? Is this
the action we should take? Is this the proper remedy? Is
the proposed change the right one?" O'Neill, Laycock, and
Scales, Argumentation and Debate, pp. 56-57.
•^°Ibid., p. 57. The essential test of an issue
was, for 0 'Neill, that it be vital. He also distinguished
issues from points of partition.
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Case
In the first edition of Principles, Baker labeled
the fifth step of analysis "to find the relation to the
central idea of ideas essential in the case." 111
Or, to put it differently, we must decide what
ideas are to be proved true, and in what order,
if the1Ispecial issue is to be settled as we
wish.■L ± *
Baker used an historical example to show the relation of
the issues in a given case, but he gave no specific methods
for determining the structure of the material in a
proposition.
In their 1905 revision, though Baker and Huntington
continued to treat "constructing the case" as a step in
analysis, they devoted less than a page to its discussion,
simply saying:
Even, however, as a student takes the
three steps in analysis,— phrasing the propo
sition, defining the terms, and finding the
special issues, he acquires material which
may be used to support his views or to combat
his opponent's ideas. He must next learn how
to value all this correctly, and hew to mass
it about his special issues so as to give it
the strongest presentation. In this construc
tion of a case a knowledge of evidence and a
knowledge of brief-drawing are essential. 13
Many "early period" writers treated case in terms
of brief-drawing.

Though most outlined the work of

■^^■Baker, Principles, p. 77.
ll2Ibid.
113
Baker and Huntington, Principles, p. 60.
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individual speakers in a debate, they did not call it
case.

These prescriptions appear, therefore, in a later

section of this chapter which examines the forensic.
O'Neill included one of the first modern treatments
of case in his 1917 revision of the Laycock-Scales text.
He laid out, though sketchily, the work of the affirmative
and examined negative alternatives.

Regarding the affirma

tive "case" he said:
The work of the affirmative in a debate
differs somewhat from that of the negative.
The affirmative has the burden of proof in
all properly worded questions. The affirma
tive case then must establish the affirmative
of all issues— ail potential issues not
admitted by the negative. The question should
be analyzed to find the issues. . . . Then a
partition should be decided upon that will
back up the affirmative of all issues on which
there is a fight.
O'Neill also outlined four "types" of negative case:
1.

2.

Pure refutation. The first, and weakest,
negative is a case of pure refutation.
The negative simply attacks what the
affirmative offers and seeks to destroy
it without taking any responsibility for
"the situation." . . . It is simple
denial. It is simply resting on their
presumption and trying by pure refutation
to prevent the affirmative from establish
ing a prima facie case. . . . This type
should never be used when there is any
good or truth at all in the affirmative
contentions. It is practically never found
in contest debating.
Defense of the present. The second type
of negative is a positive "defense of the
present" (in addition to refutation of

'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and
Debate, pp. 376-77.
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3.

4.

course). The affirmative is wrong because
no change is needed at all. . . . This is
little better than pure refutation of the
affirmative, but does have the added ele
ment of actually defending the negative
presumptions. . . .
Adjustment. The third case is one of
adjustment, repairs, some changes, but not
an adoption of the affirmative case. It
is a liberal view of the situation, ready
to make what changes are necessary. Admit
ting the present is not perfect, but still
denying that the affirmative is right, it
substantially defends the present. This
is a very common type of negative in con
test debating and everywhere else. This
case is also cumulative, adding "repairs"
to "defense" and "refutation."
Counter proposition. The most radical case
possible for a negative is that of a counter
proposition. This is admitting that there
is a situation which demands remedy, admit
ting a cause for action, but advocating a
different remedy. . . . There are two prin
ciples that must always be lived up to in
this case: (a) The counter proposition
must be stated with perfect clearness. The
negative has to take the burden of proof on
this proposition, and for safety and clear
ness the proposition must be carefully
worded and stated.
(b) A counter proposi
tion must be counter. It must be mconsistent with the proposition of the
affirmative. ^
The Brief

The Nature of the Brief
Argumentation and debate writers appropriated the
term, brief, f r o m

law to distinguish "a particular kind

*-^Ibid., pp. 377-78.
■'■^Warren C. Shaw felt that claims for the brief
were over-estimated insofar as providing systematic
analysis of debating problems. Shaw said: "As a means for
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of plan or summary that shall have the greatest possible
clearness of exposition with the least number of words."1171
Baker viewed the brief as an outgrowth of analysis.

He

said:
Study of analysis has shown that the
process of finding what is the question to be
discussed and what the work to be done gradu
ally develops in our minds a rough diagram of
the field we are to cover. We learn that
there is one essential idea, or one essential
group of ideas, to prove true or false, and
that a variable number of other ideas bear
certain relations to the special issue and to
one another, and must be taken up with some
regard for this fact. It is evident that to
put this inherent structure on paper must help
us in gathering evidence, for we shall know
what proof will be needed first, and shall
have pockets, so to speak, into which we may
put evidence bearing on the idea with which
each pocket is labeled. 18
For Baker, this plan "must . . .

be something that will

make a person who has not given any special thought to the
securing system in the arrangement of arguments, the brief,
of course, is invaluable; but as a means for securing
systematic analysis of the problem that is to be briefed,
it does scarcely more than to emphasize the necessity of
finding what we are looking for. To be sure, it makes allimportant the discovery of the issues; and it requires
that all material shall be tested by its relevancy to these
issues; but it does not really help us in the practical
operations of analysis, because it does not tell us how to
find the issues. The brief really presupposes that the
work of analysis has been done, and it is in itself the
means of preserving in crystallized form the thought that
has been analyzed." Warren C. Shaw, "Systematic Analysis
of Debating Problems," Quarterly Journal of Public
Speaking, II (October, 1916), 344.
13 7Baker, Principles, p. 85.
118 TIbid.,
, •j
n -3
p. 83.
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case in question see exactly what is to be discussed and
exactly what the student wishes to do with it." 119
It must tell the examiner what the question
is: must, that is, state the proposition;
make clear in what sense important terms are
used; show him the origin of the question;
by making him understand what is generally
admitted in regard to the subject and what
matter usually associated with it is really
extraneous, put the special issue before him;
and make him see clearly what relations the
other ideas bear to the main idea and to one
another. That is, it must convey to another
person just the information that the writer of
the plan found it necessary to gain before he
could treat his topic intelligently. More
over, this outline must convey to a reader an
idea of the general treatment the writer
intends to give the structure just mapped
out, an i^f§r that is, of the nature of his
evidence. 29
Most early writers accepted Baker's rationale of
b r i e f - d r a w i n g . T h e y agreed, moreover, that the forensic
1 nn

was "really but an expansion of the brief itself.

it

was not until 1917 with the revision of Laycock and
Scales's earlier work that O'Neill clearly separated the
brief from the outline of a given speech. 123

The major

developments which culminated in this split follow.
119Ibid., p. 84.
120Ibid., pp. 84-85.
1?1See Alden, Art of Debate, p. 52; Laycock and
Scales, Argumentation and Debate, p. 141; Foster, Argumen
tation and Debating, 1908 ed., pp. 220-42.
■'■^Baker, Principles, p. 269 .
123 O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and
Debate, p. 211.
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Alden believed that the outline or brief "will put
into visible form the results of analysis"; i.e., "the one
or two principle points to be proved," these points pro
viding "the main headings of the outline."12 4
three reasons why an outline is important:

He SUggested

it maps the

argument; it frees the faculties "for the perfecting of
phraseology"; it helps make the structure of the argument
clear to an audience.

TOC

J

Recognizing that "it is all too easy to confuse
the issues with . . .

a partition," Laycock and Scales

made the following distinction:
A partition . . . is a statement of the points
the arguer intends to prove; the issues are
the points he must prove in order to prove his
case. If the points of the partition are well
chosen, they will usually correspond closely
with the issues; but they may be entirely dif
ferent, and they are not in any case neces
sarily identical. 26
Foster perceived the brief to be "an outline guide"
with the following functions:
With one good look at his brief, a writer sees
his whole work in its broad aspects; he under
stands the relation of parts; he perceives the
right arrangement of the main divisions, and
he is able to develop them one by one. He is
Alden did not distinguish between the terms
brief and outline though he used both when discussing a
plan for argument. Alden, Art of Debate, p. 52.
^•^Ibid., pp. 50-51.
^^Laycock and Scales, Argumentation and Debate,
pp. 43-44.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

48

constantly guided by his brief in the selec
tion and rejection of material. It warns
him when he is in danger of inserting evi
dence out of its place, or of omitting evi
dence necessary to the proof. Finally, the
brief serves as a test of the firmness and
logical sequence of the finished s t r u c t u r e . ^^7
In a chapter entitled "Developing the Argument from the
Brief:

Relation of the Brief to the Complete Argument,"

Foster suggested that "the relation of the brief to the
complete written argument may best be seen by observing
them side by side." 128

From his "specimen," it is clear

that Foster perceived "the argument" to be merely a
development of the headings in a brief. 199
Though relying on Laycock and Scales's earlier
distinctions that "the completed brief should contain
130
nearly all the proof of the whole case,"
and though
recognizing that "it sometimes happens that . . . the
brief itself may be the presentation of our argument," 131
O'Neill nevertheless viewed the brief as "impersonal" and
127

Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 1908 ed.,

p. 192.
128 Ibid., p. 219. Foster recommended an exchange
of briefs between opposing teams.
129
Ibid., pp. 220-42. In his 1917 revision,
Foster limited his discussion of developing the argument
from the brief to "principles and qualities of style."
1917 rev. ed., pp. 243-56.
130 See Laycock and Scales, Argumentation and
Debate, p. 142; O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation
and Debate, p. 20 8.
131O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and
Debate, p. 250.
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advocated making an outline for a given speech.

too

He

said:
In drawing up the outline the speaker should
always keep his particular audience in mind,
and adapt his speech carefully to the audience
which he must meet. In preparing an argumen
tative speech one may differ from the order of
the brief as much as is desirable. It is a
mistake to suppose that a brief is always a
good outline for a speech. As a matter of
fact it is rarely if ever so. An outline of
almost any great argument will not coincide
with a brief of the material in the argument.
This is as it should be.-*-33
Formulae for Brief-Drawing
Baker's specific method of brief-drawing was based
on the system "developed during the last five years of the
work in forensics at Harvard College.

The essential

tenets of this system are enunciated in the following
discussion.
For Baker, a good brief ordinarily had three
divisions:
conclusion.

the introduction; the brief proper; and the
In the 189 5 edition of Principles, he outlined

the functions of those divisions:^33
TOO

"The brief is determined by the nature of the
impersonal case which it is possible to build up on our
side of the proposition; the speech outline (or the speech)
is determined by the kind of presentation (both m sub
stance and order) which it is most desirable to make to a
particular audience or set of judges.11 Ibid., ~p~! 213.
133Ibid., p. 211.
^34Baker, Principles, p. 83.
135 Ibid., p. 86.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

50

The Introduction should state as concisely
as possible, by suggestive phrases of a line
or two, the facts necessary to an understand
ing of the discussion: namely, how the ques
tion arose; what are the facts admitted by
both sides; and, by definition and exposition,
what is the exact point at issue. It should
clear away all extraneous matter and should
place the essential idea, or group of ideas,
clearly before the reader. ^
The Brief Proper should, by a series of
headings and sub-headings, very concisely make
clear . . . the development of the argument by
which the writer expects to prove the affirma
tive or the negative of the question he has
clearly stated in the Introduction. The writer
should first select the main ideas that prove
his conclusion. These he should arrange so
that his plan shall show the relations they
naturally bear to one another and to the
essential idea or group of ideas. In arranging
the material he should as far as possible
regard climax. . . . All the main headings and
sub-headings should read as reasons for the
conclusion. The correlation of all the parts
should be distinctly marked by letters and
numbers. '
lot

Baker suggested that "the test of an introduc
tion to a brief is that it shall iupply a reader with what
ever information must be needed by him, if he is to read
the brief proper understanding^.
ibid., p~l 92. He also
insisted that the brief includes "only what both sides must
admit to be true," p. 10 8.
137 Summarizing his discussion of the brief proper,
Baker set forth the basic principles and procedures fol
lowed by later writers. He said: "In the brief proper,
then, a student should state clearly and very succinctly
the ideas by which he hopes to prove the correctness of his
opinion. Separating direct proof from general refutation,
. . . he should phrase his ideas as reasons and connect
them by for and because. Vagueness in phrasing and in
transitions from idea to idea he must carefully avoid. He
must so correlate his ideas that their correct relation
ships one to another will be clear at a glance. He should
remember that one letter or number is enough for one idea.
He should break up and correlate crowded headings. As far
as possible he should aim at climax in arranging his
material." Ibid., p. 150.
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The Conclusion simply sums up briefly the
argument, showing clearly how it has led to a
decision in the case. This decision— unless
it is given at the beginning of the Brief
Proper as the proposition— should always be
stated.138
Laycock and Scales systematically enumerated rules for
brief-drawing.

*j O Q

^

In their revision, Baker and Huntington

also tabulated criteria which "should be memorized and in
the class room may be referred to by number."

That listing

follows:
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.
VIII.

IX.

GENERAL
A brief should be divided into three
parts, marked "Introduction," "Brief
Proper," and "Conclusion."
Ideas should be phrased in complete
statements, arranged in headings and
subheadings.
The relation of each idea to every
other should be indicated by means of
numbers, letters, or other symbols.
A change of symbol should always denote
a change of relation.
Headings or subheadings should never be
marked twice.
INTRODUCTION
The Introduction should contain all the
information necessary for an intelli
gent reading of the Brief Proper.
The Introduction should always contain
a statement of the Special Issues.
In the Introduction ideas bearing upon
the truth or the falsity of the propo
sition in dispute should be so phrased
as not to produce immediate discussion.
In the Introduction the connectives
"for" and "because" should be avoided.

^■^Ibid. , p. 86.
139 Laycock and Scales listed general rules for
brief-drawing along with specialized ones for the intro
duction, brief proper, and conclusion. See Laycock and
Scales, Argumentation and Debate, pp. 142-80.
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X.

XI.

XII.
XIII.
XIV.
XV.

XVI.
XVII.
XVIII.

BRIEF PROPER
In the Brief Proper every main heading
should read as proof of the truth of
the proposition, and every subheading
as proof of the truth of the heading
to which it is subordinate, never as
mere explanation.
The relation between subheadings or
series of subheadings and their head
ings is never expressed by "hence" or
"therefore," but by "for" or "because."
Subheadings should be arranged in the
order of climax, unless this order
violates the logical order.
Each heading or subheading should con
tain but a single proposition.
Refutation should be so phrased as to
make the objection perfectly clear.
Refutation of objections, not to the
proposition, but to details of proof,
should meet such objections where they
arise.
CONCLUSION
The Conclusion should state concisely
the steps by which the decision is
reached.
The Conclusion should never contain
new evidence.
The decision should never qualify the
proposition but should be an affirma
tion or denial of it in its original
form.*40

Early period writers failed to depart significantly
from Baker's system of brief-drawing. Some substitutions
141
of terms occurred.
Various rules were qualified,
rephrased, or shifted from one section to another, 142 and
a few new criteria appeared.

In his 1917 revision, Foster

140 Baker and Huntington, Principles, pp. 256-57.
141
Laycock and Scales called the "brief proper"
discussion, while Foster termed it proof.
142 See Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 1908
ed., pp. 191-218.
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prescribed:

"When two or more statements do not stand in

the relation of proposition and proof, but as coordinate
parts of one piece of evidence, this relationship should
be shown by symbols."

143

And, under "general rules,"

O'Neill added:
Every coordinate series of statements should
be arranged in order of climax, unless this
violates time order in expository matter or
logical order in argumentative matter. 44
O'Neill also suggested that "all references and sources of
information should be accurately stated in the brief, on
the same page on which the information is given."^4^
Proof
Burden of Proof
Though rhetoricians had applied the legal phrases
"burden of proof" and "presumption" to argumentation at
least since the time of Whatley,^-4® Baker largely ignored
the concepts, simply distinguishing presumption from
assumption in a footnote in a section on residues. 147

It

^~*Ibid., 1917 rev. ed., p. 89.
14 4O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and
Debate, p. 213.
14^Ibid. O'Neill introduced the "parallel column"
brief which set out affirmative and negative issues,
pp. 238-39.
146 See Whatley, Elements of Rhetoric, pp. 86-99.
'1'4^Baker relied, moreover, on
Adams S. Hill who defined presumption
proposition "is assumed to be true in
to the contrary." Hill, Rhetoric, p.
Principles, p. 308.

the definition of
as occurring when a
the absence of proof
332, cited in Baker,
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was rather Raymond Alden who gave the terms currency in
the new discipline and identified them with debating.
Believing that legal definitions "are perfectly applicable
. . . to the question of 'burden of proof' in the debate
of ordinary life," Alden turned to legal opinions and legal
treatises. 14ft He relied particularly on the distinctions
of J. B. Thayer who suggested:
In legal discussion, this phrase, "the
burden of proof" is used in several ways. It
marks (1) the peculiar duty of him who has the
risk of any given proposition on which parties
are at issue,— who will lose the case if he
does not make that proposition out, when all
has been said and done. . . . (2) It stands
for the duty . . . of going forward in argu
ment or in producing evidence; whether at the
beginning of a case or at any later moment
throughout the trial or the discussion.
(3) There is an undiscriminated use of the
phrase, perhaps more common than either of the
other two, in which it may mean either or both
of the others.149
Alden tended to equivocate on the controversial
issue of whether burden of proof shifts.

Though pointing

out that "in one sense of the term, the disputant on whom
rests the burden of proof must cheerfully accept it, and
never forget or attempt to evade the responsibility," 150
^■^Alden, Art of Debate, pp. 62-65.
149 James B. Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on
Evidence at the Common Law (Boston: Little, Brown, and
Company, 1896-1898), cited in Alden, Art of Debate,
pp. 65-66; Baker and Huntington, Principles, p~ 40"2.
Alden, Art of Debate, p. 67.
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he recognized that "on the other hand, as in law, there
is a sense in which the burden of proof may shift back and
forth. "•'-51 Alden summarized his position as follows:
Briefly to recapitulate: the burden of
proof is, in the first place, the obligation
resting upon the affirmative to prove the
proposition it lays down at the outset,— an
obligation which it never escapes; and, in
the second place, the obligation of either
disputant to produce proof at any moment
when, in the absence of such proof, the other
side would be judged to be in the right. In
a word, it is simply the demand of the
audience: Show your proof, if we are to
believe!152
ICO
Alden's approach had much influence.
Baker and
Huntington, for example, followed his distinctions, even
citing his authorities, in their 190 5 revision of
Principles.l^4

Foster, moreover, stated that "the propo

sition should be so phrased as to place the burden of
Ibid. Alden went on to point out that "at the
close of his argument, then, a prima facie case will have
to be made for his [affirmative's! side, and the burden
will be upon the negative to show why his claim cannot be
maintained," p. 67. He further suggested that: "In a
sense, of course, any proof offered by the affirmative at
the opening of a debate, is a means cf shifting the burden
of proof; but very commonly the most convenient method of
doing so is to establish a presumption in favor of the
proposition by showing that it is more reasonable, on the
face of it, than the opponents have supposed," pp. 69-70.
152Ibid., pp. 75-76.
163Laycock and Scales avoided the whole issue
of "shift." They simply advised that "the burden of
establishing the truth of any statement rests upon the
person who originally makes the assertion." Laycock and
Scales, Argumentation and Debate, pp. 62-63.
^54Baker and Huntington, Principles, p. 402.
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proof upon the affirmative and make the presumption in favor
of the negative” though he recognized that "the burden of
proof and presumption vary with time and place."155

poster

agreed that "all argument is intended to shift the actual
burden of proof, "156 but decried the use of technicalities
to accomplish this end.
had been made ofburden
debating.157

He believed that much too much
of proof and presumption in

Hugh Wells did not agree, arguing rather that

burden of proof should be the most significant factor in
determining the outcome of a debate.

Wells queried:

Why is it impossible to see who wins a
debate? Why is it difficult for a judge who
is experienced in weighing evidence to follow
the shifting burden of the issue and to deter
mine whether the burden of proof has been
carried successfully?
The difficulty arises from the fact that
these burdens are not clearly defined.
The "burden of proof" is the duty resting
upon the affirmative to establish a prima
facie case in respect of the main proposition,
by a preponderance of the evidence and rests
upon the affirmative throughout. It does not
shift. This burden is not onerous, for it
only requires the establishing of a prima
facie case, and the maintenance of that case
to the end of the debate. It does not require
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
"The burden of the issue" is the duty
resting intermittently upon both the affirma
tive and the negative to produce evidence in
respect of the subsidiary questions arising
out of the main proposition. Issues are the
155poster, Argumentation and Debating, 1908 ed.,
p . 282.
l56Ibid., p. 283.
^ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

57

subsidiary questions which arise out of and
are inherent in the main proposition. As is
said by Professor Ketcham, on page 29 of his
work upon Argumentation and Debate:
"The burden of proof never 'shifts'; it
is duty of producing evidence which
'shifts.'"158
Though O'Neill recognized the two legal denotations
of the term "burden of proof," he limited its meaning in
argumentation to the "risk of the proposition." 159

As

such, he precluded the shifting of the burden of proof,
introducing, rather, into argumentation the phrase

burden

of rebuttal"'*'60 invented by Dean H. W. Ballentine, a legal
writer. ^'6'*' O'Neill summarized as follows:
1.
2.

3.

The burden of proof, then, always rests
upon the actual affirmative.
The affirmative is the party who will lose
if no evidence or argument is offered— if
nothing is done. The affirmative is the
dissatisfied party, the one who wants a
change, the attacking party.
Care must be taken that propositions be so
phrased that the actual affirmative and
nominal affirmative coincide, that the
affirmation of the proposition is actually
ICQ

Hugh Neal Wells, "Judging Debates," Quarterly
Journal of Public Speaking, III (October, 1917), 343.
159
O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and
Debate, p. 35.
160
Ibid. O'Neill contended that: "The duty of
going forward with evidence or argument at any given time,
of course, may shift from time to time in the course of the
trial or discussion. But the proper term to apply to this
shifting burden is neither 'burden of proof' nor 'duty of
going forward,' but 'burden of rebuttal.' This 'burden of
rebuttal' may shift."
W. Ballentine, "Apportionment of Proof and
the Burden of Rebuttal," Law Notes, December, 1912, p. 168.
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4.

5.

taken by the one upholding the burden of
the controversy. . . .
When the affirmative has carried its
burden of proof sufficiently to establish
a prima facie case, it has created for the
negative a burden of rebuttal.
The burden of rebuttal (a more accurate
term than "the duty of going forward with
argument or evidence") may shift from side
to side during the conduct of the debate.-1-62
The Nature of Proof
Law, logic, and rhetoric provided the concepts of

evidence and reasoning inherent in most modern approaches
to argumentative proof.

Difficulties arose early, however,

over the "proper" relationship of the elements of proof.
In the first edition of Principles, Baker relied on the
definition of a contemporary legal writer, William Best,
who determined proof to be "anything which serves, either
immediately or mediately, to convince the mind of the truth
or the falsehood of a fact or proposition."

Baker

reflected briefly on the relation of evidence to proof and
then turned to a discussion of evidence.

In his chapter

on "Evidence," he contended:
Whatever, then, a writer or speaker offers in
support of his statements— quotations, logical
deductions, skillful analysis, illustrations,
figures, etc., etc.— is, taken as a whole, his
proof of their truth. Each portion of his
1.62

O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and
Debate, pp. 38-39.
163Wiiiiam M. Best, On Evidence, Chamberlayne's ed.
(Boston: Boston Book Company, 190 8), cited in Baker,
Principles, p. 180.
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proof is evidence, for the latter is 11that
which generates proof. Any matter of fact,
the effect/ tendency/ or design of which is
to produce in the mind a persuasion affirma
tive or disaffirmative of the existence of
some other matter of f a c t . 1^4
Recognizing that "the attempt to classify processes
of proof has always been the bugbear of students of argu
mentation," Alden postulated that "reduced to its lowest
terms, all our processes of reasoning, great and small
are simply inferences based on experience.”

He identified

three classes of proof for legal argument— facts,
authority, and reasoning— and discussed them in relation
to argumentation."^®®
Laycock and Scales divided proof into evidence and
arguments, differentiating the terms as follows:
1.

2.

Evidence consists of all matters of fact
that may be used in the generating of
proof. It is the raw material from which
the finished product, proof, is to be
manufactured.
Argument, in its restricted meaning, is
the name used to designate the process by
which, from knowing the existence of one
fact, or a certain number of facts, we
infer the existence of other facts. This
meaning of the word "argument" must not be
confused with other meanings. The word
may be used to refer to a finished dis
course as a whole; it may refer to an
entire debate or discussion; or, as here,
it may mean simply a single process of
reasoning. There is, perhaps, no better
definition of an argument, in this sense,
than Cardinal Newman's definition of
reason, as "any process or act of the mind
164Ibid.
^®®Alden, Art of Debate, pp. 77-86.
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by which, from knowing one thing, it
advances on to know another!" . . .An
argument is the machinery by which the
raw material, evidence, is turned into
the finished product, proof.
In the 1905 edition of Principles, Baker and
Huntington recognized the need to revise "the difficult
subject of evidence, especially refutation.

16 7

Though

defining evidence and proof in essentially the same terms
as the first edition,

16 o

Baker and Huntington included the

notion of evidence as the material of proof in their
revision.
Foster held steadfastly to Baker's delineation of
1CQ
reasoning as a kind of evidence. D
Yet, his own treatment
^^Laycock and Scales defined proof essentially as
had Baker. See Laycock and Scales, Argumentation and
Debate, p. 59.
167 Baker and Huntington, Principles, p. v.
16 8Baker and Huntington continued to delineate
reasoning as a form of evidence, defining the "broad field
of evidence" to include "facts, reasoning, and authorita
tive opinions." Ibid., p. 72. Baker and Huntington
examined causes for disagreement and concluded that "since
all evidence— the material of proof— consists of inferences
from experience and is open to disagreement, it is impor
tant that students train themselves in selecting and
presenting evidence." They listed the three following
causes of disagreement:
"(1) because one man's experience
is different from that of another; (2) because he draws
his opinions from a different authority; (3) because the
inferences drawn from the same experience differ,"
pp. 78-82.
1 6Q

"The first kind of evidence— testimony of
authorities as to facts— we shall consider at once. The
second kind of evidence— reasoning about facts— we shall
consider in the three succeeding chapters." Foster, Argu
mentation and Debating, 1908 ed., p. 56; 1917 rev. ed.,
p. 97.
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of proof balanced the two elements.

Citing a contemporary

legal treatise, Wharton's Criminal Evidence, which defined
proof as "the sufficient reason for assenting to a proposition as true," 170 Foster concluded that:
The material of Proof is Evidence. Evidence
is everything which ought to bring or tend to
bring the mind to the conviction of the truth
or falsity of a proposition. The finding
and employing of Evidence is the business of
argumentation.^71
O'Neill recognized that the term proof is used to
refer to the "effect of evidence" as well as to the "medium
172
by which truth is established."
He followed, neverthe
less, Laycock and Scales in determining evidence and argu
ment to be "subdivisions" of proof.
Finding the Material of Proof
Most early period writers at least mentioned the
gathering, selection, and tabulation of the materials of
proof.

Baker summarized his chapter on the preparatory

reading for argumentation as follows:
170 Francis Wharton, A Treatise on the Law of
Evidence in Criminal Issues (8th ed.; Philadelphia: Kay
and Brothers, 1880) , p. 3*i
171
Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 1908 ed.,
p. 51; 1917 rev. ed., p. 92.
172
O'Neill relied primarily on distinctions by
Best and Greenleaf. Best, On Evidence, p. 5; Simon
Greenleaf, Law of Evidence, 3 Vols. (1st ed.; Boston:
C. C. Little and J. Brown, 1842-1853), cited in O'Neill,
Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and Debate, p. 82.
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In brief, then, in preparing for the
discussion of a proposition a student should
(1) examine the content of his own mind on the
subject and clear it for action; (2) strive to
understand the case for his opponent as well
as he does his own; (3) read (a) widely,
(b) with careful, critical consideration of
the material for and against him; and (4) by
passing all the material through his own
thought transmute it into new shapes, give it
a new significance, impart to it something of
himself,— in a word, make it his own,^-^
Baker also cited specific "rules" for quoting and para
phrasing the writings of others. ^74

Alden specified

procedures for tabulating materials in addition to general
comments on the gathering of material.

Laycock and

Scales advised using a notebook when reading; suggested
an "effective method" for reading from general to specific
recommended reading on both sides of a question; and dis
cussed what to look for in reading, assimilation being
their ultimate aim.^7^

Baker and Huntington omitted

Baker's entire chapter on materials.

Foster limited his

discussion to the selection, use, and recording of
evidence.^77

O'Neill, on the other hand, expanded Laycock

and Scales's original treatment of gathering material and
i7o

Baker, Principles, p. 175.

174Ibid., p. 172.
^■7^See Alden, Art of Debate, pp. 44-50.
-*-7^Laycock and Scales, Argumentation and Debate,
pp. 47-57.
177Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 1908 ed. ,
pp. 76-80.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

63

included a systematic plan for reading, recording, and
assimilating materials.

*| 70

Kinds of Proof
Disagreeing on the nature of proof and the relation
of evidence to reasoning, early writers in argumentation
also failed to concur on systems of classification.

They

did, however, follow Baker in precluding assertion as
proof.

Pointing out that unsupported assertion is "safe"

only in argument from authority, Baker had said:
There are men and books which are regarded
as authorities on the subjects they treat, and
their testimony as to facts and inferences
from facts is accepted unquestioningly. . . .
These men give, not a careful statement of the
reasons for a belief held by them, but merely
an unsupported statement of another; that is,
they use the so-called Argument from Authority.
When it is proper to use this, then, and then
only, is an unqualified affirmation of some
thing as true permissible.1^9
Baker cited numerous examples illustrating the
proper support of assertion.

Having observed in his first

edition that evidence in argumentation is bound by none of
the rules of evidence in the law courts, he, nevertheless,
borrowed from law and rhetoric the following classifica
tions of evidence:

testimonial and circumstantial; direct

and indirect; and argument from antecedent probability,
i7o

'“O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and
Debate, pp. 68-80.
179

Baker, Principles, p. 177.
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sign and example. 180

Dissatisfied with these distinctions,

Baker proposed a complicated fourth possible division of
evidence which attempted to classify arguments according
to resemblance. 181 He summarized this system in a detailed
chart 189 and explained its significance as follows:
This chart shows, then, that it is pos
sible to divide the field of evidence on the
basis of completeness of resemblance between
two phenomena, and that in so doing a student
moves by graduated steps from a resemblance
that has no probative value to complete
resemblance. It must make clear, too, that
this method of division but renames what has
already been considered as Direct and Indirect
(or Circumstantial) Evidence; or as the Argu
ment from Antecedent Probability, the Argument
from Sign, and the Argument from Example. The
chart shows, also, that all Evidence must be
1 ftfi

Ibid. Baker distinguished the rhetorical
classification as follows: "The argument from Antecedent
Probability tries to account for something that is assumed
to be true,— to find a motive for it," p. 20 2. The Argument from Sign, as defined by Whately, "is an inference,
from a part of a process, object, or fact, of the presence
of another part, or of the whole,— is an argument from
an effect to a condition," p. 203. Cited from Richard
Whately, Elements of Logic (New York: Sheldon and Company,
1869). "The Argument from Example rests on the idea that
objects which resemble each other in two or more respects,
connected with the point in discussion, will resemble each
other in this particular point." Baker, Principles,
p. 204.
181
This scheme included "argument from a
resemblance which, if it be found that the result really
occurred, may have produced this result; argument from a
resemblance known in a past case to be an essential part
of a process leading to the result in question; argument
from a series of such resemblances; and argument from com
plete resemblance," p. 206. Baker's system was strongly
influenced by Fletcher and Carpenter, Introduction to
Theme-Writing.
1 89

Baker, Principles, pp. 213-14.
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from a man's own experience or from that of
other men.^°3
The 1905 revision of Principles abandoned Baker's
chart and detailed prescriptions but not his conviction
of the value of arguing from resemblances.

It revealed,

moreover, a clearer and more coherent view of evidence:
Evidence . . . consisting of facts, the
opinions of authorities, and reasoning (infer
ences from the facts or opinions) can be clas
sified as testimonial and circumstantial,
facts and opinions being testimonial and
inferences being circumstantial. Testimonial
evidence needs no subdivision beyond the
natural division into facts and the opinions
of authorities, since the same tests are
applicable to all witnesses and to all
authorities. Circumstantial evidence, how
ever, can be more surely tested if we sub
divide it into deductive and inductive
reasoning. Deductive reasoning, moreover,
for our purposes may be tested without con
sidering the subdivision which formal logic
applies to it. Inductive reasoning, on the
other hand, it is helpful to separate somewhat
arbitrarily into generalizations, arguments
based on a causal relationship and arguments
based on resemblance.
Most of the early writers at least mentioned the
common classifications of evidence to which Baker had
referred.

IOC

They also agreed that evidence includes both

183Ibid., p. 214.
184
Baker and Huntington, Principles, p. 109.
185
O'Neill added real evidence to his classifica
tion. O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and
Debate, pp. 90-92. He cited Best's definition: "By real
evidence is meant evidence of which any object belonging
to the class of things is the source, persons also being
included, in respect to such qualities as belong to them
in common with things." Best, On Evidence, p. 16.
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facts and authoritative opinions.
reasoning.

The rub came with

In an attempt to minimize Formal Logic in

argument, Baker had treated reasoning as subsidiary to
evidence.

Though he did not reject the logical substratum

of argument, Baker did not detail its processes.
took them for granted.
a different tack.

He simply

At least two early writers took

Both Elias MacEwan, writing in 1898,

and Gertrude Buck, writing in 1899, viewed logical reason
ing as the core of proof, and their respective texts
emphasized Formal Logic as central to a study of
argumentation.187
Though many early writers applied Baker's label
of "practical argumentation" to their own systems, rela
tively few were content to reject the rigid super-structure
of Formal Logic.

Pedagogically, Formal Logic provided the

security of a concrete and time-honored subject matter;
its terminology made possible precise differentiation;
and, its historical roots gave its result the aura of
"truth."

Baker's notion that such a system bears little

relation to the "argumentation of everyday life" seems to
have gotten lost in the jargon.

Baker, moreover, was able

to offer no concrete, teachable alternative.

In his most

precise description of this "practical application" of
logic, he said:
■^^See Baker, Principles, Ch. I.
187 MacEwan, Essentials of Argumentation; Buck,
Argumentative Writing.
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When we argue, we try to make a listener
or reader believe that this or that is true,
because for the reasons, a, b, £, it seems to
us true, and because the special exciting
interest, d, that the idea has for him, must
stir him to act on the belief that we are
seeking to inculcate. . . . These reasons with
which we support our belief are but thoughts,
and all argumentation is an aggregation of
reasonings, or varied processes of thought.
Even, however, in the simplest reasoning some
structure is involved, for we do not think at
random, and it is evident that it may have
been possible to examine these processes of
thinking, to study their structure, and to
derive rules of correct thinking therefrom.
This has been possible, and the result is
called Logic, "the science of the laws of
thought," or that which teaches us to know how
to think correctly.^88
Those writers who followed Baker approached
reasoning in varying ways, though in general they moved
collectively toward a greater dependence on Formal Logic.
Alden opted for a rhetorical approach.

Believing that the

induction-deduction distinction "is only a matter of the
point of view taken," 189 he examined "processes of
reasoning," "according as they are based on matters before
the fact in dispute" (antecedent probability and analogy
or example), and "on matters after the fact" (a
posteriori) .19 0
Laycock and Scales differentiated argumentation
18 8Baker, Principles, pp. 13-14. Baker's "reasons
for" argument corresponded to certain modern theories of
the enthymeme.
189Alden, Art of Debate, p. 78.
190
Ibid., pp. 86-98.
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from Formal Logic both in method and

p u r p o s e .

^1

They

ignored the induction-deduction distinctions altogether
and suggested that the classification of arguments should
"make clear, as far as possible, on what the strength of
the various kinds of arguments depends.1119 2 Insisting
that "in nearly every argument the validity of one infer
ence depends upon a connection of cause and effect between
the facts from which we infer and the facts to which we
infer," they determined that "this connection is, . . .
in most cases, the source of strength or weakness in the
reasoning." 19 3

Laycock and Scales's own particular system

of classification, however, which divided arguments into
antecedent probability, sign, and example, paralleled that
of "nearly all writers on the subject of rhetoric." 19 4
191x"Logic aims merely to investigate and explain
'the operations and processes of thought,'" while argumen
tation purposes "to make practical rules and suggestions
which will facilitate correct reasoning and the producing
of beliefs in the minds of others." Laycock and Scales,
Argumentation and Debate, p. 84. They explained, moreover
that "Logic explains the different ways in which the mind
may work in making an inference or reasoning," while
argumentation wishes "to make clear the rules that must be
followed in order to make arguments that will be valuable
for the purpose of convincing and persuading others,"
pp. 84-85.
192
Ibid., p. 86.

194

Ibid., p. 85. Laycock and Scales divided
argument from sign into arguments from effect to cause,
effect to effect, and association of phenomena in the past
They treated generalization and analogy as types of argu
ment from example, pp. 95-113.
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Foster examined the relation of argumentation and
logic similarly to, though more precisely than, Laycock
and Scales. 19 5

Though insisting that "an extensive study

of Formal Logic is not necessary,"196 Foster, nevertheless,
detailed the rules and structure of the syllogism, "the
IQ n

usual form in which logic presents reasoning." ^

He

advised, moreover, "any one who does not understand the
nature of the false inferences resulting from a violation
of these rules . . .

to study . . . some elementary

treatise," and recommended W. S. Jevons' Primer of
Logic.198
Recognizing deficiencies in the methods of Formal
Logic as applied to argumentation, Foster relied on the
rationale of probability in argument:
Whereas syllogistic logic sets forth the
conditions under which a conclusion is neces
sarily true, argumentation, on the other hand,
195 See Foster, Argumentation and Debating,
1908 ed., pp. 85-86.
196
Ibid., p. 88. He went so far as to suggest that
"an extensive study of syllogistic logic is not only of
little help to a student of argumentation and debating,
but . . . may actually prove a hindrance," pp. 89-90.
Referring to the danger of overlooking "attendant circum
stances," he substantiated his view by citing the logicians
Alfred Sidgwick and Bernard Bosanquet. Sidgwick, Process
of Argument, p. 74; Bernard Bosanquet, Essentials of Logic
(London: Macmillan Company, 1895), p. 99.
197
Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 1908 ed.,
p. 86. He also defined the enthymeme as "a syllogism with
one or more of its propositions suppressed."
19 8
Ibid., p. 87. Jevons, Primer of Logic.
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is concerned mainly with attempts to show
merely that the chances are in favor of the
truth of a given conclusion, under condi
tions which demand action at the same time
that they preclude the possibility of ade
quate tests of t r u t h . 199
In his own discussion of proof, Foster utilized "a classi
fication provided by the science of logic," inductive and
deductive argument.

He defined the processes as follows:

The process of reasoning by which we
arrive at a general law through the observa
tion of particulars is called inductive
reasoning. . . . The opposite process, by
which from a general law we draw a conclusion
with regard to a particular case, is called
deductive reasoning. . . . Inductive argument
is inference from the specific to the general;
deductive argument is inference from the
general to the specific.200
Within this framework, Foster set forth a representative
and detailed analysis of the "typical forms of inductive
and deductive reasoning," argument from example and
argument from causal relation.

Though his treatment of

these "kinds" of reasoning was clearer in the 1917 revi
sion, it did not differ appreciably in content from his
1908 pronouncements.
Foster divided argument from example into two
parts;

generalization and analogy.

he meant imperfect induction.
trouble.

By generalization,

Analogy gave him more

Having cited the wide disagreement among writers
•*-^Ibid., p. 89; 1917 rev. ed., p. 126.
2°°Ibid., 1908 ed., pp. 91-92.
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over the meaning of the term, 201 Foster incorporated the
logician William Minto's definition into his own treatise:
In the argument from analogy the ground
of inference is the resemblance between two
individual objects in a certain number of
points; and the inference is that they
resemble one another in some other point,
known to belong to the one, but not known
to belong to the other. ®2
By 1917, Foster had crystallized his own thinking and
described the argument from analogy as
201

Foster pointed out m footnotes in both editions
that Baker followed Whately in confining the term analogy
to resemblances "not so much in the things themselves as in
the relations in which things stand to other things. . . .
'Thus an egg and a seed are not in themselves alike, but
bear a like relation to the parent bird and to her young
nestling, on the one hand, and to the old and young plant
on the other, respectively.' Genung regards an argument
from analogy as one which takes 'relations that exist in
one sphere of life or experience, as indications of what
may be regarded as true of another sphere whose relations
are similar.' But whether the argument is based on simi
larity between objects in the same sphere of life or in
different spheres of life, and whether the argument is
based on similarity in the objects or in relations, the
force of the argument depends on precisely the same condi
tions; we should apply the same tests, and expose its
insufficiency by the same methods. For practical purposes,
therefore, the distinctions would hardly be worth insisting
upon, even if there were any agreement among writers. In
this chapter, the term Argument from Analogy is used in the
wider sense to include all arguments from example which do
not amount to an induction, that is to say, all arguments
from resemblance in which the operating principle is sup
pressed. Anyone who prefers the term Argument from
Resemblance for the whole class, with the Argument from
Analogy as a sub-class, can readily make the distinction."
Ibid., 1917 rev. ed., p. 150. See also 1908 ed.,
pp. 109-110.
20 2

William Mmto, Logic: Inductive and Deductive
(London, 1893), p. 368, cited in Foster, Argumentation and
Debating, 1908 ed., p. 109.
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the inference that if two objects resemble
one another in certain points/ they also
resemble one another in some other point,
known to belong to the one, but not known
to belong to the other. . . . An argument
from analogy is, therefore, that kind of
argument from example which steps from one
particular case to another particular case.
It does not amount to a complete or even
attempted generalization. 03
In his first edition, Foster had insisted that analogy
"may create an exceedingly high degree of probability,
but never conclusive p r o o f . " I n the 1917 revision,
he noted that argument from analogy "taken alone should
205
rarely be regarded as conclusive proof."
Believing that the ultimate justification of all
argumentation is causation, Foster concluded that:
We may derive considerable help in our own
reasoning by studying arguments which direct
attention to causal connections. All such
arguments proceed from effect to cause, from
cause to effect, or from effect to effect.
All rest on the universal belief in causation:
nothing happens without sufficient cause. 06
in')
Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 1917
rev. ed., pp. 150-51.
204
Ibid., 1908 ed., p. 112.
205
Ibid., 1917 rev. ed., p. 152.
^ ^ Ibid., 1908 ed., p. 124; 1917 rev. ed. , p. 170.
Foster equated effect to cause argument with a posteriori
reasoning and cause to effect with a priori reasoning. He
suggested, moreover, that the latter *is sometimes called
argument from antecedent probability." He concluded,
however, that "the use of the latter term is so much con
fused that we have thought best to get along without it;
though the argument itself is illustrated under various
topics," 1908 ed., pp. 125, 132.
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Foster attempted to bring "the so-called 'argument from
sign'" within the framework of causation.

Pointing out

that most writers, though using the classification
"argument from sign" disagree on definition, he said:
If we made no mistake when we asserted . . .
that all arguments rest on generalization,
stated or implied, and that no argument,
not even a generalization itself can commend
itself to a rational mind, except on the
assumption that a causal relation exists, we
ought to be able to explain all so-called
arguments from sign by reference to generali
zation or causation, or both.2®7
O'Neill recognized that forms of arguments are
classified and studied mainly from two points of view—
logic and rhetoric.

He examined the "kinds" of arguments

applicable to rhetoric using the traditional outline
employed by Laycock and Scales:
sign, and example.

antecedent probability,

His section on logic, however, was

new.
O'Neill differentiated Formal Logic from argumen
tation much as had his predecessors.

He went further,

however, to suggest that "anyone who is trained in argu
mentation should be familiar with the vocabulary of argument whether he ever makes practical use of it or not.

20 8

O'Neill synthesized the views of certain contemporary
logicians toward deduction, induction, and the syllogism,
admitting that his own discussion was "taken almost
207Ibid., pp. 137-38.
208O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and
Debate, p. 116.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

75

entirely from the standard text-books of recognized
authorities on logic (Jevons, Creighton, Bode, Hibben,
Hyslop, Sidgwick)."209

O'Neill included the notion

that the real process of inference is the same in induc
tion and deduction, the object being a "necessary connection of facts according to some general principle," 210
and he reasserted the "mutual dependence" of the
processes.2^
O'Neill included Hyslop's detailed description
of the kinds of induction:
inductive method. 212

perfect; imperfect; and the

He also expanded Laycock and

Scales's original discussion of John Stuart Mill's methods
of induction which had appeared in their section of
fallacies. 213

Both texts, however, quoted from Jevons'

analysis rather than directly from Mill's work. 214
as Mill, began with causation.

Jevons,

Wishing to "supplement"

rather than "supercede" the old logic, Mill had isolated
certain methods for discovering causal connections and
had arrived at four variants of induction by elimination:

21°Ibid., p. 119.
2~^Ibid., p. 120.
212

Hyslop, Elements of Logic, pp. 29 5-9 8.

213

Baker and Huntington also included certain of
Mill's distinctions in their discussion of fallacies.
Baker and Huntington, Principles, pp. 144-46.
2^S e e Jevons, Lessons in Logic, pp. 239-53.
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agreement; difference; residues; and concomitant variations.

21

K

O'Neill included these as methods appropriate

for argumentation.
O'Neill examined deductive reasoning through
exploring the syllogism, 216 sorites, inferences in quantitative relations, 217 and enthymemes. 218

He agreed,

moreover, with Sidgwick's analysis of the weaknesses of
the syllogism for assessing the strength of inferences. 219
Tests of Proof
Whereas the early writers in argumentation had
clashed on the nature and kinds of proof, they largely
agreed on its tests.

Disparities arose primarily with

regard to terminology and emphasis, differences which
215

See John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic
(New York: Harper, 1852) .
216
O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and
Debate, pp. 131-33. He quoted extensively from Jevons*
Lessons in Logic, lifting rules of the syllogism and defi
nitions of premises and terms directly from his work.
Jevons, Lessons in Logic, pp. 127-29.
217
O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and
Debate, pp. 133-35. O'Neill cited Bode on sorites and
"inferences in quantitative relations." B. H. Bode, An
Outline of Logic (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1910),
pp. 78-80.
218 O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and
Debate, pp. 135-36. O'Neill quoted Creighton's definition
of an enthymeme as an argument with one premise lacking.
J. F. Creighton, Introductory Logic (New York: Macmillan
Company, 1907), p. 41.
219 See Sidgwick, Process of Argument, p. 46.
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reflected the various authors' predispositions regarding
the nature and kinds of proof.

The same general princi

ples, however, pervaded most of the early works.

Repre

sentative methods of detailing these tests follow.
In the first edition of Principles of Argumenta
tion, Baker set forth "the place of rules of evidence in
argumentation."

"We must learn," he said, "not only how to

attack incorrect drawing of conclusions from data given,
but how to test whether the data are correctly
reported." 2 20

Baker included external tests which corre

sponded to traditional tests of evidence and internal
tests which essentially evaluated reasoning.

Tests which

examine evidence externally, he said,
consider the man who gives the testimony, the
conditions under which it was given, whether
the evidence as a whole coincides with other
testimony known to be true, whether it is
self-contradictory; they do not say: "Is
there anything faulty in the process of
thought, the logic that has produced the
opinion?" If they did, they would not be
external, but internal tests. . . .
The external tests ask: "Is there good
reason to think that the evidence, if inter
nally examined, will be found to be logically
unsound?" The internal tests ask rather:
"Just what is the logical unsoundness of the
argument?"
The examination of evidence for internal
weaknesses is a search for fallacies. By a
fallacy is meant any unsound mode of arguing
which appears to demand our conviction, and
to be decisive of the question in hand, when
in fairness it is
n o t .

220
221

^ 1

Baker, Principles, p. 20.
Ibid., pp. 242-43.

Baker used Whately's

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

78

Baker's list of tests may be catalogued as follows:
I.

External Tests:
A.

B.

C.

Testing the Statement
1.

Evidence should be consistent with
ordinary experience.

2.

Evidence should be consistent with the
other known facts of the case.

3.

Evidence should be consistent with
itself.

Testing the Conditions Under Which the
Statement Was Made
1.

Is the witness willing or reluctant?

2.

Was the testimony given under
compulsion?

Examining the Witness Himself
1.

Is the evidence prejudicial, does it
show personal interest?

2.

Is the witness intellectually strong?

3.

Are the physical powers of the witness
sound?

4.

What is the moral character of the
witness? Is he naturally truthful?

definition of a fallacy. See Whately, Elements of Logic,
1869, p. 168. Baker included three kinds of evidence
which he believed were trustworthy in themselves and
which, therefore, needed no testing. He labeled them as
follows: undesigned testimony; negative testimony; and
hurtful admissions or concessions. Baker, Principles,
p. 238. Here Baker is indebted to Genung. Baker con
tended, however, that "of these three kinds of evidence,
although all three are self-commendatory, only hurtful
admissions are convincing without the successful applica
tion of one of the other tests of evidence already
considered," p. 241.
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II.

Internal Tests of Evidence:
A.

B.

Fallacies Arising from Lack of Definition
1.

Words with two common meanings left
undefined.

2.

Using at will different meanings of the
same word.

3.

Words used as identical because they
look alike.

4.

Confusion of the etymological and the
common meanings of a word.

5.

Unexplained words used with meanings
which do not belong to them.

The Fallacy, Begging the Question, Petitio
Principii
1.

Assuming the truth of an unsupported
assumption which is equivalent to the
conclusion or results from it.

2.

Undue assumption of a premise as true.
a.

Stating without support what should
be proved true.

b.

Two fallacies arising from an
attempt to find a cause for an
effect.
1) Mistaking a sign for a cause
2) Post hoc ergo propter hoc

C.

c.

Arguing from a false assumption.

d.

Referring to ambiguous evidence as
if it could have but one
interpretation.

The Fallacy, Ignoring the Question,
Ignoration Elenchi
1.

Direct ignoring of the question.

2.

The fallacious use of the argumentum
ad hominem.
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3.

Shifting ground.

4.

The fallacy of objections.

5.

Proving something true of a part
only, not of the whole. 22

In addition to labeling fallacies, Baker pointed out that
a conclusion is not necessarily true or false because a
premise is.

Neither is a premise necessarily true or

false because a conclusion is.

He included in this dis

cussion the non sequitur argument, "the name applied to an
argument whenever the conclusion does not logically follow
223
from the two statements from which it is drawn."
The 1905 revision of Principles incorporated
Baker's original listings and terminology relative to
external tests of evidence.

The discussion of internal

tests (fallacies), however, differed from the first edition
in arrangement, emphasis, and, to a lesser extent, in
content.

Here Baker and Huntington examined three sources

of fallacies:

lack of definition; errors of observation;

and errors in reasoning.

The section on definition closely

followed Baker's earlier edition.

The second division,

fallacies arising from errors of observation, was entirely
new.

Relying on John Stuart Mill's analysis, Baker and

Huntington contended that "non-observation and erroneous
observation result in errors due to inattention or to
222jbid., pp. 220-68, passim.
223

Ibid., p. 245.
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preconceived theory, in the neglect of significant
circumstances, and in the confusion of an incorrect infer
ence with a direct sense impression."^24

Their discussion

of the third major source of fallacies, those arising from
erroneous reasoning, combined two major divisions of
fallacies labeled in the 189 5 edition of Principles
(begging the question and ignoring the question) with hasty
generalization and non sequitur arguments.

A subdivision

of these areas resulted in a representative, if not comprehensive, check list of fallacious argument. ^
Most writers who followed Baker related fallacies
to refutation.

Alden's only discussion of tests of proof

came in a chapter entitled "Methods of Refutation" where
he suggested:
In general, one may refute the argument of
an opponent either (1) by showing that the
facts in the case are not true as alleged; or
(2) that the fact being admittedly as alleged,
the inferences drawn from them are incorrect;
or (3) that the alleged facts are not true,
and that even if they
true, the infer
ences are unwarranted.22°
Alden's particulars incorporated tests of facts, opinions,
224Baker and Huntington, Principles, p. 166.
22^Baker felt no further classification of
fallacies was necessary for the student of argumentation.
Rather, within this broad framework, he recognized falla
cies when he confronted them. For other detailed treat
ments of fallacies see Buck, Argumentative Writing, p. 94,
and MacEwan, Essentials of Argumentation, pp. 97-10 8.
22®Alden, Art of Debate, pp. 128-29.
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examples/ and causal reasoning. 227

He treated fallacies

as "gaps" in the reasoning process 228 and labeled the
reductio ad absurdum and the dilemma as "particular"
methods of refutation.
Laycock and Scales examined tests of proof from
several different perspectives.

They included specific

"methods of refuting" arguments from antecedent proba
bility, sign, and example,^29 devoted an entire chapter to
227Ibid., pp. 107-117.
22p
JAlden's listing of fallacies was similar to
Baker's .
229
These "methods" may be outlined as follows:
I. Antecedent Probability
A. Is the connection of the cause and effect
complete?
B. Is the cause adequate to produce the effect in
question?
C. The operation of other causes in the case in
question may prevent the action of the assumed
cause.
D. Might not the fact in question be accounted for
by the action of some other cause?
II. Arguments from Sign
A. Argument from effect to cause.
1. May not the known effect be due to some other
cause than the one alleged?
2. Is the alleged cause capable of being the
real cause of the effect in question?
B. Argument from effect to effect.
C. Arguments from the association of phenomena in
the past.
1. Point out that the cases are too few to
establish a law of occurrence.
2. Produce definite examples where the one
phenomenon has occurred without the other.
III. Argument from Example
A. Argument by generalization
1. The resemblance between the cases given as
examples must be such as to justify the
making of a general law concerning them.
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fallacies, 2 3 0 and in a later section advised "exploring
fallacies" as one of "certain peculiar methods of arranging
and presenting the material of destructive proof.
Foster presented tests of evidence and arguments,
fallacies, and special methods of refutation in a wellorganized, teachable form in his 1908 edition of Argumenta
tion and Debating.

His delineation of specific tests of

proof, which remained essentially intact in the 1917
revision, was particularly influential. 23 2
2. The case in question must be such that the
general law is applicable to it.
3. The resemblances must be such as to have a
direct bearing on the argument.
B. Argument by analogy
1. The case or cases given as examples must
resemble the case in question, in the rela
tions which they respectively bear to
surrounding facts or circumstances.
2. The resemblances must be such as to have a
direct bearing on the argument.
Laycock and Scales, Argumentation and Debate, pp. 87-113.
2 30

They examined false cause (including Jevons'
discussion of Mill's canons of induction), ambiguous terms,
composition, and division, ignoring the question or
arguing beside the point and begging the question, "the
more important [material fallacies] for purposes of
argumentation." Ibid., p. 114.
231 They suggested the following:
(1) State clearly
the argument to be answered, (2) Exploring any fallacy,
(3) Reductio ad absurdum, (4) Dilemma, (5) Residues,
(6) Showing an opponent's proof to be a proof of your own
side of the case, and (7) Refutation should be followed by
positive proof. Ibid., pp. 254-70.
2 32

Foster's tests of evidence from authority in the
1917 revision deleted the "hearsay" requirements of the
1908 edition. Rules for evaluating argument from generali
zation were identical, while those testing argument from

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

84

Foster suggested the following criteria for
evaluating evidence from authority.
1. Is the reference to authority definite?
2. Is the authority capable of giving expert
testimony?
3. Has the authority had sufficient
opportunity to know the facts?
4. Is the authority prejudiced?
5. Is the authority reluctant?
6 . Is the authority aware of the significance
of his testimony?
7. Is too great reliance placed on one
authority?
__
8. Is the authority used by opponents?
He also set out specific tests of inductive and deductive
argument, argument from example, and argument from causal
relations. Advocating reducing a deductive argument to
the syllogistic form, Foster believed that one can "readily
test its validity by inquiring whether the conclusion
234
inevitably follows from the premises."
He suggested:
A deductive argument has the fundamental
requisites of effectiveness if it satisfies
these conditions: First, if the generaliza
tion on which it is based is proved true or
accepted without proof; second, if the term
about which something is affirmed in the con
clusion is brought unmistakably within the
analogy simply dropped obvious or repetitive phrases.
Foster did not specifically list tests of causal reasoning
in his 1917 revision, but his discussion included the
essential criteria set out in the 1908 edition. See
Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 1908 ed., pp. 51-141;
1917 rev. ed., pp. 92-184.
233Ibid., 1917 ed., pp. 99-111. It is interesting
to note that Foster ignored the test, consistency, which
appeared in most of the contemporary literature.
234Ibid. , p. 131.
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class about which the generalization asserts a
truth; third, if the conclusion inevitably
follows from the two propositions thus estab
lished. In other words, a deductive argument
has the primary requisites of conviction if
the two premises are true, and if the infer
ence from them violates none of the rules of
logic.235
Foster devised the following system to test induction;
i.e., to test arguments from generalization and analogy,
the two categories of argument from example:
I.

II.

236

Argument from Generalization
A.

Is the relative size of the unobserved
part of the class so small as to warrant
the generalization?

B.

Are the observed members fair examples of
the class?

C.

Are we reasonably sure that there are no
exceptions?

D.

Is it highly probable that such a general
rule or statement is true?237

Argument from Analogy
A.

Are the points of similarity outweighed
by points of difference?

B.

Is the fact known to be true of the
analogous case even more likely to be
true of the case in question?

C.

Are the alleged facts on which the analogy
is based really true?238

235Ibid., p. 129.
236 He was influenced here by Baker.
Huntington, Principles, p. 109.

See Baker and

227poster, Argumentation and Debating, 1917 ed.,
pp. 142-50.
238Ibid., pp. 153-63.
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Foster also setout
I.

II.

tests for causal reasoning:

Argument from Effect to Cause
A.

Could any other cause have produced the
observed effect?

B.

Is the assumed cause sufficient to produce
the observed effect?

C.

Was the operation of the assumed cause
prevented by other forces?

Argument from Cause to Effect
A.

Is the known cause adequate to produce
the cause in question?

B. Are there other causes sufficient to
prevent the known cause from producing
the effect in question?
C.

Is there any positive evidence tending to
verify or refute the presumptions furnished
by the argument from cause to effect?239

Interested in refuting opposing arguments,240 as
well as in testing one's own proof, Foster included a
detailed section on fallacies.
I.

His outline follows.

Fallacies of the Argument from Example
A. Hasty Generalization
B. False Analogy

II.

Fallacies of Mistaken Causal Relation
A. Mistaking the Cause
B. Mistaking the Effect

239 Foster included effect to effect reasoning and
"the so-called" argument from sign, but did not list
separate tests for them. Ibid., 1908 ed., pp. 125-41.
240 Foster defined refutation as "argument which
weakens or destroys the contentions of the other side."
Ibid., p. 142.
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III.
IV.

Fallacies of Ignoring the Question
Fallacies of Begging the Question
A.

To

argue in a circle.

B.

To
assume
the point at issue
cover of confused language.

C.

To assume a more general truth which
involves the point at issue.

D.

To assume a particular truth which the
proposition involves.

E.
F.

To

employ

To
assume
terms.241

"question-begging"

directlyunder

words.

a point at issue in definingthe

Foster discussed six "special methods" of refutation:
reductio ad absurdum; residues; dilemma; syllogism;
exposing inconsistencies; and turning the tables.*242
O'Neill amplified and clarified Laycock and
Scales's tests of proof in his "rewriting" of that work
in 1917.

Following Laycock and Scales in examining the
quality and source of evidence 243 and in citing specific
"methods of attack" for arguments from antecedent
241

Ibid., pp. 146-72. Foster's 1917 revision
refined his discussion of fallacies, but included essen
tially the same concepts, 1917 rev. ed., pp. 192-216.
242Ibid., 1908 ed., pp. 177-89. In the 1917
edition he shifted the syllogism to the chapter on
inductive and deductive argument and treated the dilemma
as a form of the fallacy, ignoring the question.
243
His specific tests did not differ significantly
from those of the earlier work. O'Neill did add the
"hearsay" test. O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumenta
tion and Debate, pp. 101-112.
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probability, sign, and example,

244

O'Neill departed from

his mentors in his treatment of fallacies.

Whereas Laycock

and Scales had limited their discussion to material logical
fallacies, O'Neill explored the rhetorical (error in
interpretation)

0 4

and formal logical (violations of rules

of the syllogism) varieties.2^

He reorganized the dis

cussion of material fallacies, moreover, as follows:
I.

Equivocation (ambiguity)
A.

B.

In quantity
1.

Composition

2.

Division

In quality
1.

Ambiguous middle (specific accident)

2.

Simple accident

3.

Converse accident

244 O'Neill's major contribution here was a
clarification of tests of the example. Regarding generali
zation, he asked: Fair specimens? Large enough part of
field? He applied the tests of generalization to the
literal analogy and advised attacking a figurative analogy
as "false." Ibid., pp. 155-69.
2^5He included incorrect obversion (changing a
proposition from affirmative to negative or vice versa
without changing its meaning); incorrect conversion
(transposing subject and predicate without changing mean
ing) ; amphibology (ambiguous grammatical structure which
produces misconception); and accent (ambiguity arising from
misplaced accent or emphasis). Ibid., pp. 172-76.
246Gertrude Buck had earlier brought formal logical
fallacies within the scope of argumentation. See Buck,
Argumentative Writing, p. 94. For O'Neill's specific
tests, see O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and
Debate, pp. 176-82.
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II.

Presumption
A.

B.

Begging the Question
1.

Assumption of an unproved premise

2.

Arguing in a circle

Irrelevant Conclusion— Ignoring the
Question
1. Argumentum

ad hominem

2. Argumentum

ad populum

3. Argumentum

ad ignorantiam

4. Argumentum

ad verecundiam

5. Argumentum

ad judicium

C.

Complex Question

D.

Non sequitur
1. Simple
2.

False cause2**7

O'Neill's contribution to the testing of proof lay
primarily in his perspective rather than in the development
of original rules.

His discussion of "methods of refuta

tion" brought under one umbrella the various evaluative
criteria included in most argumentation and debate texts:
tests of evidence; attacks on forms of arguments; exposing
fallacies; and special rhetorical devices (reductio ad
absurdum, dilemma, residues and turning the tables).248
The 1917 revisions of both O'Neill and Foster thus provided
247see ibid., pp. 182-96.
248Ibid., pp. 355-65.
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the essential framework for "middle period" approaches to
proof.
The Forensic
George Pierce Baker defined the forensic as
a written argument resulting from careful
analysis that has taken form in a good brief,
careful selection of evidence, and literary
skill that knows how, placing the carefully
selected evidence at the places where the
brief proper calls for it, to expand the brief
into the complete a r g u m e n t . ^ 49
This predisposition toward a written argumentative essay
was not, however, necessarily the majority view.

Inter

collegiate debating, though on less than a grand scale,
250
was already a fact of life.
During a relatively short
period of time, the forensic, as it was called, expanded
beyond sectional contests to become a national affair.
Not only did individual schools meet, but debating leagues
were formed, debating contests were organized on statewide
249 Baker, Principles, pp. 269-70. In the preface
to his 1895 edition of Principles, Baker, the English
professor, justified his position as follows: "It is
because I believe that for the speaker as well as the
writer the principles which lead to convincingness merelynot to persuasion— are practically the same; and, most
important of all, because I am convinced that the easiest,
the most rapid method for a speaker to acquire good form,
and ability to handle evidence well, is for him to write
out his work until he has mastered the principles in this
book which lead to convincingness merely," p. vii.
250 For an account of the various claims of which
was the first intercollegiate debate, see Ralph C.
Ringwalt, "Intercollegiate Debating," Forum, XXII (January
1897), 633-40; Henry Lee Ewbank and J. Jeifery Auer,
Discussion and Debate (New York: F. S. Crofts, 1941),
pp. 395-400.
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bases, and debate trips were instituted. 2 5 1

This rapid

expansion of intercollegiate debating resulted in highly
structured, fairly sophisticated debate programs.^ 2
Early textbooks in argumentation reflected this
emphasis on debating.

Alden, for example, called his work

The Art of Debate, while Laycock and Scales, and Foster
251 Princeton, Harvard, and Yale established the
first triangular league (1895) and Michigan, Minnesota,
Northwestern, and Chicago Universities formed the first
quadrangular league (1897). See Leroy Cowperthwaite and
A. Craig Baird, "Intercollegiate Debating," in A History
of Speech Education in America, ed. by Karl Wallace
(New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1954), p. 260. "The
University of Denver was the first institution to schedule
more than one debate on a trip into neighboring states.
In 1913, a Denver team journeyed to Kansas and debated
Ottawa University on April 16, and to Missouri for an
engagement with William Jewell College on April 18. Almost
immediately other colleges and universities began sending
teams on cross country tours until by 1916 the debate trip
had become a popular feature," p. 269. See also Edwin D.
Shurter, "State Organization for Contests in Public
Speaking," Quarterly Journal of Public Speaking, I (April,
1915), 59-64.
In 1916, J. R. Pelsma sent a detailed question
naire on debating to "about fifty of the most prominent
colleges and universities." From Pelsma's comprehensive
survey one may conclude that debate continued to operate
both within the academic curriculum and outside it. The
debate coach, moreover, emerged. For controversy over the
"proper role" of the coach, see Rollo L. V. Lyman, "Some
Suggested Reforms in Intercollegiate Debating," Public
Speaking Review, III (January, 1914), 144-54; Frank H.
Lane, "Faculty Help in Intercollegiate Contests," Quarterly
Journal of Public Speaking, I (April, 1915), 9-16; Thomas
C. Trueblood, "Coaching a Debate Team," Public Speaking
Review, I (November, 1911), 84-85. Finances, derive# from
university appropriations, student appropriations, admis
sion fees, blanket taxes, and alumni gifts influenced the
size of debate programs, the number of men on a team, and
the number of debates in which a team participated. See
J. R. Pelsma, "Questionnaire on Debating," Quarterly
Journal of Public Speaking, II (April, 1916J7 l3o-40.
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respectively included the terms debate and debating in the
titles of their texts.

Though proclaiming debating to be

"for the most part, but oral application of the principles
of analysis, structure, evidence, and presentation," and
though believing it "a pity that in many instances study
of argument is regarded only as a stepping stone to suc253
cessful debating,"
Baker and Huntington succumbed to the
prevailing trend and included a short chapter entitled
"Debating" in their 1905 revision.
253 Baker and Huntington, Principles, pp. vii, 398.
254 Baker and Huntington treated— though perfunc
torily— such problems as choice of subject, burden of
proof, and attitude toward colleagues. They believed that
"topics, whether for intercollegiate contests or class
debates, should be chosen much more carefully than they
often are." That their list of prescriptions contained an
inordinate number of "do nots" probably reflects some of
the prevailing excesses. They suggested that: "The
desideratum is not any debatable question, nor one which
gives the affirmative or the negative an advantage, and
least of all is it a question which involves some trap for
opponents. The last is unpardonable, for what is wanted
is a two-sided question which will give each group of
speakers a chance under approximately equal conditions to
show what it can do evidentially and persuasively with a
definite case. Avoid, then, those questions on which it
is practically impossible to reach any final decision.
. . . In choosing a question, then, consider carefully the
probability that evidence is accessible, in print, through
interviews, or from one's own thinking. Avoid also topics
that produce little except haggling over definitions. . . .
Again, avoid topics which in the last resort can be made
conclusive only for certain temperaments, that is, which
rest more on persuasion than on conviction. . . . Select,
too, topics which can be treated in the time allowed for
the debate. Many questions of the day are hydra-headed.
. . . As a rule, reasonably fresh topics, the really
current questions of the day on which public opinion is
still forming, are the best training. Use the negative
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Probings into the nature of the forensic varied in
the identification as well as treatment of relevant and/or
appropriate material.

The very early writers emphasized

the construction of the forensic, while later ones attended
more to the presentation, ethics, and evaluation of contest
debating.
Constructing the Forensic
Though early period writers perceived the forensic,
at its core, to be the issues derived from analysis
buttressed by proof and laid out in a quasi-legal brief,
they did not discredit the importance of "rhetoric" or
"composition" in argumentation.

Conversely, early texts

included sections on arrangement and style.
Arrangement
Baker divided the forensic into three parts—
introduction, argument, and peroration— and discussed each
phrasing with caution. . . . Usually this phrasing, turning
affirmative into negative and negative into affirmative,
leads before the end of the debate to double negatives and
to confusion in the minds of the audience. . . . One
tendency in phrasing, much fostered by intercollegiate
debating, to select questions in which the negative need
only show that the proposition of the affirmative does not
hold good, but need itself support no case of its own, is
not productive of the best training in argument. This
leads to overestimating the value of rebuttal in debate,
with the result that often speakers skillful in rebuttal
fail utterly when forced to support a constructive case.
Would it not be much better, both in class and inter
collegiate debates, to find questions which oblige both
sides to work both destructively and constructively? Any
comparative question does this." Ibid., pp. 398-402.
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in terms of conviction and persuasion. 2 5 5

Agreeing that

"the structure of the brief should be the basis of the
2C/T

structure of the finished argument," both Alden 30 and
Laycock and Scales2^

applied Baker's divisions of the

written forensic to debating.

These texts emphasized par

ticularly the work of the introduction, anticipating later
discussions of division of labor among speakers in a
2!^Baker believed that the work of conviction in
an introduction "is to develop, always with as much clear
ness and force as possible, and with degrees of elegance
varying according to circumstances, the outline of the
well-planned brief introduction." Baker, Principles,
p. 279. An introduction may "endeavor to persuade*1 under
the following circumstances: a technical or otherwise
difficult subject; unknown speaker; hostile audience. Con
viction in the argument results from "giving in a literary
form the evidence for which the carefully constructed brief
proper calls," pp. 279-93. "Persuasive value may be given
to arguments either by a direct appeal, suggested by them,
to the emotions, or by pointing out or suggesting that
significance of the ideas advanced which, for any reason,
is likely to stir the audience to action," (italics
omitted), p. 322. The work of conviction in the peroration
was, for Baker, two-fold: recapitulation of the argument;
and amplification and diminishing the importance and con
clusiveness "to take advantage of the last opportunity
offered the writer to win the sympathy of his audience for
himself or his subject"; and "to stir the passions of his
hearers," p. 329.
2!
^Alden, Art of Debate, p. 152. See also Laycock
and Scales, Argumentation and Debate, pp. 342-43.
257
Laycock and Scales also included the need for
"strategy" as a distinguishing characteristic of debate;
i.e., "How to open the battle, when to use light cavalry
and when to use artillery, when to attack, when to give
way, how to plan an ambuscade, how to retreat." Laycock
and Scales, Argumentation and Debate, p. 274. They
observed, moreover, that preparation for argumentation
varies according to the form of the finished product.
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debate.

258

Their treatments of the argument proper and

of the peroration differed little, moreover, from most
contemporary rhetorics.

It is noteworthy, however, that

Alden also stressed the structuring of proof s.
By Baker and Huntington's revision, and certainly
by Foster's first edition, one could perceive a clear
shift in emphasis regarding the structure of a forensic.
Baker and Huntington relegated the divisions of intro
duction, argument, and conclusion so prominent in the
first edition of Principles to a short section on form in
which they included the classical dictum; "Let a speech
2 58Alden suggested that the introduction should
set out the nature and origin of the question; state
fundamental facts in the case; admit if side has the
burden of proof or presumption; show how side proposes
to shift the burden; and set out issues. Alden, Art of
Debate, pp. 138-39. Laycock and Scales listed similar
duties for the "first speaker on the affirmative." They
included: "to win sympathy for himself or his view of
the subject, and so to present the question as to persuade
his audience that his method of treating this question is
just and sensible." Laycock and Scales included "explain
the origin and history of the question, and . . . present
the issues." Laycock and Scales, Argumentation and Debate
p. 280. They also suggested the importance of definition
of terms in the introduction, p. 29 3. Laycock and Scales
also included specific prescriptions for the "first
speaker on the negative"; "he must . . . overthrow the
influence of his opponent who has introduced the debate,"
p. 281. Laycock and Scales also examined such strategies
as argumentum ad hominem and questioning, pp. 315-23.
2^Alden labeled Baker's "argument," the "body of
proof." He also believed that "the nature of the proof
must determine the best order for its presentation," and
offered some special rules for ordering proofs. See Alden
Art of Debate, p. 141.
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have a beginning, a middle, and an end."260

Interested,

moreover, in the unity in each side of a case and in
progression as well as unity in the whole debate, they
outlined in more detail than had their predecessors the
work of individual speakers, 261 setting out this work in
terms of "class debates" rather than a contest format.262
Foster ignored the introduction, argument, conclu
sion distinctions except in discussing the brief.

He

clarified, moreover, Baker and Huntington's suggestions
for the work of individual speakers and presented the
following concise, usable rules.

The first speech for the

affirmative, Foster said, "should present all the steps in
analysis which are necessary for an understanding of the
debate and no m o r e . "263
260

Baker and Huntington, Principles, p. 412.

261

See ibid., pp. 415-21. The mechanics of
debating were only beginning to become crystallized during
the early period. Since "practically all the early debates
were conducted on the basis of the single debate 'contract1
arrangement," which set its own rules and format, there
was little continuity. For a summary of prevailing pro
cedures, see Cowperthwaite and Baird, "Intercollegiate
Debating," pp. 260-62; Pelsma, "Questionnaire on Debating,"
p. 135.
26 2

Baker and Huntington's "class debate" used the
following format: "there are usually two persons on each
side, allowed, for instance, ten minutes in which to open
the discussion, fourteen minutes for the main speech, and
six minutes for final rebuttal, with some five or six
speeches from the floor of four minutes each." Baker and
Huntington, Principles, pp. 415-16.
261 Foster contended that this introduction should
be "unprejudiced."
1908 ed., p. 288.

Foster, Argumentation and Debating,
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After presenting such introductory matters
as the proposition demands, the opening speaker
should take up the first issue and endeavor to
make definite progress with the case of the
affirmative. He should show the relation of
his work to the work of the other speakers on
his side; and he should make clear just what
he understands to be the bearing of his argu
ment on the negative side, and what, conse
quently, his opponents must do to meet the
contentions of the affirmative.^®^
Foster believed that "the first requisite of the
opening speech for the negative is adaptation to the
n/rc

preceding speech."

He further suggested that:

The speaker must make clear to what extent
he accepts the work in analysis presented by
the affirmative.
If the affirmative speaker has failed to
analyze the proposition and set forth the
issues, the negative speaker must supply the
deficiency. . . . Furthermore, the first nega
tive speaker must either refute the arguments
just advanced or show good reason for post
poning the refutation.
At the close of his speech, the first
speaker for the negative should summarize his
own argument, show its bearing on the argument
of the other side, and point out just what
work, in view of these facts, the affirmative
still has to perform.2®®
As for the other main speeches, Foster counselled
For the other speakers, the first
requisite is adaptation. They must adapt
their work to that of the other side, as the
debate proceeds, and they must adapt their
work to that of their colleagues. . . . It is
264Ibid., p. 296.
265Ibid.
266Ibid., pp. 296-302.
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the duty of each speaker to summarize, not
only what he.has said, but all that has been
said on his side up to that point.^67
^ ^ Ibid., p. 302. Pattee took a different view,
approaching what speakers must do largely in terms of
affirmative and negative prerogatives. Pattee said: "The
first speaker for the affirmative— Upon the first speaker
falls the duty of interpreting the proposition. . . . Since
the burden of proof always rests on the affirmative, the
first speaker in the argument proper, as a rule, points
out the weaknesses in existing conditions, leaving to his
colleague the task of presenting the advantages of a
change. In handling his proof he must be sure so to
correlate his work with the work of his colleague that,
in the minds of the audience, it will all hang together
as a united whole. To accomplish this object, he may, as
he finishes with his partition, state what points he will
discuss himself, and what points will be handled by the
affirmative speakers that are to succeed him; and he must,
without fail, when he nears the end of his allotted time,
hastily summarize the proof he has given, and outline the
proof to follow. . . . It rests with the first speaker
for the negative to determine whether the introduction as
presented by the affirmative has erred in any respect, it
is the duty of the first negative debater to supply the
deficiency or make the correction; otherwise he errs
equally with the affirmative. . . . Two courses are open
to him; he may at once refute his predecessors' arguments,
or he may proceed to take up his constructive proof,
giving reason for postponing the refutation. . . . About
the only practical suggestion that can be made to the
other speakers is that they adapt their constructive work
to that of their colleagues, and deploy their refutation
so as to hammer the principle positions of their
opponent. . . . Good speeches of refutation deal largely
with main ideas . . . and the offer [of] some opposition
to every main heading used by his opponents. . . . The
work of the last speaker on each side differs somewhat
from the work of his colleagues. All the speakers try
to overthrow the opposing arguments, and by means of
summaries keep their case as a whole before the audience.
The last speaker devotes far less time to pure refutation,
gives a more detailed summary, and in addition, compares
and contrasts the arguments of his side with the argu
ments of the opposition. This last process is called
amplifying and diminishing." Pattee, Practical Argumen
tation, 1915 rev. ed., pp. 241-50, passim.
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Foster insisted on thorough preparation for
rebuttal.
The debater must decide at once what is the
bearing on the question, and what is the rela
tion to his own case of the argument advanced
against him. He must decide whether it is
worth answering; if so, when and by what
method.26 8
The first function of the closing rebuttal speech was, for
Foster, "to make clear what has been done by both sides."
He advised the following procedure:
To make this clear, the speaker must take
up the issues, one by one, in a logical order,
which is usually the order determined at the
outset. His purpose is to show, by contrast
ing the arguments which the course of the
debate has left standing on each side of each
issue, that his side has the weight of proof
in its favor. He thus emphasizes his own
arguments at the expense of his opponent's
arguments. . . . He must subordinate the
insignificant odds and ends, which are more
or less confused in the minds of the hearers,
to the main issues. His task is to muster the
whole forces of his side for an orderly,
unified, final
269
a t t a c k .

Agreeing that "the debate should be one— should
have absolute unity," and insisting that "it should be
fundamentally the same if delivered by one or two or three
speakers," O'Neill returned to the framework of introduc
tion, discussion, and conclusion for examining the main
2^®Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 1908 ed.,
p. 305.
269

,
„ .
Ibid., p. 306. Foster was also concerned with
the organization of rebuttal material and gave specific
prescriptions for writing specimen rebuttal cards.
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speeches in a debate,

270

to Laycock and Scales.

treating the divisions similarly
O'Neill progressed beyond the

scope of the earlier work, however, at least in two major
areas:

outlining duties for the first affirmative speaker;

and differentiating rebuttal from refutation.

The first

affirmative, according to O'Neill, should "explain the
case, set forth the issues, accept the burden of proof,
outline your case as far as seems advisable, and then
start the argument.

07 I

In a detailed section on rebuttal

of speeches, 27 2 O'Neill made the following critical
distinctions:
Refutation is the broader term . . . and
rebuttal is the refutation that is given in
a special speech which has properly no (or
very little) constructive material in it.2^2
Style
Most early writers integrated discussions of style
into their treatments of structure.

Baker, for example,

labeled clearness, force, and elegance as characteristics
270

O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and
Debate, p. 39 3.
271Ibid., p. 394.
272
As had Foster, O'Neill advocated detailed
preparation for rebuttal but advised against memorized
rebuttal speeches. He suggested that a speaker must know
the other side and "be ready for surprises." For O'Neill,
as for Laycock and Scales, "the great fundamental principle
which should guide the preparation of all rebuttal speeches
is: Answer the whole case of the other side." Ibid.,
p. 425.
272Ibid., p. 421.
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of a good introduction; unity, clearness, and force "the
great essentials in the argument proper, . . . both from
the argumentative and from the literary point of view"; 274
and an element of surprise, avoidance of statements not
in the argument proper, brevity, clearness, and elegance
as "the requisites of a good peroration."
Sensing a close relationship between structure
and style,

276

Alden examined paragraph structure, tran

sitions, and distinguished the compact from diffuse
277
styles.
Recognizing that "it is common for rhetoricians
to classify the qualities of a good style under the three
heads of Clearness, Force, and Elegance," he added to
274 Baker believed that "whether elegance is
desirable will . . . depend on the nature of the public
address." Baker, Principles, p. 293.
27 5With the exception of an element of surprise,
Baker followed the requisites given by Phelps, Theory
of Preaching, pp. 520-22, cited in Baker, Principles,
p. 335.
276 Laycock and Scales posed several questions
which indicated a similar awareness. They asked: Is
the introduction phrased so as to arouse interest? Is
the connection between the main points of the proposition
made perfectly apparent? Is the arrangement in any way
defective? Are there well managed transitions? They
suggested, moreover, that transitions, summaries, and
partitions are valuable aids to unity in the proof itself.
Laycock and Scales, Argumentation and Debating, pp. 232,
356.
2 77

He advised a compromise between the compact
and liffuse style. See Alden, Art of Debate.
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these qualities 278 unity, proportion, continuity, and an
element of general truth.

279

For Baker and Huntington, "clearness, force, and
movement are not, however, everything needed in argument."
They believed that "style depends . . . primarily on
thought; secondly on imagination . . . ; and finally on
an accurate, copious, and responsive vocabulary."280
Baker and Huntington did not offer specific suggestions,
however, for oral style. 281
Foster gleaned from contemporary rhetorics 282
certain "principles" and "qualities" of style, and sug
gested that "observance of these principles of Unity,
Emphasis, and Coherence tends to secure the qualities of
Clearness, Ease and Force." 283 For Foster, these "prin
ciples" and "qualities" were of value, however, only
278 Ibid., p. 164. Alden also discussed figures of
speech in relation to the force of an argument, p. 176.
279
Ibid., p. 184.
280 Baker and Huntington, Principles, p. 385.
281
Neither did most writers who followed them.
282Foster recommended particularly two works:
Barrett Wendell, English Composition (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1891); Hammond Lamont, English Composition
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1907). His treatment
is essentially the same in the 1917 revision.
28 3

Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 1908 ed.,
p. 250. His treatment is essentially the same in the 1917
revision.
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inasmuch as they helped to secure the "paramount quality
of Force."284
Though O'Neill contended that "a 'speech style' or
'oral style1 is always preferable in argumentation and is
practically always used in good argumentation," 285 his own
treatment was traditional.

He discussed style primarily

in relation to the introduction, discussion, and conclusion
of a speech, much as had Laycock and Scales.
Presentation
Raymond Alden was among the first to treat
TOC
extensively "the spoken debate."
Not only did he
explore the relation of written and spoken speech, 2 8 7 but
he also examined in detail kinds and qualities of delivery.
Alder, recommended the writing out of an argumentative
speech, but warned against memorizing 2 8 8 or reading2 89
document.

the

He preferred an extemporaneous delivery using

284

"For this purpose," he said, "Clearness and Ease
are invaluable; and to them we should add the rhetorical
aids of Brevity, Concreteness, and Illustration.11 Ibid.,
p. 250.
28 5O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and
Debate, p. 11.
285
See Robinson, Forensic Oratory; George Jacob
Holyoake, Rudiments of Public Speaking and Debate (1st
American, from 2d London ed.; New York: McElrath and
Barker, 1853).
287
See Alden, Art of Debate, p. 187.
288Ibid., p. 194.
289Ibid., pp. 191-92.
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notes.

Alden also included "characteristics of a good

delivery" which he "stated in the same words as the quali290
ties of a good style":
clearness (enunciation and
purity of tone); force (vigor and variety of pitch); and
elegance (posture and gesture).291

He believed, however,

that:
All these matters of delivery can, from one
point of view, be reduced to a single prin
ciple. The successful speaker is one who is
able to reach and move his audience. To do
this he must . . . talk to t h e m .^92
Baker and Huntington included a short section on
"external form" in their chapter on debating in which they
stated:

"Debaters should remember that their appearance

before an audience may have a large persuasive effect for
293
or against them."
They advised that "any beginner in
debate will save himself much if he will take as preliminary a good course in voice-training, pose, and gesture." 29 4
Though Foster believed that "matter is more
important than form," he, nevertheless, recognized the
importance of a speaker's delivery.

Of the five "methods"

which he labeled, Foster precluded both writing out a
290Ibid., p. 205.
291
Ibid., pp. 205-214; Alden believed that little
should be said about posture, and little gesture is needed
in debate.
292
3 Ibid., p. 205.
29 3Baker and Huntington, Principles, p. 413.
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speech and reading it, 2 9 5 and memorizing it.

He recognized

problems in transition with the third method, "memorizing
important parts and adapting the rest to the occasion,"
and suggested that the use of an outline or brief might
even "detract . . . from the effectiveness of delivery." 29 6
He argued rather that "most successful of all— other things
being equal— is the speaker who extemporizes his whole
address, without even a scrap of paper between himself and
his hearers." 297

Foster also recognized the importance of

voice, enunciation, position, and gestures, and referred
his readers to several contemporary texts which stressed
delivery.298
In addition to rules of good delivery, early period
argumentation texts offered advice on manners in debating.
Baker and Huntington, for example, talked about attitudes
79
6
^Foster,
Argumentation and Debating, 1917 rev.
ed., pp. 299-300. Foster agreed that a direct quotation
that is read may be quite effective "provided that the
speaker knows how to read," p. 30 3.
^ ^ Ibid., p. 300.
297
Ibid. Foster suggested, nevertheless, that
"even a speaker who has followed the extempore method with
some success feels more confidence if he has adequate notes
in his pocket. They have been compared to life-preservers
under the berth, ready for use if the ship is sinking,"
p. 300.
298
Irvah L. Winter, Public Speaking (New York:
Macmillan Company, 1912); S. S. Curry, Mind and Voice
(Boston: Boston Expression Company, 1910); Henry Evarts
Gordon and Rollo L. Lyman, Vocal Expression in Speech
(Boston: Ginn and Company, 1911); w! B. Mitchell^ School
and College Speaker (New York: Henry Holt and Company,
1901) .
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toward colleagues.

Though viewing debating as a "kind of

game," Foster stressed that it should not be mere
"contentiousness."3^

He advised caution in the use of

ridicule, satire, invective, and epithet, and decried the
tendency in debating to "quibble."

In a section entitled

"attitude toward opponents," Foster said:
No speaker can carry conviction who
imagines all truth to be on his side and all
who differ from him to be in obstinate error.
Such an attitude arouses antagonism.300
O'Neill also emphasized "personal attitude and
bearing."

Though agreeing that sarcasm, ridicule, and

personality attacks "are undoubtedly admissible and
helpful, under certain circumstances and when properly
handled, in discrediting an opponent," he warned of dangers
in using such techniques inadvisedly. 301
Ethics
Most early period writers made some mention of the
ethics of debating.

Baker and Huntington, for example,

labeled "fairness" as one of "the special characteristics
of good debate," 30 2 while Foster included sections on
3^Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 1908 ed.,
pp. 280-81.
300Ibid., p. 3C9.
301O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and
Debate, p. 379. O'Neill also warned against personal
inconsistency and wished for self control among debaters.
on o

Baker and Huntington, Principles, p. 421.
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"honor" in both the 190 8 and 1917 editions of his text.

It

was, however, the issue of debating both sides of a ques
tion that provoked most conflict.

Baker, who sanctioned

such a procedure, purportedly suggested that "few college
30 3
students have any deep convictions on public questions."
Even so august a figure as former President Theodore
Roosevelt felt compelled to comment:
What we need is to turn out of our colleges
young men with ardent convictions on the side
of the right; not young men who can make a good
argument for either right or wrong as their
interest bids them. Our present method of
carrying on debates . . . encourages precisely
the wrong attitude among those who take part
in them. There is no effort to instill sin
cerity and intensity of conviction. On the
contrary the net result is to make the con
testants feel that their convictions have
nothing to do with their arguments.^04
Criticism came, moreover, from within the ranks.

Foster

urged students "to refuse— even for the sake of practice,
even for the supposed honor of the college— to speak
against their convictions."^05

He argued:

■^^Baker, cited in Pelsma, "Questionnaire on
Debating," p. 133.
3C^Theodore Roosevelt, "Chapters of a Possible
Autobiography," Outlook, CIII (February 22, 1913), 406.
305
Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 1908 ed.,
p. 326; 1917 rev. ed., pp. 307-308. "At once the objection
arises that it is good training for a person to study both
sides of a question. Certainly it is. By all means let a
debater earnestly study the side of the question in which
he does not believe; let him be honest and diligent in his
efforts to find all that can be urged against his own
beliefs, in his efforts to get the point of view of 'the
other fellow1; but let him decline to stand before an
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A speaker who, even in a formal contest,
endeavors to convince an audience of the truth
of what he believes to be false engages in an
undertaking of doubtful morality. Here is the
dilemma. If he simulates sincerity and
earnestness, he is deceiving his hearers,
emulating the most contemptible speakers in
public life, preparing to swell their ranks.
If he does not even appear to be sincere and
earnest, he lacks the primary requisites of a
persuasive speaker, and becomes the lifeless
kind of debater of whom we hear complaint. 06
O'Neill offered one of the better defenses:
It certainly is_ the duty of the colleges
to turn out "young men who can make a good
argument" on either side of such questions
without regard to their convictions. Whether
a man will argue against his convictions in
actual life, where the "merits of the ques
tion" are really to be decided, is a very dif
ferent thing. Surely he must be mentally
capable of doing it. . . . Argument that is
worth while has an intellectual basis. It is
built upon facts and logical inference rather
than on ardent convictions. Skill in the use
of the facts and inferences available may be
gained on either side of a question without
regard to convictions. Instruction and prac
tice in debate should give young men this
skill. And where these matters are properly
handled, stress is not laid on getting the
speaker to think rightly in regard to the
audience and attempt to convince them of the truth of
statements which he believes to be false. It is said,
further, that the prevailing methods in classroom and
intercollegiate debates offer practical difficulties in
the attainment of this ideal. If so, let the methods go.
Let us not sacrifice the ends for the sake of the means.
If the rules of the game prevent the attainment of its
supreme objects, let us discard the rules. The supreme
objects of argumentation and debating are to train citizens
who shall be, first, keen and sound and enthusiastic
thinkers, second, leaders of men, fearless, able, devoted,
but, above all, honest," 1917 rev. ed., p. 30 8.
306Ibid., 1917 rev. ed., p. 308.
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merits of either side of these questions— but
to think accurately on both sides.
Judging
Attitudes toward judging reflected philosophical
divergencies regarding the "proper" end of contest
debating. 308 William H. Davis set out the nature of the
dispute as follows:
If my analysis is correct, two fairly
distinct conceptions of debating are recog
nizable. According to the first of these
conceptions, debating is a game; the contests
in debating exist in and for themselves and
are conducted accordingly.
The opposite conception of debating . . .
is that of training for the wise disposition
of important matters in legislatures, public
gatherings, club and society meetings— wherever
men collect, as they must constantly be doing,
at least in a democracy, for counsel and effec
tive action. Debating, according to this con
ception, is an approximation of actual
conditions, of "real life." The "contest"
feature, the "sport" element, while still
present, becomes secondary; and superiority,
skill, becomes inconceivable apart from the
total persuasive effect secured by the
contestants.309
■^^O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation aud
Debate, pp. 374-75.
30 8Pelsma, "Questionnaire on Debating," p. 136.
Almost one-third of those responding to Pelsma's question
naire did not consider judges essential for intercollegiate
debates. And of those who answered, many considered them
to be a "necessary evil."
309 William H. Davis, "Is Debating Primarily a
Game?" Quarterly Journal of Public Speaking, II (April,
1916), 172-73. Davis noted, however, that these concep
tions do not exist "absolutely." Rather, he was concerned
with "the emphasis, the chief tendency, the predominating
element."
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The battle over the issue of "game" versus "tool"
was largely fought in the pages of the Quarterly Journal of
Public Speaking.

Its editor, James M. O'Neill, advanced

time and again in articles, editorials, and book reviews,
his conviction that "the object of any particular team
is to demonstrate its superiority over its opponent in
debating."3^®

Debating should be judged "like other sport

on the skill shown, by experts who are qualified to pass
on the quality of that skill." 311

In rendering decisions,

O'Neill contended,
The proper question to be answered by the
award is, "Which university has the better
debating team?" It is not right either to
expect judges to have no opinions on the ques
tions debated or to expect the debaters to
change the opinions of the judges. Each judge
should know enough about debating (regardless
of his knowledge or opinions in economics,
politics, theology, etc.) to give an expert
opinion on the comparative skill of the
opposing teams, entirely aside 'rom his
private opinion on the question debated,
either before or after the debate.
Unless we accept this as the proper basis
of judgment we must either assume that the
debater is actually supposed to change the
opinions of the judges on these great civic
questions, or we must be content with an
opinion which could as well be obtained by
mail weeks before the debate.
James M. O'Neill, "A Disconcerted Editor and
Others," Quarterly Journal of Public Speaking, I (April,
1915), 82-83.
311Ibid.
3-'-20'Neill agreed, however, that "judges should be
chosen who know enough about real debating to know that
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O'Neill's pronouncements did not go unchallenged.
The first volley of magnitude came from William H. Davis
who, "impressed by the reality involved in the debating
contest," 313 argued that "frankly accepted as a game,
314
debating becomes a monstrous affair."
Davis' predic
tions were dire:
The erection of specious structures of
argument can hardly be ruled out; the more
cunningly specious they are, the more com
mendable, as the fruit of brilliancy and
industry, they become. As participants in a
game, debaters may devise artfully misleading
arguments or wordings, affirmatives may post
pone answerable refutation until negatives
have no opportunity to answer, negatives may
withhold treatment of an "alternative plan"
in order to diminish their opponents1 oppor
tunity for refutation, and no one can sensibly
find fault; it is all in fun. It is hard to
see why minor fabrications may not be regarded
as venial. Surely the whole nauseating
machinery of "colleagues," "opponents,"
"previous speaker," "we of the negative,"
"the gentlemen of the affirmative," becomes
justified and essential and each debate will
be a wordy quarrel between individuals
restricted only by their having to speak
within time limits and but one at a time.
O'Neill countered in an editorial entitled "Game or
on c.
Counterfeit Presentment,"
and by the time Hugh Neal
skill does not consist in glibness of tongue, trickery of
phraseology, nor superficiality of thought." Ibid.,
pp. 81-82.
Davis, "Is Debating a Game?" p. 177.
314Ibid., p. 175.
315Ibid.
3^James M. O'Neill, "Game or Counterfeit Present
ment," Quarterly Journal of Public Speaking, II (April,
1916), 193-97.
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Wells entered the fray in October, 1917, debate ensued on
a full scale.
Wells argued that the only valid basis for judging
a debate is to assess "the respective merits of the case
317
or argument presented by the opposing teams."
"Skill
in 'reasoning, research, and speaking' should be judged by
■31 O

results," he said.
Debate decisions must be rendered upon the
merits of the argument presented by the
debaters, irrespective of the personal
opinions of the judges concerning the merits
of the resolution.
The judges must pass upon the arguments
presented as though they were exhaustive of
the subject. The task of the judge, there
fore, is to place himself in the
position of
one who has no opinions or knowledge of the
subject, other than what has been presented,
and to make the decision which any reasonable
and intelligent person would predicate upon
the premises. ^19
Meanwhile, Howard S. Woodward was experimenting with
decisionless debates. 320

Lew

Sarett

constructedoneof

the more popular paradigms, a "Board
of Judges" composed of
"one expert judge," 321 which he explained as follows:
317Wells, "Judging Debates," p. 340.
0*1 O

Ibid., p. 338.
319Ibid., pp. 340-41.
320
Howard S. Woodward, "Debating Without Judges,"
Quarterly Journal of Public Speaking, I (October, 1915),
229-33.
3 21

Lew Sarett, "The Expert Judge of Debate," Quar
terly Journal of Public Speaking, III (April, 1917), 136.
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The system rests upon the idea that a
single expert judge who has reached a high
degree of efficiency through much experience
as a debater and as a judge, car give a more
fair and helpful decision than can a board of
from three to five judges, in part, or in
whole, incompetent and inexpert. To secure
the highest type of judge it is customary to
pay a fee, and to require in addition to his
formal decision, a detailed analysis of the
debate with a statement of the basis of his
conclusion. At once the question arises: who
shall be deemed an "expert judge?" His quali
fications should include most, if not all of
the following: a thorough knowledge of the
ins and outs of debate secured through
(1) actual participation in intercollegiate
debate, (2) experience as a coach of inter
collegiate debate, (3) experience in serving
as a judge. It is desirable in addition that
he possess by virtue of his training or pro
fession, a fair knowledge and a proper per
spective of the fields of economics, sociology,
and political science, in which most of our
debate questions lie.
322 Ibid. Sarett required that a judge substantiate
his decision by reading a brief analysis of the debate.
The form he advocated is as follows: "1. Which team was
superior in the clear, coherent, and effective organization
of its material? . . . 2. Which team better supported its
contentions with sound proof? . . . 3. Which team estab
lished and maintained the most crucial issues? . . .
4. Which team was superior in destroying its opponents'
crucial issue? . . . 5. Which team, through greater free
dom in departing from prepared speeches, and through
superior extempore speaking and resourcefulness, more
readily adapted its arguments to the arguments actually
made by its opponents upon the platform? . . . 6. Which
team in its constructive argument manifested a superior
analysis of the question? . . . 7. Which team manifested a
superior analysis of the debate as it actually progressed
on the platform, i.e. which team was superior in discover
ing and following the strategic issues rather than the
minor or irrelevant points? . . . 8. Which team was
superior in team work? . . . 9. Which team was superior
in delivery, aside from effective delivery presumed in
other questions? . . .10. Which team in general— aside
from the rebuttal work presumed in other questions— was
superior in rebuttal? . . .11. Which team was superior
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Other writers continued to explore various other
alternatives to judging.

R. 0. T. Hollister advocated

faculty judging,323 while Raymond Pease believed the
audience to be the most desirable "jury."

Pease contended

that:
College audiences should function as
nearly as possible as audiences in the world
at large; that there should be the largest
possible influence of and appeal to the
audience; that we cannot otherwise expect the
greatest good either to the audience or to
the speakers; that to secure these ends the
audience must have a part in the "game."2^
Criteria for judging appeared, Pattee's listing being
representative:
I.
II.

III.

Which side has the better analysis?
Which side has the stronger proof?
A. Consider the preponderance of the
evidence.
B. Consider the quality of the
evidence.
C. Consider the skill used in
reasoning.
Which side offers the better
refutation?
A. See which side has more main
points left standing after the
refutation has been given.

in debate strategy? On the basis of the above analysis,
it is my judgment that the most effective debating was
done by the . . . team," pp. 137-38.
323R. 0. T. Hollister, "Faculty Judging,"
Quarterly Journal of Public Speaking, III (July, 1917),
235-41.
324
Raymond B. Pease, "The Audience as the Jury,"
Quarterly Journal of Public Speaking, III (July, 1917),
218.
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IV.

Which side has the better delivery?
A. Consider general bearing, voice,
and language. 25
Summary

George Pierce Baker had envisioned a "practical
argumentation for everyday life" when he first published
The Principles of Argumentation in 1895.

It was his

task to formulate its theoretical bases.

Relying primarily

on legal and philosophical writings, Baker developed
precise systems of analysis and of briefing.

His approach

to proof, moreover, sidestepped the strictures imposed by
Formal Logic.

Baker's interest in the discovery of argu

ments and in their relation to a proposition was particu
larly influential.

His approach to proof has less impact.

Most writers simply were not prepared to reject the rela
tive security of formal validity in favor of some vague
"practical argumentation."
Several notable texts published during the "early
period" followed in the Baker tradition.

By 1917, with

the revisions of Foster's Argumentation and Debating and
O'Neill's "rewriting" of Laycock and Scales's Argumentation
and Debate, traditional theory had crystallized.

Not that

total agreement prevailed in all areas, but a consensus
had been reached on major theoretical issues.

Discussions

of the nature of argumentation accommodated debating, that
o?c
Pattee, Practical Argumentation, 1915 rev. ed.,
p. 277.
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kind of argumentation which was gaining great currency, if
not necessarily great respectability around the turn of
the century.

Baker's system of analysis assimilated stock

issues as well as expanded treatments of the proposition.
The concept of proof as revised by Foster and O'Neill set
the standard not only for argumentation and debate texts,
but for general works in public speaking.

Differences

arose largely out of a philosophical split over the end
of contest debating.

The ramifications of this "game"

versus "tool" debate, as hotly argued as any contest
proposition, reached into and influenced the "middle
period" as well as contemporary debate theory.
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CHAPTER III
THE MIDDLE PERIOD— 1917-c. 1955
By 1917, argumentation and debate had established
a tradition in the academic world.
included courses in the discipline.

Many college curricula
Intercollegiate

debating had become a "big-time" activity, rivaling
athletics in certain eastern universities.

Traditional

theory, moreover, encompassed a solidified and comprehen
sive body of knowledge, many of the early problems and
controversies having been resolved.

There were rumblings

and dissatisfactions, of course, particularly regarding
the "proper" end of intercollegiate debating, but the
theoretical bases of the discipline remained largely
unquestioned.

The attack on the standard tradition was

not long in coming, however.

Mary Yost of Vassar fired

the first volley, but Charles H. Woolbert largely assumed
the bombardment.1

The Yost-Woolbert criticisms prompted a

^ a r y Yost, "Argument from the Point of Vic v of
Sociology," Quarterly Journal of Public Speaking, III
(April, 1917), 109-124; Charles H. Woolbert, "Conviction
and Persuasion: Some Considerations of Theory," Quarterly
Journal of Public Speaking, III (July, 1917), 249-64;
Charles H. Woolbert, "The Place of Logic in a System of
Persuasion," Quarterly Journal of Public Speaking, IV
(January, 1918), 19-39; Charles H. Woolbert, “Persuasion:
Principles and Methods," Quarterly Journal of Speech
117
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reassessment of argumentation and debate theory, particu
larly its philosophical underpinnings, and resulted in an
interest in new argumentative forms.

This chapter outlines

the developments spawned by this reevaluation.
The period from 1918 to 1955, though long
chronologically, exhibited homogeneity in writers,
textual materials, and in philosophy.

2

m

Though certain

isolated texts attempted to revamp the whole of argumenta
tion and debate theory in terms of the Yost-Woolbert
3
approaches, and though others ignored the attacks alto
gether,^ most "middle period" writers sought to broaden
the philosophical base of the discipline to accommodate
contemporary findings in psychology, sociology, and
Education, V, Part I: "Principles" (January, 1919), 12-25;
Part II; "Analysis" (March, 1919), 101-119; Part III:
"Synthesis" (May, 1919), 212-38; Edward Z. Rowell, "Prole
gomena to Argumentation," Quarterly Journal of Speech,
XVIII, Part I: "The Problem, Its Nature and Significance"
(February, 1932), 1-13; Part II; "The Historical Roots of
the Problem" (April, 1932), 224-48; Part III: "The Critics
of the Standard Tradition" (June, 1932), 381-405; Part IV:
"An Empirical Analysis of Argumentation" (November, 19 32),
585-606. See also Gladys Murphy Graham, "Logic and Argu
mentation," Quarterly Journal of Speech Education, X
(November, 19 24), 350-6 3; Gladys Murphy Graham, "The
Natural Procedure in Argument," Quarterly Journal of Speech
Education, XI (November, 1925), 319-37.
2

Such important writers as Baird and O'Neill
spanned the entire period.
3
See, for example, Ceorge R. Collins and John S.
Morris, Persuasion and Debate (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1927).
4
See William T. Foster, Argumentation and Debating
(rev. ed.; Cambridge, Mass.: Houghton, Mifflin Company,
1932).
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educational philosophy.

The Baker tradition not only

survived, it prospered as it accommodated new drifts in
contemporary thought.
The 1917 Foster and O'Neill revisions set the
standard for traditional theory during the "middle period."
Nor were these works discarded early.

Foster's text com

manded wide usage during the early part of the period and
C
was revised as late as 19 32.
O'Neill, meanwhile, expanded
the scope of his writing, venturing into discussion, and
co-authoring books on argumentation with McBurney,
Cortright, and a revision with McBurney and Mills.

Such

thoughtful works as W. C. Shaw's The Art of Debate,
A. Craig Baird's Public Discussion and Debate, and Russell
Wagner's Handbook of Argumentation^ were at core tradi
tional, as were the vast majority of texts which appeared
during the period.

These texts refined and/or restated

traditional principles of analysis.

They recognized, even

belaboured, the inadequacies of a logic-oriented system of
^In a review of that revision, Raymond Howes com
mented: "It has lost nothing of the authority which has
made it, for many years, the massive rock on which lesser
men have reared their little spires toward the light of
fame." Raymond F. Howes, "New Books: Argumentation and
Debating," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XIX (February,
1933), 92.
^Warren C. Shaw, The Art of Debate (New York:
Allyn and Bacon, 19 22); A. Craig Baird, Public Discussion
and Debate (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1928; 1937 rev.
ed.); Russell H. Wagner, Handbook of Argumentation
(New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 19 36).
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argument; yet their own lists of prescriptions from Formal
Logic increased.

The forensic, moreover, drew fire from

those writers, particularly in the journals, who wished
to bring contemporary debate practices into line with
revised notions about the nature of argumentation.

The

long-range results of these efforts, however, threatened
neither the primacy nor the prestige of intercollegiate
debating.

7

The major changes in argumentation and debate

theory during the "middle period" involved, rather, the
nature of argumentation and resulted in, as well as from,
a broadening of its scope.
The Nature of Argumentation
"Middle period" writers defined argumentation
Q
essentially as had their predecessors.
Their theory,
moreover, continued to draw heavily from law and Formal
Logic.

An increased interest in persuasion, however,

along with a call for a "total" organic theoretical
construct, brought psychology and rhetoric to the fore
front.

In a 19 38 journal article, Baird examined "the
7
See section on the forensic.
8

Different writers perceived different relation
ships, however, between the terms argumentation, debate,
discussion, and persuasion. See Baird's excellent
analysis. A Craig Baird, Argumentation, Discussion, and
Debate (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1950),
pp. IcT-12. For an interesting assessment of the nature of
argumentation in terms of discussion and debate, see
Wayne N. Thompson, "Discussion and Debate: A
Re-examination," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXX (October,
1944), 288-99.
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educational philosophy of the teacher of speech" and
concluded that "the conflicting attitudes of the educational world are mirrored in our own field."

g

Baird's

analysis helps to clarify the differing views on the nature
of argumentation as well as the specific principles and
procedures advocated.

"We are by turns humanists,

realists, scientists, and much else," said Baird.
Speech humanists,^ . . . are among us
aplenty. We humanists usually have a strong
English background, a predilection for
Aristotle, a faith in the seven liberal arts
(or at least the first three), and we insist
upon course content.
Among our speech fraternity are also the
disciples of reason, followers of John Locke
and Adam Smith. We Lockeians specialize in
contemporary history and economics; and we are
not averse to statistics. We rationalists
constitute the robust progeny who direct
debate teams and encourage business and pro
fessional speaking.
A third group of philosophers are the
speech aesthetes. We who fall into this
category believe in beauty of vocal diction
and correctness of posture. We talk much of
standard pronunciation as the central problem
and of linguistics for all.
Still another group of us have fallen heir
to scientific determinism. We follow Lord
Bacon, Herbert Spencer, and modern science; we
interest ourselves chiefly in physical and
physiological aspects of speech science.
Yet another branch of us have, especially
Q
A.
Craig Baird, "The Educational Philosophy of
the Teacher of Speech," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXIV
(December, 1938), 546.
10Ibid.
^ See A. Craig Baird, "Argumentation as a
Humanistic Subject," Quarterly Journal of Speech Education,
X (June, 1924), 258-64.
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since 1920, adopted the ways of behavioristic
and other varieties of psychology. We have
given new and more exact names to speech
attributes. We have, no doubt, contributed to
a new insight into our speech discipline.
Finally, a few of us have attempted to
adjust our teaching and thinking to the ways
of the social experimentalists, the progressive
educators. With these progressives we have
hoped to reconstruct the social order, provide
freedom for pupil and teacher, guidance rather
than discipline, life rather than school. 2
Conviction and Persuasion
Probably the most critical theoretical issue of
the "middle period" involved the "proper" relationship
between conviction and persuasion and their respective
roles in argumentation and debate.

Early argumentation

and debate writers, influenced by the prevailing faculty
psychology, had introduced the conviction-persuasion
dichotomy into their theory of the nature of argument.
Though Baker and Huntington had advised against considering
conviction and persuasion to be independent processes, sub
sequent writers failed to heed their counsel.

In 1917,

Mary Yost observed that "all of the usual textbooks . . .
approach the subject of argument from the point-of-view of
logic." 12 Likewise rejecting "outmoded psychological prin
ciples" as valid basis of argument, Yost preferred the
"conception of the mind as an organic unit performing a
12

Baird, "Educational Philosophy of Teacher of
Speech," p. 546.
■^Yost, "Argument from View of Sociology," p. 112.
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particular function— reasoning, feeling, willing— as may
be demanded by the situation the individual is meeting.
Though Yost wished her own analysis to be consistent with
current psychology, it was "the situation the individual
is meeting" that interested her most.

Accordingly, and as

the title of her article suggests, she viewed argument
within the social context and approached it from the point
of view of sociology.
Yost's thesis that argumentation must begin with a
view of the social situation in which the argument appears,
rather than with subject matter, presented three problems:
First, there is the search for charac
teristics of the typical social group in which
argument arises, which will distinguish it,
as a species is differentiated from its genus,
from social groups in which any act of dis
course may arise; second, the search for
characteristic effects which argument as an
act of communication has on both members of
the social group, speaker as well as audience;
and third, the search for characteristic
stages in the process of the act of communica
tion by which these effects are produced.
Yost judged, and rightly so, that "the most important
bearing the discussion of argument in this paper has upon
the teaching of argument is in regard to the treatment of
the audience."^

She said:

14Ibid., p. 111.
15Ibid., p. 113.
l6Ibid., p. 121.
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The question of how to attract the
audience's attention and eventually to focus
this on the subject, of how to present the
idea so that there is no chance of being mis
understood, of the choosing from the evidence
found trustworthy just that which will touch
the audience's experience most closely, of the
translation of the subject in terms of the
audience's interests, of making specific
suggestions as to how the ideas finally domi
nating the audience's attention can express
themselves in action which will further the
interests of the group, all these problems
must be faced bv the student as problems of a
real situation.
"Such a study does not deny the value of the logical
analysis of argument," Yost added.

"Rather its results

should be in harmony with the sound logical principles
18
underlying argument."
Professor Charles H. Woolbert agreed that "any
division of appeal and speech into conviction and per
suasion is unsound from the point of view of psychology
and unnecessary from the point of view of rhetorical
theory." 19

Contending that "mental processes can be

described and explained only in terms of psychology," he
turned to that "one concept that describes what happens
when an organism is stimulated in any and all possible
17Ibid., p. 123.
18
Ibid., p. 113. For Yost, it was a matter of
emphasis. She treated the brief, therefore, as a pre
liminary test of thinking rather than an outline guide for
the presentation of arguments.
■^Woolbert, "Conviction and Persuasion," p. 249.
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ways, . . . and which is expressed in the term action." 20
Woolbert concluded that "as a matter of the theory of
public address and appeal, all dualistic attitudes sepa
rating response into action and non-action are untenable
and misleading." 2 1

One tends to delineate "not in terms of

what the responder actually does," he said, "but in terms
of what the observer perceives him doing." 22

To phrase

it differently, Woolbert believed the conviction-persuasion
duality to be simply a means of distinguishing between
overt and covert response.

Recognizing that "if one aim,

response, covers all attempts to get results, then either
there is no place for logic in a system of persuasion in
its broader sense, or logic must be shown to run throughout
the whole process." 22 Woolbert opted for the latter
alternative and called for a rewriting of "the whole theory
of argumentation, conviction, persuasion, the rhetoric of
public address . . .
today."

to fit the facts of mind as accepted

Such an attempt, "tantamount to restating them in

terms of stimulus-response, object-subject, and
2®Ibid., p. 253. Woolbert used the terms response
and action interchangeably.
2^Ibid., p. 264.
22Ibid., p. 258.
22

Woolbert, "Logic in a System of Persuasion,"

p. 20.
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M

environment-attitude,"

should, according to Woolbert,

follow certain standards:
It will be one that will recognize the
monism of action; that will not concern itself
with any division of the mind into intellect,
emotions, and will; that will take the woof
and warp figure of Baker and Huntington at its
full value and hold to it; that will perceive
that if attention is the key of persuasion
we must not tolerate a dualism which prevents
us from showing how it unlocks all possible
processes; that will make the hearer the basis
of all divisions and not the subject-matter;
. . . that will reveal the full influence that
social relations play in securing response;
and finally, that will state the accepted
principles of composition and rhetoric in
terms of stimulus-response, stimulation-action. 5
In 1919, Woolbert attempted a restatement of
rhetorical theory.

Whether it met all the standards he had

set is outside the scope of this study.

What he said,

however, is vital, for it represented a new departure in
argumentation and debate theory.

Woolbert set out his

statement of principles and methods of persuasion in a
series of three articles in the Quarterly Journal of
Speech Education.

The first article, dealing with

"Principles," specifically involved the nature of
argumentation. 7 7

Though Edward Z. Rowell was, for the most

part, an unsympathetic reviewer, he summarized fairly
^Woolbert, "Conviction and Persuasion," p. 264.
25Ibid., p. 263.
^Woolbert, "Persuasion:

Principles and Methods."

77

The second and third articles will be included
in appropriate later sections of this chapter.
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and concisely Woolbert's first essay.

"In handling the sub

ject of 'Underlying Principles,'" Rowell said, "Woolbert
argues, in general, as follows":
All verbal communication involves one
fundamental aim, and that is response. All
responses have in common the element of
acceptance. In every act of acceptance
propositions are involved. When we come upon
these propositions we treat them as truths.
Responding to stimulation, therefore, is the
same as responding to truth, which, in turn,
is the same as accepting propositions as
true. All persuasion, accordingly, must have
for its one fundamental aim the acceptance as
true of some one or several propositions.
This implies (1) that sufficiency to gain
acceptance must be the ultimate standard for
all rhetoric even as regards the logical
principles of truth; (2) that the basis of
this sufficiency must be sought in the
occasion; and (3) that since each occasion is
dominated by such variable factors as the
speaker, the audience, and the ideas used to
secure the response desired, any sound system
of persuasion must possess the principle of
flexibility.28
The Critics' Influence
Stimulated by the ideas of Yost and Woolbert,
textbooks in argumentation and debate based on a reformula
tion or revision of persuasion theory began to appear.
Rowell cited four:

Persuasion and Debate by George Collins

and John Morris; Public Discussion and Debate by A. Craig
Baird; Argumentation by James A. Winans and William E.
TO
Utterback; and The Method of Argument by Charles Fritz.43
28Rowell, "Prolegomena to Argumentation," Part III,
pp. 396-97.
29
Collins and Morris, Persuasion and Debate; Baird,
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Collins and Morris1 Persuasion and Debate, perhaps
the most radical work, both in point of view and in
methodology, rested largely on the hypotheses of Woolbert.
The authors proposed "to provide a thoroughly modern
exposition of the basic logical and psychological prin
ciples and practical methods of oral and written persuasion," 30 and "to present a brief but comprehensive
discussion of that specialized form of persuasion commonly
31
known as debate."
Collins and Morris extended Woolbert's
system of persuasion envisioned in his journal articles,
incorporating both his organizational scheme and his
terminology. 32

They rejected the conviction-persuasion

dichotomy along with the traditional divisions and
terminology of logic.

Subsequent texts, however, incorpo

rated few of Collins and Morris' innovations.
Public Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed.; James A. Winans and
William E. Utterback, Argumentation (New York: Century and
Company, 1930); Charles Fritz, The Method of Argument
(New York:Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1931). Though purporting
to approach argument from "the psychological rather than
the logic" point of view, Fritz's book was nevertheless
largely traditional.
^Collins and Morris, Persuasion and Debate,
p. vii.
31

Ibid. This will be considered in a later section
of this chapter.
32 Ibid., p. ix. Of Woolbert's influence, they
said: "The authors owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to
Professor Charles Henry Woolbert of the University of Iowa,
who read the manuscript minutely and offered invaluable
criticism and advice," p. xi.
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Baird also wished to "restate familiar argumenta
tive principles in terms of present-day speech, logic,
and psychology." 33 Preferring to "update" and "restate"
rather than "rewrite" traditional theory, Baird incorpo
rated ideas of the New Logic as represented by Bernard
Bosanquet, Alfred Sidgwick, and John Dewey, as well as
psychological principles advocated by William James,
Carl E. Seashore, E. B. Tichener, R. S. Woodworth, and
Floyd H. Allport.

He acknowledged, moreover, a "great

debt to Professors G. P. Baker, H. B. Huntington, W. T.
Foster, J. M. O'Neill, Craven Laycock, and W. C. Shaw."^
Wishing to refine traditional theory, to modify it where
it was inconsistent with contemporary scientific and
philosophical findings, and, most of all, to incorporate
these new developments within the standard tradition,
Baird enunciated principles and worked out "accommoda
tions," both in his textbooks and in his teaching.^

His

legacy to subsequent discussion and debate works is
immeasurable. 36
33Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed.,
p. iii.
3 4Ibid.,
k .„
p. lv.
35Baird's specific theory is detailed m a sub
sequent section on discussion. See Baird, Public
Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed.; 1937 rev. ed.; Baird,
Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate.
36A later section on discussion indicates that
though the Ewbank-Auer texts cite Baird's works but
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The fact that Winans and Utterback wrote from the
psychological-sociological perspective does not neces
sarily demonstrate the influence of Yost or Woolbert on
their text, Argumentation. Winans, one of the earliest
speech scholars to apply modern psychological findings to
communication, had investigated attention as early as
1911,^ six years before Yost's article, and by 1914, he
had extended his theory to include "the modern theory of
OO
volition or will."
Winans and Woolbert, moreover,
advocated different brands of psychology.

Woolbert was a

confirmed behaviorist; Winans an empiricist.

Woolbert

redefined logic as a pervasive influence in the total
process of persuasion.

The Winans-Utterback text viewed

argumentation as "the art of influencing thought and
conduct by an appeal addressed primarily to the
sparingly, their theory does follow, or at least is con
sistent with, much of Baird's early probings. See Henry
Lee Ewbank and J. Jeffery Auer, Discussion and Debate:
Tools of a Democracy (New York: F. S. Crofts, 1941);
(rev. ed.; New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1951). For
other works indebted to Baird, see William A. Behl, Discus
sion and Debate: An Introduction to Argument (New York:
Ronald Press Company, 19 53) ; Waldo W. Braden and Earnest
Brandenburg, Oral Decision-Making: Principles of Discus
sion and Debate (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1§55).
•3T
James A. Winans, "The Attention of the Speaker,"
Public Speaking Review, I (October, 1911), 41-47.
38
James A. Winans, "Persuasion," Public Speaking
Review, III (March, 1914), 196-200. See Giles W. Gray,
"Some Teachers and the Transition to Twentieth-Century
Speech Education," in A History of Speech Education in
America, ed. by Karl Wallace (New York: Appleton-CenturyCrofts, 1954), pp. 434-35.
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understanding," 39 and treated logic traditionally.

Whereas

Woolbert wished to reconcile logic and persuasion, Winans
and Utterback saw no conflict between the two.
Though Yost's article did not seriously damage,
nor Woolbert's "rewriting" supplant, traditional argumen
tation and debate theory, most "middle period" writers
did not discredit the validity of their criticisms.
Winans, for example, thought the charges long overdue.
Most "new" texts, however, finding Woolbert's alternative
equally unacceptable, simply revised traditional philoso
phies and methodologies to accommodate new drifts in
theory.^0

These early probings resulted in the following

modifications in "middle period" theory:

an expanded

treatment of audience; an emphasis on argumentation as a
39Winans and Utterback, Argumentation, p. 3.
40 Edward Z. Rowell recognized the tendency toward
"accommodation" in his review of James M. O'Neill and
James H. McBurney, The Working Principles of Argument
iNew York: Macmillan Company, 1932). flIn general, the
reader will find in this work a serious attempt to pay
heed to the criticisms which have been levelled at our
traditional course in argumentation in the last fifteen
years. He will find here a clear recognition of all the
newly-emphasized consideration due the audience, and he
will meet here a frank attempt to mend and amend the prin
ciples and techniques which we have been teaching."
Edward Z. Rowell, "New Books: Working Principles of
Argument," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XIX (June, 1933),
429. Rowell objected, however, that the mending and the
amending are conspicuous," and concluded: "Thus our very
anxiety to give adequate recognition to the newer concep
tions of our discipline robs our books of the directness
and simplicity which we like to find in college textbooks,"
p. 430.
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balanced rhetorical effort; and a broadening of its scope
to include discussion.

Baird's analysis of argumentation

as a humanistic subject presaged these new directions.
His "admittedly fragmentary" proposal stated:
Argument shall be taught as a systematic
attempt to discover and present the truth,
whereas debating, although also having this
purpose, shall continue to aim first of all
at gaining a decision on definite issues by
means of e: act technique. Argument must con
tinue to base its procedure on the sure
foundation of logic and evidence. But a more
just proportion is to be observed between
Thought, Composition, and Delivery. Discus
sion will be substituted for formal debating;
figures and citation of authorities will not
submerge vital thought; individual expression
will have freer scope than is usually the
case in debate. . . . This shifting of
emphasis from the legal to the rhetorical and
philosophical w.i 11 logically lead to an
enlargement of the field of discussion. . . .
Argument, . , . will include the whole field
of philosophy, science, literature and
ethics.^
The Audience
Though Aristotle had insisted on the audiencecentered nature of persuasion in the fourth century B.C.,^
it was an interest in twentieth century developments in the
social sciences that catapulted the audience into a central
place in argumentation and debate theory.^

Whereas "early

^Baird, "Argumentation as a Humanistic Subject,"
p. 262.
42

See W. E. Utterback, "Aristotle's Contribution to
the Psychology of Argument," Quarterly Journal of Speech
Education, XI (June, 1925), 218-25.
^ Se e Woolbert's view of response; Yost's insist
ence on a sociological context.
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period" writers had examined the audience in chapters on
persuasion,44 many "middle period" texts included sepa
rate chapters on the audience in which they emphasized
"persuasion"; i.e., emotion appeals.4^

Various footnotes

and bibliographies indicate, moreover, that writers appro
priated their ideas about the audience primarily from con
temporary public speaking, psychology, and sociology texts.
In 1932, O'Neill and McBurney examined "five
psychological states which must be experienced by the
audience before effective communication takes place in
argument:

attention; perception; reasoning; judgment;
46
and overt action."
In his 1937 revision of Public Dis
cussion and Debate, Baird, relying on the analysis of the
psychologist H. L. Hollingsworth,47 discussed five general
aims in influencing the audience:

catch the attention of

the potential hearer; hold his interest through the
44See, for example, George Baker and Henry B.
Huntington, The Principles of Argumentation (rev. ed.;
Boston: Ginn and Company, 1905); James M. O'Neill, Craven
Laycock, and Robert L. Scales, Argumentation and Debate
(New York: Macmillan Company, 1917); Foster, Argumentation
and Debating, 1917 rev. ed.
45Audience-decision debating also gained a measure
of popularity during the period. See forensic section of
this chapter.
46
O'Neill and McBurney, Working Principles of
Argument, pp. 69-73.
47H. L. Hollingsworth, The Psychology of the
Audience (New York: American Book Company, 1935),
pp. 12-13. Whether O'Neill and McBurney and Hollingsworth
were drawing from a common source, or whether the
similarity is incidental, is difficult to ascertain.
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selection and arrangement of ideas; convince him through
logical argument and evidence; persuade him through proper
motivating materials; and secure from him definite
action. 48

Most "middle period" argumentation and debate

writers perceived their discipline to be thus multi
faceted, differences in textual treatments being primarily
a matter of emphasis.

Of particular interest, however,

was the role of attention in argumentation.
James A. Winans, probably the first public speaking
writer to discuss attention in light of modern psycho
logical theory, relied primarily on William James's
hypothesis that "what holds attention determines action." 49
Agreeing that "arguing well means holding the attention of
an audience," 50 Baird also investigated the nature of
48Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1937 rev.
ed., p. 240. Baird retained these distinctions in his
Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate, p. 214. Ewbank and
Auer also cited the Hollingsworth analysis, pointing out
that "in terms of these five tasks . . . as well as in
terms of the degree to which the audience is polarized or
oriented toward the speaker, Hollingsworth has classified
five chief types of audiences"; pedestrian; passive;
selected audience; concerted audience; and organized
audience. Ewbank and Auer, Discussion and Debate, 19 41
ed., pp. 223-24; 1951 rev. ed., pp. 208-209.
49William James, Psychology, Briefer Course
(New York; Henry Holt and Company, 1892), p. 448. See
also H. A. Overstreet, Influencing Human Behavior
(New York: W. W. Norton Company, Inc., 1925).
^^Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed.,
p. 273. O'Neill had included the concept in his 1917 revi
sion. O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and
Debate, p. 254. Babcock and Powell recognized the need for
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attention, observing that it occurs m

varying degrees;

51

that it may be voluntary or involuntary; and that certain
"conditions of attention" may be isolated.

These

"conditions" (intensity, movement, surprise, the familiar,
the concrete, suspense, and struggle) 52 appear m

certain

other works as stylistic devices for amplification. 53
Winans and Utterback held that "if the argument
itself is not sufficiently interesting to hold attention,
no matter how it is arranged, the speaker must employ
special methods to make it so."^

They suggested "two

ways to make a dull argument interesting:

relating it to

a topic or an activity in which the audience is already
holding attention, but they did not apply the James theory.
Robert W. Babcock and John H. Powell, How to Debate
(Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1923), pp. 50-51.
tr*1

Baird cited psychologists Stevenson Smith and
E. R. Guthrie who averred that degrees of attention result
from "differences in relative intensity of the various
stimuli, because of the particular orientation of our sense
organs at any moment, because of the variation of con
ductivity in neutral arcs, the result of habit and reen
forcement, and because of fatigue." Stevenson Smith and
E. R. Guthrie, General Psychology in Terms of Behavior
(New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1921), p. 204, cited
in Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed., p. 273.
■^Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed.,
pp. 273-75.
53See Angelo M. Pellegrini and Brents Stirling,
•
Argumentation and Public Discussion (Boston: D. C. Heath
and Company, 1936), pp. 112-21; Donald Hayworth and Robert
B. Capel, Oral Argument (New York: Harper and Sons, 19 34),
p. 302.
^Winans and Utterback, Argumentation, p. 231.
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interested,

cc

interest."^®

and expressing it m

language that arouses

Winans and Utterback perceived the "permanent

interests" of audiences to be fundamental interests, human
interest, interest in personages, and interest in conflict.
They outlined, moreover, the following methods of arousing
interest:

illustration; description and narration; con

crete expression; wit and humor; and the rhetorical
question.
Ewbank and Auer treated attention in a section
called "Basic Facts about Listening."
1.
2.
3.

They concluded:

Listeners cannot give continuous
attention. . . .
To hold attention, the style of the speech
must be varied. . . .
We attach meanings to concrete and spe
cific symbols more easily than to general
and abstract ones. . . .

Though including "effective rhetorical devices for gaining
attention," Ewbank and Auer dropped, as did subsequent
texts, the rationale provided by the James theory. 59
55See James's principle of derived interest.
William James, Talks to Teachers (New York: Henry Holt
and Company, 1899), p. 94.
^Winans and Utterback, Argumentation, p. 231.
^ Ibid., pp. 232-41.
Cp
Ewbank and Auer, Discussion and Debate, 1941 ed.,
pp. 452-57, passim.
59 Ibid., pp. 457-58. They included questions,
illustrations, examples, figurative language, loaded
words, and humor.
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"Middle period" texts also offered specific
prescriptions for analyzing audiences.*50

Though differing

systems (i.e., lists of questions) appeared,*51 most writers
sought to determine an audience's knowledge and beliefs
about a speaker, his subject, and to a lesser extent, the
occasion.**^

Collins and Morris wished simply to determine

the probable acceptance-attitudes of an audience.**1

The

6n
uO'Neill summarized "the whole theory of handling
an audience" as follows: "Know your audience and adapt
your speech to your audience." O'Neill, Laycock, and
Scales, Argumentation and Debate, p. 283. Baird labeled
discussion and debate "a problem of influencing the
audience." Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed.,
p. 272. The Winans-Utterback text agreed, asserting that
"the hearer's knowledge of the subject, his interest in it,
and his beliefs and bias on it so largely determine his
reaction that an analysis of his attitude is essential to
the construction of effective argument." Winans and
Utterback, Argumentation, p. 189.
C. 1

See particularly Collins and Morris, Persuasion
and Debate, pp. 58-65; Winans and Utterback, Argumentation,
pp. 172-209; Ewbank and Auer, Discussion and Debate, 1951
rev. ed., pp. 232-35; Behl, Discussion and Debate,
pp. 165-79. O'Neill and McBurney's representative list of
factors in audience analysis follows: "1. The existing
status or needs of the audience in relation to the proposi
tion. 2. The environmental background of the audience.
3. The personality type of the audience. 4. The
acceptance attitude toward the proposition. 5. Famili
arity with the proposition. 6 . Emotional attitude toward
the proposition. 7. Attitude toward the arguer." O'Neill
and McBurney, Working Principles of Argument, pp. 73-80.
fiO
These will be examined in detail in the section
on emotional proof.
63See Collins and Morris, Persuasion and Debate,
p . 62.
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development of discussion theory probably influenced
treatments of the larger audience.

Ewbank and Auer, for

example, included chapters on "How Individuals in Groups
Think" and "Characteristics of the Average Audience"
which drew heavily from contemporary sociological and
psychological research.

Behl's later list of "charac

teristics which are virtually universal to any audience
situation" 64 (that is, the tendencies to believe what one
wishes to believe, to rationalize, and to respond to per
suasive appeals) emphasized a continued interest in pathos
as a primary tool of audience adaptation.

These and

similar lists of principles governing motivation are con
sidered in a subsequent section on emotional proof.
Balanced Rhetorical Approach
The rejection of the conviction-persuasion
dichotomy by most "middle period" writers^5 along with an
64Behl, Discussion and Debate, p. 165.
^Foster, one exception, was criticized for retain
ing the conviction-persuasion dichotomy in his 1917 revi
sion of Argumentation and Debating. See William Hawley
Davis, "New Books: Argumentation and Debating," Quarterly
Journal of Speech Education, XV (January, H IT S ) , 128-31.
Disappointed, moreover, with his failure to emphasize
persuasion in the 1932 edition, Raymond F. Howes observed:
"Dr. Foster still thinks of argument and persuasion as
separate processes." Howes, "New Books: Argumentation and
Debating," p. 93. Howes editorialized: "The abandonment
o£ that concept in recent years is in one sense new, since
psychologists and rhetoricians have learned something about
the human mind since ancient times, and in another sense
fundamental, because it necessitates pervasive changes in
the discussion of argument itself. Thus the analysis of
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increased interest in the audience resulted in a search—
in the classical sense— for "all the available means of
persuasion," the practical effect of which elevated the
status of emotional and ethical appeals in argumentation
and debate theory and emphasized style and delivery as
integral to a "total" process.66

Though many "early

period" writers had embraced, at least philosophically,
67
Baker's "woof" of argumentation,
and though argumentative
"composition" had called for chapters on style and arrange
ment, early texts treated these elements as subsidiary to
the audience is not something that the speaker does after
he has prepared his brief, merely for the purpose of dis
covering the best way to present contentions already
selected. The knowledge and beliefs of the audience form
a standard of relevance for the contentions themselves.*1
Donald Ecroyd leveled a similar criticism at the McBurney,
O'Neill, and Mills revision. He said: "The chapters
dealing with the actual seeking of audience agreement,
however, seem to have been written as re-definitions and
defenses of such older notions as the conviction-persuasion
dichotomy, and a classification of motive appeals." Donald
Ecroyd, "New Books: Argumentation and Debate," Quarterly
Journal of Speech, XXXVII (December, 1951), 50 3.
66Considerations regarding arrangement appeared in
sections on briefing or case construction.
^Baker had included sections on arrangement and
style. George Pierce Baker, Principles and Argumentation
(Boston: Ginn and Company, 1895), Ch. VII. Alden added
a section on delivery. Raymond Alden, The Art of Debate
(New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1900), pp. 203-215.
Laycock and Scales used invention, selection, arrangement,
and presentation as the basic outline of their text.
Craven Laycock and Robert L. Scales, Argumentation and
Debate (New York: Macmillan Company, 190 4). 0 1Neill
followed their organizational pattern. O'Neill, Laycock,
and Scales, Argumentation and Debate.
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logical proof.

The sociological-psychological perspective,

on the other hand, encouraged viewing style, delivery, and
motivational and ethical proofs as integral to an organic
theory of argumentation.
Emotional Proof
Emotional proof, reserved by certain writers for
gaining attention in an introduction and perhaps amplifying
the appeal in a conclusion, 6 8 assumed a more central role
in "middle period" argumentation and debate theory.

Not

only did it achieve status equal to conviction, but modern
psychology argued that there was no division between the
t w o .

^

Most texts continued, nevertheless, to examine the

processes separately,^

the main divergence from tradi

tional theory being simply a greater emphasis on emotional
proof. 71

■
That emphasis, derived primarily
from a renewed

interest in the audience and from the reevaluation of the
^Se e Babcock and Powell, How to Debate, pp. 5-7.
69
See Rowell's distinctions between the psycho
logical duality and the rhetorical duality (Aristotelian).
Rowell, "Prolegomena to Argumentation," Part IV, pp. 59660 4. Nichols and Baccus quoted Rowell's analysis and con
tinued to treat conviction and persuasion separately.
Egbert R. Nichols and Joseph H. Baccus, Modern Debating
(New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1936),
pp. 14-15.
70Baker and Huntington had earlier reasoned that
"for purposes of instruction" it is convenient to treat the
processes separately. Baker and Huntington, Principles,
1905 ed., p. 11.
71

processes.

Collins and Morris did not label separate
Collins and Morris, Persuasion and Debate.
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place of persuasion in argumentation, centered on analyses
of audience beliefs, classifications of emotions, and
restatements of principles of motivation in terms of con
temporary psychology.
Though Baird paraphrased Shaw's definition of
belief (the "certainty or assurance with respect to the
alleged truth of an idea"), 72 he recognized that "belief
. . . is (according to modern psychology) a form of
behavior." 73

Later developments in the social sciences

gave even greater insights into the nature of belief.

In

their revision of Discussion and Debate, Ewbank and Auer,
for example, cited the findings of social psychologists
David Krech and Richard S. Crutchfield who contended that
"as soon as we experience any facts, they will be perceived
as organized into some sort of meaningful whole." 74

From

this "universal characteristic of the cognitive process,"
Ewbank and Auer concluded:
72 See Shaw, Art of Debate, p. 3. Shaw had dichoto
mized belief: that based on reason, conviction; that based
on faith, persuasion. Baird cited O'Neill and Weaver's
distinction. Baird said: "Belief is a form of behavior
in which tendencies to respond in any given way are touched
off by a combination of words called a proposition." See
J. M. O'Neill and A. T. Weaver, The Elements of Speech
(2d ed.; New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1932),
p. 268. See also Smith and Guthrie, General Psychology,
pp. 195-96.
73Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed.,
— .

y •

C•

^David Krech and Richard S. Crutchfield, Theory
and Problems of Social Psychology (New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Company, 1948), p. 86.
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When analyzing an audience perhaps the
most important observation to make about
belief is that all men tend to formulate some
kind of belief about situations they encounter.
That is, men perceive with meaning and inter
pretation, even though they do not have all
the evidence.^5
A general agreement with Winans1 position that "to
convince or to persuade a man is largely a matter of identi
fying the opinion or cause of action which you wish him to
adopt with one or more of his fixed opinions or customary
courses of action" 7

prompted an interest in the existing

beliefs of an audience. 77

Winans and Utterback went so far

as to suggest that the beliefs of an audience should become
75Ewbank and Auer, Discussion and Debate, 1951
rev. ed., p. 227.
76James A. Winans, Public Speaking (rev. ed.;
New York: Century Company, 1917), p. 276.
77
See Collins and Morris, Persuasion and Debate,
pp. 4-6, 57. Defining persuasion as "that form of instrumental composition which is used by a writer or speaker
to influence a particular audience to shape its conduct
(whether thought or action) in conformity with his desire,"
Collins and Morris believed that "persuading a single
individual or a group is largely a matter of connecting,
or identifying a desired belief or action to or with one
or more established beliefs or customary courses of
action."
(Author's italics omitted.) J. Walter Reeves
and Hoyt H. Hudson had considered "the principles for
choosing persuasive material" to be: "Do not disturb any
more than necessary the fixed beliefs of your hearers, but
rather show, if possible, that your views are in accord
with their fixed beliefs.11 J. Walter Reeves and Hoyt H.
Hudson, Principles of Argument and Debate (Boston: D. C.
Heath and Company, 1941), p. 116. Ewbank and Auer had
defined persuasion as "the process of securing acceptance
of an idea, or an action, by connecting it favorably with
the listeners' (or readers') attitudes, beliefs, and
desires." Ewbank and Auer, Discussion and Debate, 1941
ed., p. 261; 1951 rev. ed., p. 241.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

143

the speaker's basic premises.

Regarding the relative

strengths of beliefs, they said:
Certain conditions are conducive to the
formation of strong beliefs. With these con
ditions in mind, the speaker can infer from
the background and experience of his hearers
what many of their strongest beliefs are.
Those beliefs are likely to be strongest
(1) which are based upon habitual modes of
action, (2) which are closely bound up with
the hearer's personal interests and feelings,
(3) which are an integral part of a system of
beliefs felt to be mutually dependent, or
(4) which are held by all, or nearly all, of
those in the hearer's social group. 8
Ewbank and Auer also emphasized the importance of isolating
the chief factors which determine the relative strength of
beliefs.

They cited numerous experimental studies in both

editions of Discussion and Debate which demonstrated the
following factors to be determinants of belief strength:
length of time held; influence of group and expert opinion;
ability to influence beliefs of others; personal, social,
or economic status (degree of involvement);79 and desira
bility of belief.**®
Baird averred that "to the extent that the emotions
which stimulate approval are aroused will the speech be
successful." 81 He cited contemporary treatments of emotion
78Winans and Utterback, Argumentation, p. 142.
79
This was added to the revised edition. Ewbank
and Auer, Discussion and Debate, 1951 rev. ed., pp. 228-30.
80Ibid., 1941 ed., pp. 247-48.
p. 280.

8^Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed.,
See James, Psychology, Briefer Course, pp. 373-90.
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which perceived it as "a consciousness, or awareness, of
bodily changes, these bodily changes resulting from some
stimulus which is communicated to the higher centers of
the nervous system." 82 Allport put it this way: "This
fused complex of sensory experience is what we call an
emotion.
The tradition 84 of classifying emotions gave way
during the "middle period" to the classification of
motives. 85

Writers disputed, moreover, over the difference

in the terms.

Winans cited the positions of John Dewey,
or
William McDougall, and Edward Lee Thorndike.
Dewey had
®2Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed.,
p. 281.
83Floyd H. Allport, Social Psychology (Boston:
Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1924), p . 85, cited in Baird,
Public Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed., p. 281.
84See Lane Cooper, The Rhetoric of Aristotle
(New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1932),
pp. 93-131; W. C. Robinson, Forensic Oratory (Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1893), pp. 14-lS; Winans, Public
Speaking, 1917 rev. ed., pp. 261-63.
85See, however, Baird, Public Discussion and
Debate, 1937 rev. ed., p. 253. Baird referred his readers,
moreover, to Seashore's classification and discussion of
emotions and feelings. Carl E. Seashore, Introduction to
Psychology (New York: Macmillan Company, 19 23),
pp. 302-337. A. E. Phillips' listing of "seven impelling
motives" was particularly influential, though subsequent
writers amended his categories. A. E. Phillips, Effective
Speaking (Chicago: Newton Company, 1908), p. 48. See also
Shaw, Art of Debate, pp. 303-304; Baird, Public Discussion
and Debate, 1928 ed., p. 281; James M. O'Neill and Rupert
L. Cortright, Debate and Oral Discussion (rev. ed.;
New York: Century Company, 1931), p. 167.
O£
Winans, Public Speaking, 1917 rev. ed., pp.
196-97.
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contended that the most evident way in which we arouse
emotion to fix attention is by awakening desire for the
end sought, an effective desire being called a motive.®^
Thorndike suggested that an emotion which moves to action
is a motive, though he did not consider all motives to be
emotions. 8 8

Baird, on the other hand, insisted that "all

emotions are motives."

89

Later writers paid little attention to individual
emotions and motives, investigating, rather, bases or prin
ciples which govern motivation.

Winans had set out three

such principles in Public Speaking:

"in dealing with those

practical issues that directly affect human conduct, the
very basis of argument is emotion; or . . . the major
premise of such an argument is the expression of an
emotion"; the "strong tendency of men to believe what they
wish to believe"; and, "emotions not properly belonging to
87John Dewey, Psychology (3d rev. ed.; New York:
American Book Company, 1886), p. 366. See also William
McDougall, An Introduction to Social Psychology (4th ed.;
Boston: J. W. Luce and Company, l9ll), p. 241. Baker had
advised a speaker to "choose the highest motive to which
you think your audience will respond." Baker, Principles,
p. 351. O'Neill and Cortright, on the other hand, advised
appealing to the "lowest basic motive common to all
present." O'Neill and Cortright, Debate and Oral Dis
cussion, p. 16 8. These positions are not necessarily
inconsistent, however, depending on one's definition of
"highest" and "lowest."
88

Edward Lee Thorndike, The Elements of Psychology
(2d ed.; New York: A. G. Seiler^ 1907), p. 89.
89 Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1937
rev. ed., p . 253.
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the argument itself, affect decisions."

90

Ewbank and Auer

discussed six bases of persuasion in the first edition of
Discussion and Debate and called them "the main-springs of
human motivations." 91

They expanded their list in the

revised edition to include the following:
1.

We tend to believe what we want to believe.

2.

We tend to believe, and to do, as we are told.

3.

We tend to act in accordance with our dominant
attitudes.

4.

We tend to make stereotyped responses to
stereotyped stimuli.

5.

We tend to respond to the emotional connota
tions of words.

6.

We tend to yield to the repetition of stimuli.

7.

We tend to accept ideas from those we like.

8.

We tend to conform.

9.
10.

We tend, when persuaded, to act immediately.
We tend to regard our actions as

l o g i c a l .

Baird attempted to isolate the same phenomena in his
analysis of the audience as individuals and as a group.
He concluded:
1.

The individual and the audience as a group are

90Winans, Public Speaking, 1917 rev. ed.,
pp. 250-55.
91 Ewbank and Auer, Discussion and Debate, 1941 ed.,
pp. 261—66.
^2Ibid., 1951 rev. ed., pp. 240-45.
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affected by basic emotional responses and
desires.
2.

The individual and the audience as a group
tend to believe what satisfies their primary
and secondary needs and wants.

3.

The individual and the audience as a group
tend to respond to connotative language.

4.

The individual and the crowd tend to be
suggestible.

5.

The individual and the crowd tend to
rationalize.

6.

The individual and the crowd tend to think and
act from prejudice.

7.

The individual and the audience tend to accept
fallacious arguments. 9 3

McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills included a compre
hensive approach to motivation based on data provided by
contemporary psychological and sociological studies. 94
Though Mills defined motivation "generally as the process
of stimulating inner urges and desires which prompt persons
to action," 9 5 he suggested for practical purposes Robert H.
Q *0
Baird, Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate,
pp. 215-21.
94
Glen Mills was responsible for this particular
chapter. James H. McBurney, James M. O'Neill, and Glen E.
Mills, Argumentation and Debate: Techniques of a Demo
cratic Society (New York: Macmillan Company, 1951).
^I b i d . , p. 143.
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Seashore's "operational definition":

"Motivation is the

selective reinforcement or inhibition of stimuli or sets
(preparatory responses) evoking any given type of response
in competition with stimuli or sets leading to other
gc
behavior."
Mills's discussion in the McBurney, O'Neill,
and Mills revision integrated traditional notions of
motivation into treatments of "persuasive values of
motivation" (utilizes reaction tendencies and commands
attention) and methods to "associate motive appeals with"
the proposition (suggestion, rationalization, and forthright
statement).97

He also included "some typical lists of

appeals.
Though most writers of the "middle period"

99

had

Robert H. Seashore, "Introduction to Motivation"
(lecture delivered at Northwestern University in 1949),
cited in McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, Argumentation and
Debate, p. 143.
q7
McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, Argumentation and
Debate, pp. 146-48, 151-53. See Behl's discussion of
suggestion.
98Behl added suggestion as a factor in persuasion.
Relying on the definition of Emory S. Bogardus (Emory S.
Bogardus, Fundamentals of Social Psychology [4th ed.;
New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1950], p. 275)
that "suggestion is the process of sending out specific
stimuli to which uncritical responses are made," Behl
postulated that "persons react favorably to certain stimuli
whether or not those stimuli present a logical pattern or
configuration." Behl, Discussion and Debate, p. 167. He
then identified three factors influencing suggestibility—
knowledge, fatigue, and the existence of a crowd— a knowl
edge of which would be helpful to a speaker, pp. 167-78.
99 Hayworth and Capel offered a novel approach to
persuasive appeals. Having distinguished the academics
"those who live largely in a world of facts, who get their
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included considerations of motivation in their texts, some
believed emotional proof to be outside the scope of— if
not argumentation— then at least their particular studies.
Pellegrini and Stirling, for example, in a "note to
instructors" said:
We have not dealt with the psychological
implications of speech and argumentation. We
have felt, in the first place, that a treat
ment of this phase of the speech discipline
would not fall within the scope of our work.
The problems of motivation, persuasion, etc.,
are properly considerations for advanced
courses in speech and argumentation. We have
designed this text primarily for a beginning
course in argumentation. 00
Such pronouncements occurred, however, early in the period.
Ethical Appeals
Baker and Huntington had recognized that "the means
by which a speaker aims to produce action is by winning
sympathy for himself or his subject— usually both."101
Foster had listed "the man" as one of the three sources of
knowledge of life chiefly from reading, and who are defi
nitely introspective" from the "warm 'human' people who,
without bothering to think things out for themselves, take
their beliefs from their most immediate desires and from
those who happen to be near them," the authors turned to
"the fundamental appeals of academic debating." Hayworth
and Capel, Oral Argument, pp. 271, 284. They listed four:
the social good; the rxghts of man; straight thinking; and
good fellowship, p. 284.
100Pellegrini and Stirling, Argumentation and
Public Discussion, p. ix. See also Babcock and Powell,
How to Debate, p. 214.
101Baker and Huntington, Principles, 1905 rev. ed.,
p. 294.
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persuasion, and had isolated the following characteristics:
sincerity; earnestness; simplicity; fairness; self-control;
humor; sympathy; and personal magnetism.^®^
that a speaker must "know human nature." 103

O'Neill added
Most "middle

period" texts simply reiterated various combinations of
these characteristics,^®** the primary development in theory
being an increased emphasis on the value of ethos for
argumentation and debate.

Some authors discussed the

intelligence, character, and goodwill characteristics of
classical invention. 105

Ewbank and Auer equated ethical

proof with prestige.'*'®®

Winans and Utterback presented

one of the more comprehensive treatments of ethical proof.
They averred that an audience's estimate of a speaker
"determines to what extent the speaker may rely upon his
own unsupported assertion for the acceptance of his
premises," and "a speaker who enjoys their [the audience's]
102

Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 1932 rev.
ed., p. 233. Foster included the ''good man' concept in
discussing personal magnetism, p. 238.
103
O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and
Debate, p. 265.
104
O'Neill and Cortright, for example, included
vigorous, sincere, earnest, fair, just, and reasonable.
O'Neill and Cortright, Debate and Oral Discussion, p. 166.
Reeves and Hudson mentioned modest, fair, and sincere.
Reeves and Hudson, Principles of Argument and Debate,
p. 114.
^®®See Behl, Discussion and Debate, pp. 174-75;
Braden and Brandenburg, Oral Decision-Making, p. 474.
10 6

Ewbank and Auer, Discussion and Debate, 1941
ed., pp. 266-67; 1951 rev. ed., pp. 246-47.
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confidence often exerts an influence all out of proportion
10 7
to its logical value."
Style
Interested primarily in oral argumentation, "middle
period" writers distinguished the variables of oral and
written communication in more detail than had their
predecessors. 10 8

Russell Wagner set out these differences

clearly:
Speech must be almost instantaneously
apprehended. Connections must be plain. The
structure, relationships, and emphases must
be much more plain and effective. Most of
all, speaking must be more concrete and vivid
than writing.
10 7Wmans
.
and Utterback, Argumentation, p. 172.
Gustave Le Bon, a psychologist, labeled the speaker's
authority the "fundamental element of persuasion." Gustave
Le Bon, The Crowd (New York: Macmillan Company, 19 25) ,
p p

.

1 5 7 - f s ":------------------

10 8

Alden, Art of Debate. Certain "middle period"
stylistic theorists did not, however, reflect this purely
oral approach.
109Wagner, Handbook on Argumentation, pp. 88-89.
Wagner suggested that: "Oral composition differs from
written also in that it is more direct and personal, more
informal, more communicative. It is the discourse of one
person speaking to another, face to face, and therefore
resembles, in structure and .style, conversation at its
best. The exigencies and conventions of the platform
require it to be good English, the continuity of the dis
course requires attention to unity and coherence, but at
all points it must be direct, oral speech. The speaker
uses the passive voice less often than the writer. . . . He
amplifies more, supplies more details; he uses more
appositional and parenthetical expressions, since he must
dwell on each idea until it is clear. Many sentences are
therefore longer than they would be in written composition.
But the alternation of long and very short sentences is
more noticeable in oral than in written speech."
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Though considerations of style appeared in chapters on
persuasion, composition, language, semantics, and con
struction, most texts simply enumerated traditional
characteristics of "good style"11® and/or stylistic
devices for elaboration or amplification.111
Some writers turned to the popular field of
semantics for insights into the nature and components of
style.

Alan Nichols, for example, believed instruction in

semantics to be an essential part of "the principles and
techniques which assist the investigation and presentation
O'Neill and Cortright, for example, added
"originality" to O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales's "brevity,
simplicity, vividness and variety." O'Neill and Cortright,
Debate and Oral Discussion, p. 150; O'Neill, Laycock, and
Scales, Argumentation and Debate, pp. 273-82. Some other
representative methods of classification follow: Ewbank
and Auer referred to "clear" language. Ewbank and Auer,
Discussion and Debate, 1941 ed., p. 445; 1951 rev. ed.,
p. 423. Reeves and Hudson included interest, along with
clarity, as the qualities of style "that debaters should
mainly cultivate." Reeves and Hudson, Principles of Argu
ment and Debate, pp. 129-33. Wagner discussed clearness,
coherence, interest, and emphasis or force, "the qualities
desired in good argumentative style." Wagner, Handbook of
Argumentation, pp. 89-102. Behl labeled "the three significant principles of style" as: clarity (adaptation to
listener, accuracy of words, simplicity of sentences);
forcefulness (variety of words, repetition, connotative
words, simple words, an economy of words, variety of
sentence structure, variety of sentence types); and
spontaneity. Behl, Discussion and Debate, pp. 192-96.
111Pellegrini and Stirling, for example, included
restatement, repetition, general illustration, the
probative example, the rhetorical question, negation, the
illustrative analogy, contrast, and comparison. Pellegrini
and Stirling, Argumentation and Public Discussion,
pp. 134-42. See also Hayworth and Capel, Oral Argument,
pp. 303-308.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

153

of a subject of controversy." 112

In the conclusion to a

chapter labeled "Semantics," he summarized as follows:
The chief office of semantics is to make
the student eternally aware of the inherent
ambiguity of words. The word is not the
object described. The object may, therefore,
be something entirely different from the words
used to describe it, or there may be no object
whatever. We never can express all there is
to say about an object; therefore, our descrip
tion must always be imperfect. Words may be
spoken and written in a multitude of senses,
and may be heard, read, and understood in a
multitude of other senses. We must, therefore,
be constantly on the alert to apprehend the
correct meaning and to achieve the truth.
Baird's Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate also began
with "principles of language usage."

Having cited twelve

semantic principles relevant to argumentation, discussion,
and d e b a t e , B a i r d offered the following suggestions for
concrete application.
1.

Adapt your language to the audience.

2.

Use accurate language.

3.

Use objective language.

4.

Be concrete.

5.

Be concise.

6 . Use unhackneyed language.
7.

Use illustrative or figurative language.

112

Alan Nichols, Discussion and Debate (New York:
Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1941), p. 426.
113Ibid., pp. 425-26.
^■^See Baird, Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate,
pp. 203-204.
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8. Use oral language in speech composition.
9.

Use variety in language.

Baird also discussed sentence structure and types of
sentence forms and counselled that one might improve his
oral style^"^ by reading, writing, and listening.

He also

advised that one acquire a knowledge of logic and semantics,
and that he study language.
Delivery
"Middle period" writers followed their predecessors
in examining methods of delivery, 117 the most common list
ing being manuscript, memorized, impromptu, and extemporaneous speaking.

The tendency to "can" rebuttal speeches 118

probably prompted the vociferous defense of and insistence
upon extemporaneous delivery in debating evident in some
119
quarters.
A general commitment to the extempore
115Ibid., pp. 204-210.
116Ibid., pp. 211-12.
117
See Alden, Art of Debate, pp. 187-98.
118 See Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 1917
rev. ed., p. 306.
119 Not everyone, however, espoused pure extempo
raneous delivery. O'Neill and Cortright, for example,
examined both its advantages (flexibility, allows adapta
tion to mood of audience, physical and nervous advantages,
finer convincingness, inspiration of the audience) and
its disadvantages (inaccurate, repetitious, monotonous,
poor judgment), and preferred the "mixed method" of
memorizing parts of the speech and extemporizing the rest.
O'Neill and Cortright, Debate and Oral Discussion,
pp. 217-23.
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method for debating continued, moreover, throughout the
period.^20
Probably at least partially as a result of the
excesses of elocution, most "early period" texts did not
emphasize principles of delivery.

In 1918, C. F. Lindsley

observed that
average debating is not good public speaking.
. . . There is nothing of the human quality,
no conversational style, no sincere
personality. . . . 2-*Aware of these and similar indictments, Baird included a
chapter in Public Discussion and Debate on delivery in
which he stressed voice and bodily action. 122

In reviewing

the text, Charles A. Marsh questioned "the wisdom of
including in a work on argumentation these technical sub123
jects taction and voice]."
By the end of the "middle
period," however, a comprehensive treatment of delivery
120

See, for example, Wagner, Handbook of Argumen
tation, pp. 114-16; Baird, Argumentation, Discussion, and
Debate, p. 246. Behl suggested, on the other hand, that
"the type of delivery that the speaker elects to use in any
one argumentative situation will vary according to the
circumstances." Behl, Discussion and Debate, p. 207.
121

C. F. Lindsley, "Delivery in Debate," Quarterly
Journal of Speech Education, IV (January, 1918), ll7.
122

Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed.,
pp. 335-50. See Harry F. Covington, The Fundamentals of
Debate (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1918), p. 208.
123Charles A. Marsh, "New Books: Public Discussion
and Debate," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XV (February,
1929), 116.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

156

was the rule, rather than the exception.

Baird's text

marks a shift toward including these elements as integral
to a total theory of argumentation and debate.
Relying heavily on Woolbert's treatment of delivery
in Fundamentals of Speech,124 Baird suggested that:
Good speaking
emotion . . .
Good speaking
voice and the

is emotional speaking; and
is a general bodily activity.
requires activity of both the
body. 25

Baird proffered practical advice to the debater, moreover,
regarding "the aspects of action, posture, movement, and
gesture." 1 26

He summarized, "the elements of vocalization"

(quality, force or intensity, pitch, and duration or
.
time) 127 and discussed pronunciation, pointing
out its
Charles H. Woolbert, Fundamentals of Speech
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 19 20). Cited m Baird,
Public Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed., p. 336.
125 Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed.,
p. 342.
126

Ibid., pp. 342-45. Baird's discussion included
specific advice regarding platform manners. Crocker's
listing was more pedantic: "See that your clothes are
pressed. Wear your best suit when you go on the platform.
. . . Keep your shoes shined and do not let your socks fall
down around your ankles. . . . Wear suspenders. . . . Go
into the washroom before the debate to be sure your hair
is all right, and then leave it alone." He also included
lists of visual and auditory "don'ts." The following is
a sampling: "Don't button and unbotton [sic] your coat.
. . . Don't pick your nose. Don't rub your beard. . . .
Don't smoke your fountain pen. . . . Don't consume gallons
of water. . . . Don't cough. . . . Don't tear paper."
Lionel Crocker, Argumentation and Debate (New York:
American Book Company, 1944), pp. 247, 256-57. See also
Winans, Public Speaking, 1917 ed., pp. 492-96.
^•2^Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed.,
pp. 345-48.
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importance, offering suggestions for its improvement, and
examining the concept of "standard pronunciation." 128
Writers of the "middle period" also incorporated
Winans' criterion of "conversational" delivery into their
texts.

Winans had talked about "conversational speech" in
Public Speaking,129 and in Argumentation, written with
Utterback, he declared:
As regards delivery, public speaking is
best thought of as a conversation between the
speaker and his audience. It is not a one-man
activity, but involves a process of give-andtake in which the audience plays an active and
important part. . . .
Not only should the speaker conceive of
his speaking as an enlarged conversation, but
he should, while on the platform, have the
feeling that it is conversation. He should
not feel that he is talking at his audience or
over their heads, but that he is talking with
them. His delivery will not be effective
unless he feels that he has entered into a
direct, personal relation with his hearers. 30
Winans and Utterback held that "delivery is con
versational when, and only when, two conditions exist:
. . . a full realization of the content of one's words as
one utters them"; and "a lively sense of communication." 131
128Ibid., pp. 348-50.
129 Winans, Public Speaking, 1917 rev. ed.,
pp. 25-32.
^^Winans and Utterback, Argumentation,
pp. 300-301.
131
Ibid., p. 302. See Ehninger's discussion of
Campbell's "lively" idea. Douglas Ehninger, "Campbell,
Blair, and Whately Revisited," Southern Speech Journal,
XXVIII (Spring, 1963), 169-82. See also Lloyd F. Bitzer,
"The Lively Idea: A Study of Hume's Influence on
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Though many writers appropriated the phrase, "lively
sense of communication," they tended to ignore, or
perhaps assume, the "first condition of conversational
delivery." 132

Babcock, and Powell's treatment, an excep-

tion, did insist on "an idea worth communicating." 133
Winans and Utterback admitted, nevertheless, that "con
versational quality alone does not insure good delivery,"
for it "may also have all of the faults of the speaker's
private conversation, perhaps in an exaggerated degree."1^4
Egbert R. Nichols and Joseph H. Baccus argued that "public
speaking is not conversation despite the fact that it is
135
based upon it to a certain extent."
Though granting
George Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric" (unpublished
doctoral dissertation, University of Iowa, 1962).
1 '50

Harrison B. Summers and Forest L. Whan concen
trated simply on "a sense of communication" in their book,
How to Debate, though they included the characteristics
"animation',"11 which corresponded to the term "lively," and
"sincerity." Harrison B. Summers and Forest L. Whan, How
to Debate (New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1940),
pp. 282-83.
133They added "earnestness," "directness," and
"spontaneity." Babcock and Powell, How to Debate,
pp. 252-55.
134
Winans and Utterback, Argumentation, pp. 30 3304. See also Ewbank and Auer, Discussion and Debate,
1941 ed., p. 463; 1951 rev. ed., pp. 436-37.
^35Nichols and Baccus, Modern Debating, p. 300.
"One does not speak to an audience or to a composite mind
as he speaks to a companion in conversation. There is a
psychological difference. In conversation speech and reply
are a mutual affair. In public speaking speech is one
sided except for the subtle, silent, psychological emana
tions from individuals in an audience. Conversation often
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the concept of public speaking as "enlarged conversation"
to have "a measure of truth," they believed "improved conversation" to be an equally appropriate criterion.

136

A cursory examination of texts co-authored by
O'Neill demonstrates the "middle period" trend toward
incorporating principles of delivery into argumentation
and debate theory.

In his revision of the Laycock and

Scales text, O'Neill organized his treatment of delivery
around the four methods of presentation.

He included,

moreover, a few specific suggestions regarding use of
notes, outlines, and charts. 137

Suggesting that "it is

impossible in this book to discuss platform speaking at
any length," O'Neill advised students to take courses in
speaking, and to practice before real audiences. 138 In
Debate and Oral Discussion, O'Neill and Cortright added
"desirable qualities" 138 of delivery and recommended
"reality" 140 in presentation.

O'Neill and McBurney

expanded the treatment of delivery in Working Principles
lacks the dignity that public speaking demands, but it does
furnish the basis for directness, intimacy of communica
tion, and earnest sincerity needed in public speaking."
136Ibid., pp. 300-301.
137 O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and
Debate, pp. 441-43.
138 .
...
Ibid., p. 443.
l390'Neill and Cortright, Debate and Oral Discus
sion, pp. 223-24.
14QIbid., pp. 224-25.
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of Argument to two chapters in which they included methods
of presentation, the conversational basis of delivery,
emotion, and personal and persuasive qualities in delivery.
They introduced, moreover, a detailed discussion of platform decorum, voice, and action. 141

McBurney, O'Neill,

and Mills, on the other hand, compacted these notions of
delivery into a section of a chapter called "The Advocate
as Speaker."142
Discussion
The incorporation of discussion into argumentation
and debate theory, a "middle period" development, also
helped to answer some of the criticisms leveled at the
discipline.

Not only did the addition of discussion

broaden argumentation's theoretical base by incorporating
modern psychological and sociological thought, but it
also provided a practical methodology for meeting social
problems.
Public discussion, certainly not a new phenomenon,
had assumed many different forms m

America 143— town

1410'Neill and McBurney, Working Principles of
Argument, pp. 266-307.
142McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, Argumentation and
Debate. Mills was primarily responsible for the above
chapter, p. vi.
143
Paul D. Bagwell, "The Development of Public Dis
cussion in the United States" (unpublished M.A. thesis,
University of Wisconsin, 1938). J. F. O'Brien, "A Defini
tion and Classification of the Forms of Discussion,"
Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXV (April, 1939), 236-43.
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meetings,144
1A
open forums

]_yCeum145 an(j Chautauqua movements,
such as Cooper Union, to mention some of the

more popular. 14 8

It functioned within these contexts

variously as a political vehicle, a method of socializa
tion, and as an educational tool for the dissemination of
ideas.

Committee or group discussion also flourished 149

and a relevant body of theory developed.
In a study of "The Inquiry," "a small group of
conference experts who began in 1922 a comprehensive though
not too systematic development of discussion principles,
techniques, and instructions," Richard Douthit traced the
philosophical origins of the discussion movement to "the
major thought currents of the nineteenth and twentieth
■'■^^John F. Sly, Town Government in Massachusetts
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 19 30) .
14 8
Waldo Braden, "The Lecture Movement: 18401860," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXXIV (April, 1948),
206-2121 Cecil B. Hayes, The American Lyceum, Bulletin
12 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Printing Office, 1932).
146
John H. Vincent, The Chautauqua Movement
(Chautauqua, N. Y.: Chautauqua Press, 1886).
147
Mary L. Ely, "Talking It Over: The Old Town
Meeting Reincarnated," Survey Graphic, XXVII (January,
1938), 57-59.
148 Later developments such as the symposium will
be detailed in a later section of this chapter on the
forensic.
149 Baird suggested that "the applications of dis
cussion, especially during and after the Second World War,
have been more and more extensive— in communities, in labor
and other economic areas, and in schools and colleges."
Baird, Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate, p. vi.
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centuries." 1 5 0

Of its more immediate roots/ he

concluded:
Along with Bagehot, Wallas, and Wilson, Dewey
had seen the promise of public discussion as
early as the turn of the century. Probably he
more than any other American was responsible
for establishing a new intellectual climate
which demanded a rigorous examination of
methodology. Historians seem agreed that John
Dewey . . . became the symbol for those who
would approach social problems scientifically. 5
Both the practical effects and the theoretical
aspects of the discussion movement influenced the practice
as well as theory of argumentation.

Baird noted in 1928

that:
In recent years the pendulum in student
public speaking has swung from interest in
formal argument and, perhaps, contest debate
to the study and practice of discussion in its
broader application, including public discus
sion, committee conference, persuasive busi
ness talk, and open-forum debating. 52
In 1920, O'Neill published A Manual of Debate and Oral
153
Discussion for Schools, Societies and Clubs,
largely
a prescriptive text which reiterated in simple fashion
traditional argumentation and debate principles.

Baird,

Richard Pfaff Douthit, "A Historical Study of
Group Discussion Principles and Techniques Developed by
'The Inquiry,' 1922-1933" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Louisiana State University, 1961), p. 289.
151Ibid., p. 291.
152 Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed.,
p. iii.
153

James M. O'Neill, A Manual of Debate and Oral
Discussion for Schools, Societies and Clubs (New York:
Century Company, 19 20).
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meanwhile, wishing to strengthen and update traditional
argumentation theory and to bring it into line with current
practices, 154 treated discussion, debate, and persuasion as
"types" of argumentation and contended that "the general
principles of argumentation . . . may be applied effec
tively" regardless of their ultimate use.

Baird's specific

"principles for the mastery of argumentation, public
discussion, and debate" followed closely the standard
t r a d i t i o n , h i s particular innovation being an updating
of the underlying theory.

Though some later writers (Behl,

Braden and Brandenburg)^-55 followed Baird's tripartite
scheme, most texts omitted persuasion as a specialized form
of argumentation, 157 investigating rather the functions and
processes of discussion and debate.
154 Baird had essentially the same aim in his 1937
revision of Public Discussion and Debate and in his later
work, Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate.
^55Baird said: "The conquest of the art requires
long application and training. These include, first, frank
self-analysis of your shortcomings and needs; secondly,
ability to frame and analyze a subject for debate; thirdly,
habits and methods of accumulating knowledge and thinking
on that material; fourthly, ability to synthesize your
ideas in the form of a brief; fifthly, power to analyze a
special audience and to adapt your material effectively;
sixthly, practice in stating the arguments persuasively;
seventhly, ability to criticize your own work; and finally,
a will to persist and master the art of persuasion."
Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed., p. 14.
155Behl, Discussion and Debate; Braden and
Brandenburg, Oral Decision-Making I
157
See O'Neill and Cortright, Debate and Oral Dis
cussion, p. 3; Nichols, Discussion and Debate, p. 4; Luther
A. Courtney and Glenn R. Capp, Practical Debating (Chicago:
J. B. Lippincott Company, 1949).
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Baird had characterized discussion and debate as
"especially useful in working out . . . immediate problems
and m

training for citizenship." JO

The political con-

text 1F9 as well as the rapid intellectual development of
the early twentieth century^® created a very real "felt
difficulty."

Pellegrini and Stirling pointed up the

"social utility of public discussion" when they said:
Today more than ever before we are aware
of an urgent need for clear thinking on
social, political, and economic matters. We
158 Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed.,
p. 10.
159

William Utterback perceived a direct relation
ship between the form which public discussion assumes and
the political context within which it operates. Utterback
concluded: "The modes of public discussion through which a
nation effects collective decision in any era are deter
mined by the nature of the governmental process at the
time, and this in turn depends upon the comparative sta
bility of equilibrium between those conflicting interest
groups whose activities underlie political phenomena. If
the equilibrium has been stable long enough to generate a
political tradition, debate will be the predominant form of
public discussion. When a sudden and radical shift in the
balance of power renders much of the tradition obsolete,
propaganda and conference supplant debate until such time
as the new equilibrium has found expression in a new
political tradition." William E. Utterback, "Patterns of
Public Discussion in School and in Life," Quarterly Journal
of Speech, XXIV (December, 1938), 588. That the experience
of one war— and then two— upset any equilibrium which might
have existed is obvious. Moreover, the need persisted for
an alternative to violence for the solving of problems.
See J. T. Salter, The Pattern of Politics (New York:
Macmillan Company, 1940) .
^®New theories in sociology and educational phi
losophy emphasized the need and provided new methodology
for "skill in working through the complexities of a given
social question." See Pellegrini and Stirling, Argumenta
tion and Public Discussion, p . ix.
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are constantly warned by the more critical
historians that the institutions by which we
have lived for the past two centuries have
run their span, and that the alternative to
chaos is a formulation of new values. Whether
the new generation is capable of meeting
sanely an uncertain future will depend largely
upon the clear-headedness with which it con
fronts the problems which are its legacy. It
is for the members of this generation to
acquaint themselves with the problems which
soon they will be called on to resolve. Let
us teach them to approach these problems with
a clear, analytical mind. 61
Auer agreed and emphasized "an exchange of information and
ideas, in a cooperative process for the resolving of these
162
common problems."
The title of the Ewbank-Auer text,
Ibid., p. vii. Braden and Brandenburg demon
strated the persistence of the need almost twenty years
later: "We live at a time when vigilance is demanded of
those who wish to govern themselves. In addition to the
necessity for finding protection from physical destruction,
citizens of today need a staunch intellectual and moral
stature, a fortitude to resist and overcome subversive
forces, and a constant watchful guard against complacency.
How can these needs be met? . . . The authors of this book
believe that . . . protection comes from equipping citizens
with means and techniques which will enable and encourage
them to recognize, to understand, to analyze, and to answer
unwise counsel or dangerous programs. We believe that the
need of today is a citizenry who can measure up to the
responsibilities and obligations imposed by self-government,
and who can work creatively and cooperatively in solving
the problems of the group." Braden and Brandenburg, Oral
Decision-Making, p. ix.
•^^J. Jeffery Auer, "Tools of Social Inquiry:
Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate," Quarterly Journal
of Speech, XXV (December, 1939), 533. Yost had also
envisioned argumentation as a cooperative affair. So had
John Dewey. In the foreword to Pellegrini and Stirling's
Argumentation and Public Discussion, he said: "Argumenta
tion is reasoning but it is reasoning together; it is a
process of cooperative search." Pellegrini and Stirling,
Argumentation and Public Discussion, p. iii. Traditional
debating fit neither the Yost nor Dewey model.
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Discussion and Debate:

Tools of a Democracy, represents

the importance those authors attached to "training for
citizenship."^^

Such subsequent works as Baird's

Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate, Braden and
Brandenburg's Oral Decision-Making, and McBurney, O'Neill,
and Mills's Argumentation and Debate;

Techniques of a Free

Society 164 reflect a similar philosophy.
"Middle period" writers further maintained
discussion and debate to be instruments "for tempering
the judgments of students";

for the promotion of open-

mindedness";^^ for the "working out" of problems.
Toward the end of the period, Baird summarized various
such rationales.

Argumentation, discussion, and debate,

he said, will:
1.

Educate you for active responsible
participation in democratic government.

^Ewbank and Auer, Discussion and Debate,
1941 ed., pp. 3-6.
164
Baird, Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate;
Braden and Brandenburg, Oral Decision-Making; McBurney,
O'Neill, and Mills, Argumentation and Debate.
^^Lester Thonssen, "The Social Values of
Discussion and Debate," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXV
(February, 1939), 117.
166
Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1937
rev. ed., p. iii.
167
Ibid., 1928 ed., p. 10.
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2.

Assure you more efficiency in your occupation
or profession.^-®®

3.

Strengthen your self-confidence and enable you
to make more satisfactory social adjustments.

4.

Provide you with defenses against "bad"
propaganda.

5.

Widen your general influence in social
movements.169

These justifications paralleled and/or complemented much
of the philosophy of the discussion m o v e m e n t . A s
Douthit 171 suggested, members of "The Inquiry" believed
they were developing the methodology for democracy. 172
The commitment of the discussion movement to a
scientific methodology for the working out of problems in
the real world influenced the development of argumentation
l®®Behl also included a section on the importance
of argument in business and the professions. Behl,
Discussion and Debate, pp. 3-4.
169 Baird, Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate,
pp. 4-7.
170

Wishing to determine a situational approach to
discussion relevant to life, "The Inquiry" adopted a social
creed grounded in the social gospel and practical politics.
Their intellectual godfather, John Dewey, provided a
scientific instrument for approaching social problems.
171

Douthit, "Study of Group Discussion,"

pp. 291-94.
172

See Harrison Sacket Elliott, The Why and How
of Group Discussion (New York: Association Press, 1923),
pp. 7-8.
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and debate theory.

Though the pattern of reflective

thinking 173 appeared in discussion texts at least as early
as 1928,^^ Fritz^^ was probably the first argumentation
writer to include Dewey's analysis.

Baird's revision of

Public Discussion and Debate appended the concept as "a
guide for group discussion,"

176

and Harold F. Graves,

177

8
and James H. McBurney and Kenneth Hance 17 °
followed suit.

Nichols' text, published in the same year as Ewbank and
Auer's Discussion and Debate, contained "a Manual of
Discussion, a concise, up-to-the-minute survey of
17 8
John Dewey, How We Think (Boston: D. C. Heath
and Company, 1910), p. 72. Reflective thinking involved
the following steps:
(1) a felt difficulty; (2) its loca
tion and definition; (3) suggestion of possible solution;
(4) development by reasoning of the bearings of the
suggestion; and (5) further observation and experiment
leading to its acceptance or rejection.
174
See Harrison Sacket Elliott, The Process of
Group Thinking (New York: AssociationPress, 1928), p. 35;
Edwin Leavitt Clarke, The Art of Straight Thinking
(New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1929), p. 368.
175
Fritz, Method of Argument, p. 295.
176
Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1937 rev.
ed., p. 362. That Baird had been thinking in this direc
tion is evidenced by his short section in the first edition
of Public Discussion of Debate called "the technique of
discussion." He said: "The chairman of the group calls
the meeting to order, states the problem, and calls for
further interpretation and solution," 1928 ed., p. 34.
177
Harold F. Graves, Argument (New York: Cordon
Company, 19 38), p. 21.
178 James H. McBurney and Kenneth G. Hance, The
Principles and Methods of Discussion (New York: Harper
and Brothers, 1939) , p. 1~62. The authors called their
five steps "the logical pattern of discussion."
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discussion methodology"

179

which reduced Dewey's steps in

reflection to three.
Contrary to discussions which perceived reflective
thinking to be merely the "logical method of discussion,"
Ewbank and Auer applied Dewey's paradigm to the total
process of discussion and debate.

Though Auer had espoused

this idea first in a journal article, 181 his text with
Ewbank refined, expanded, and popularized the concept.
Discussion and debate viewed as interrelated parts of one
process was not, however, a new idea.

Baird implied such

a position when he characterized discussion as "a stage
182
immediately preceding argument proper."
Thonssen,
moreover, saw discussion and debate as "correlative aspects
179 Nichols, Discussion and Debate, p. vn.
180
Ibid., pp. 51-52. Nichols included the follow
ing "problem-solving" outline:
I. The Presented Problem
II. Analyzing the Problem
A. Its definition and exact scope, including
the historical background.
B. The causes of the problem, or the evils
to be corrected.
C. The interests, or stake groups, which must
be reconciled.
III. Determining the Solution
A. Presentation of each solution, with a brief
description.
B. Evaluation of each solution.
C. The selection of the best.
1ft1
Auer, "Tools of Social Inquiry," pp. 533-39.
182
Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed.,
p. 9.
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of one process."

183

But it was Auer who perceived that

process to be reflective thinking.
In his early probings, Auer had concluded that
cooperative problem-solving can occur only "when . . . the
citizen is able to use intelligently adequate tools of
social inquiry, tools which may be used in the continuum
of inquiry and judgment which is the process of reflective
184
thinking."
Recognizing that "the scientific method
cannot be applied, ill to to, in the solution of public
problems," Ewbank and Auer suggested:

"Rather, it is the

discussion and debate technique based upon scientific
procedures which should be applied to the democratic
processes of social inquiry and judgment." 185

Adapting

the inquiry-judgment continuum of the Auer article, the
Ewbank-Auer text added the dimension of investigation and
decision and suggested that "it is along this continuum
. . . that discussion and debate is ranged."

Their

diagram^-88 follows:
183 Thonssen, "Social Values of Discussion and
Debate," p. 114.
184
Auer, "Tools of Social Inquiry," p. 533. Auer
labeled these tools argumentation, discussion, and debate.
Ewbank and Auer dropped the term argumentation and treated
discussion and debate. Ewbank and Auer, Discussion and
Debate, 1941 ed.; 1951 rev. ed.
185 Ewbank and Auer, Discussion and Debate,
1941 ed., p. 20.
^86Ibid., p. 5.
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Treating discussion and debate as parts of a total
process persisted in certain later works.

Baird, for

example, referred to "the correlative character of discus187
sion and debate" in his 1950 text,
while Braden and
Brandenburg presented "discussion and debate as related
187 Baird, Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate,
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counterparts of a larger process . . . called oral
decision-making." 188

Writers did not agree totally,

however, on the relation of those elements and the appro1OQ
priate logical method to be applied to them.
Contro
versy centered particularly on the role of reflective
thinking in discussion and debate.
Baird held that argumentation "whether general
argument or specialized discussion or debate, is primarily
logical." 190 His suggestion that the logical structure
of problem-solution (examination of facts and making of
inferences) parallels the reflective thought pattern
implied that both discussion and debate are reflective. 191
18 8Braden and Brandenburg, Oral Decision-Making,
p. ix.
189

.

.

.

.

Many texts viewed discussion as preparatory to
debate. See McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, Argumentation
and Debate, p. 68. See also William M. Sattler, "Some
Values of Discussion in the Investigation and Analysis
Phases of Debate," Gavel, XXV (March, 1943), 3-4;
(May, 1943), 54-55.
190 Baird, Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate,
p. 38.
191

In Public Discussion and Debate, Baird had
included a section entitled "reflective thinking" in which
he treated the tendency toward eclecticism; proper indica
tion of quotations; need for assimilation of material; and
methods of assimilation of material. Baird, Public Dis
cussion and Debate, 1928 ed., pp. 65-66; 1937 rev. ed.,
pp. 52-53. For a discussion of Baird's distinction of
bilateral and multilateral processes and their relation
to reflective thinking, see Baird, Public Discussion and
Debate, 1937 rev. ed. , p. 358; Thompson, ‘‘Discussion and
Debate," p. 295; Behl, Discussion and Debate, p. 15.
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In fact, however, Baird specifically applied Dewey's
analysis only to the process of discussion, setting forth
different steps for fact and policy questions. 19 2
Braden and Brandenburg presented three alternative
methods for arriving at decisions and actions.

Their

continuum began with discussion, to which the authors
applied a version of reflective thinking similar to
Baird's "pattern" for policy questions. 19 3
Brandenburg asked:

Braden and

"What is included in the process of

democratic decision-making?"

Their answer implied that

reflective thinking operates in all deliberation.

"The

group talks together, moving successively step by step
from a felt need to the successful operation of a plan,"
they said.

"It may be summarized in three words:

deliberation, decision, and action." 194

Their paradigm 195

follows:
19 2Baird included the following "pattern of a dis
cussion of policy": define terms; expound goals or aims
to be considered in solution; analyze immediate and back
ground causes and results; weigh representative solutions;
weigh each solution evaluating evidence and argument;
present diagnosis and verification of preferred solution;
frame and justify a program to carry out conclusions. The
following constituted his "pattern of a discussion of
fact": explain terms; set up goals (criteria); examine
relevant data, arguments, evidence; classify, synthesize,
interpret and evaluate, and make judgment. Baird, Argu
mentation, Discussion, and Debate, pp. 265-66.
191 Braden and Brandenburg, Oral Decision-Making,
pp. 210-14.
194

Ibid., p. 4.

~^^Ibid., p. 11.
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Three Routes to Decision and Action

Problem

>Discussion--------------- >Decision--->Action

Debate

Persuasive
speaking

Those argumentation and debate writers who first
included treatments of discussion in their texts emphasized "public discussion." 19 6 Gradually group discussion
replaced that emphasis.

Such concepts as group leadership,

agenda, interpersonal relations, even role-playing became
a part of the theory of argumentation.

These concepts,

developed more comprehensively in discussion texts,
reverted almost solely to those works after c. 19 55.

197

Analysis
Though "middle period" notions of analysis
1 9 ft

See Baird, Public Discussion and Debate; O'Neill
and Cortright, Debate and Oral Discussion.
197 Braden and Brandenburg treated discussion
probably more comprehensively than any other dual text.
After their work, discussion moved almost exclusively to
separate texts.
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corresponded to Baker's "investigation for a central idea
or group of ideas,"

19 8

Edward Z. Rowell probably over

stated the case when he asserted that "Baker's exposition
of argumentative analysis our tradition has continued
199
without significant change."
Even by 1932, the date of
Rowell's statement, several important modifications had
begun:

a general use of "stock" methods for determining

issues; more thorough explorations of the proposition;
expanded chapters on research methods and sources; and
well-developed and highly sophisticated treatments of case.
Since these modifications continued throughout the period,
it is probably more accurate to suggest that Baker's "steps
in analysis" provided the framework for succeeding
treatments.
The Proposition
Though most "middle period" writers defined the
proposition traditionally,^00 they failed to agree on a
19 8Russell Wagner viewed the nature and scope of
analysis in a fashion representative of most writers of the
"middle period." He said: "Analysis . . . is that study
of the subject matter of the argument which sifts the ideas
discovered, reduces them to lowest terms, determines the
essential controversy and the chief differences of opinion,
and ascertains what one must do to effect a sound demon
stration of proof to others." Wagner, Handbook of
Argumentation, p . 5.
199 Rowell, "Prolegomena to Argumentation," Part
III, p. 247.
^°°Pellegrini and Stirling viewed the proposition
in the traditional sense as "that which is stated or
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single, consistent approach for its formulation.

Those

authors who treated discussion and debate as a total
process saw the proposition as the result of reflective
thinking.

201

Others, relying on traditional theory and

methodology, began with subject matter. 202

Still another

affirmed for the purpose of discussion. It is a provi
sional statement, usually stated affirmatively, the truth
or falsity of which must be demonstrated in the argument."
Pellegrini and Stirling, Argumentation and Public Discus
sion, p. 7. Hayworth and Capel defined the proposition
simply as "the concise statement of a difference in
belief." Hayworth and Capel, Oral Argument, p. 14.
McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills treated propositions in terms
of the fields of knowledge from which they emanate.
McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, Argumentation and Debate,
p. 18. They said: "Rhetorically !
It [a proposition]
is a judgment expressed in a declarative sentence . . .
consisting of two terms and a copula. The subject of the
sentence is one term, the verb is the copula or connecting
link, and the object of the verb or some other predicative
expression is the other term. A judgment so stated is a
proposition." Collins and Morris, on the other hand,
suggested a "purpose-proposition." "Such a sentence or
epigram concisely and compactly constructed will tell the
members of the audience just what the persuader wishes them
to do and why he wants them to do it," they said.
"Repeated often, it will give unity and definite direction
to the entire speech or article." Collins and Morris,
Persuasion and Debate, p. 27. Collins and Morris made
other pronouncements about the purpose-proposition: it
keeps the speaker on a "straight course"; repetition of the
purpose-proposition impresses audiences; the purposeproposition should express question of policy; and, time
and occasion are limiting factors, pp. 28-32.
201Ewbank and Auer, Discussion and Debate, 19 51
rev. ed., p. 63.
202

See, for example, Shaw, Art of Debate, pp. 8-12;
Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, pp. 43-51. See Braden
and Brandenburg for ‘'criteria of good subjects for either
discussion or debate." Braden and Brandenburg, Oral
Decision-Making, pp. 39-52.
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group viewed the proposition primarily in terms of desired
203
response.
Most, however, skipped such preliminary con
siderations and proceeded directly to an examination of
the characteristics and types of propositions.
Characteristics of "Good"
Propositions
"Middle period" texts stressed various criteria
essential for the formulation of "good" propositions.

Few,

however, went beyond O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales's 1917
standards:

propositions should be unambiguous; unpreju

diced; concrete and specific; place the burden of proof
on the affirmative; be brief and simple, debatable, and
interesting.2®**

Essentially the same criteria also

appeared as "characteristics of a good proposition," 20 5
20 6

"rules for phrasing a proposition,"
"requirements of
207
the proposition,"
"rules for constructing a
203 This audience-centered approach, suggested by
Woolbert, was most fully developed by Collins and Morris.
204
O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and
Debate, pp. 28-31; see also Foster, Argumentation and
Debating, 1917 rev. ed., p. 11.
205
O'Neill and Cortright, Debate and Oral Dis
cussion, pp. 42-49.
20 6See Winans and Utterback, Argumentation,
pp. 29-30. They required that propositions be free from
ambiguity, be expressed in a simple sentence, contain no
words or phrases that beg the question, and place the
burden of proof on the affirmative.
207See Shaw, Art of Debate, p. 12; Pellegrini and
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proposition," 20 8 and "tests of a proposition." 20 Q
offered a slightly different twist.

Crocker

He framed his charac

teristics as_ propositions, indicating that they should:
fit the speakers; fit the audience; be debatable; be
clear; be phrased affirmatively; be timely; not be too
broad; state one central idea; and, be free from questionbegging terms.
O'Neill and McBurney separated the functions of
propositions from the rules for selecting and phrasing
them.

They listed four functions:

to serve as the basis

of the argument; to name the affirmative and the negative;
to state the action demanded of the audience; to place the
burden of proof.

pi 1

McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills added

two "functions" and restated and expanded two.

Their

listing reads:
1.

To express a conclusion from study and
reflection.

Stirling, Argumentation and Public Discussion, pp. 8-11.
The proposition must state a definite problem, be free of
ambiguous terms, be controversial, and be worthy of
argument.
20 8

Babcock and Powell, How to Debate, pp. 10-19.

209

See Hayworth and Capel, Oral Argument, pp. 2025. They added the standard of "availability.11 Wagner,
Handbook of Argumentation, pp. 13-15. Wagner added that
a proposition should be "vital," p. 13.
210

Crocker, Argumentation and Debate, pp. 21-26.

211

O'Neill and McBurney, Working Principles of
Argument, pp. 13-17.
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2.

To express the meaning and intent of an
advocate.

3.

To serve as the basis of the argument.

4.

To name the affirmative and the negative.

5.

To state the desired audience reaction.

6.

To place the presumption and the burden of
proof.2^2

Types of Propositions
Though classifying propositions is not technically
a development of the "middle period," the procedure became
widely accepted as an integral part of argumentation and
213
debate theory during that time.
Despite O'Neill's con
viction that "it is hardly worthwhile we try to make much
of this c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , t h e fact-policy divisions
appeared, nevertheless, in his texts with Cortright and
212

McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, Argumentation and
Debate, pp. 19-22.
213 Beginning with Baker, argumentation and debate
writers had used the conviction-persuasion distinction as
a basis for division. Though Walter F. Terris' treatment
is incomplete, his conclusions have some validity. See
Walter F. Terris, "The Classification of the Argumentative
Proposition,11 Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLIX (October,
1963), 266-73. Moreover, Gardiner had used the terms
fact and policy and had anticipated a third category as
early as 1912. See J. H. Gardiner, The Making of Arguments
(New York: Ginn and Company, 1912), pp. 14-25.
2^40'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and
Debate, p. 19.
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McBurney,

pic

.

.

.

.

along with the value distinction m

McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills revision. 216

the

Even Foster,

who had ignored classification in his 190 8 and 1917
texts,217 included "propositions of fact and propositions
of policy or principle" in his 1932 revision. 218 These
and other "middle period" writers divided, defined, and
discussed "kinds" of propositions.

W. C. Shaw's influen-

tial distinctions 219 follow:
A proposition of fact consists of any
statement that affirms or denies:
(1) the
existence of things; (2) the occurrence of
acts; (3) the classification of objects; or
(4) the connection of events.
A proposition of policy consists of any
statement that affrirms or denies that a
specified course of action, in preference to
other possible courses of action, should be
a d o p t e d . 220

21^0 'Neill and Cortright, Debate and Oral Discus
sion, pp. 40-41; O'Neill and McBurney, Working Principles
of Argument, p. 17.
216
McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, Argumentation and
Debate, pp. 22-23. This chapter, however, was Mills's.
217
Foster, Argumentation and Debating,
1917 rev. ed.
218
Ibid., 1932 rev. ed., pp. 13-14.
219
See Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, p. 41;
Hayworth and Capel, Oral Argument, p. 17.
220

Shaw, Art of Debate, pp. 20-21. Shaw believed
further that propositions of policy are best suited for
debate, p. 21. For similar positions, see Collins and
Morris, Persuasion and Debate, pp. 30, 33-34; Pellegrini
and Stirling, Argumentation and Public Discussion, p. 11.
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Disagreements regarding the classification of
propositions surfaced early, both fact and policy cate
gories being dissected.
of policy as:

Baird differentiated propositions

those dealing with proposals advocated as

theoretically sound and those dealing with matters of
practical policy. 221

Though subsequent texts did not

readily adopt this division, and though Baird himself
dropped the classification in 1950,222 the distinction
between theoretic and practical policy did not disappear.
It reemerged rather over the issue of the meaning of the
word should in propositions of policy.

In 1942, F. W.

Lambertson concluded:
Obviously we are dealing with a problem and
a solution. Any debate question which presented
an evil for which there was no remedy would be
of little value in debate. We may rest assured
that our planning committee will not make such a
mistake. Therefore we may conclude that the
word "should" includes the word "could." Whether
or not Congress or the people "would" adopt a
particular reform at the present time is beside
the point. The merit of a measure is not neces
sarily shown by popular disapproval. A plan
"should" be adopted if it is wise, good, desir
able, and practicable; if, of all the alternate
courses of action, it will most adequately
remedy the existing or threatened evils.22^
221

Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed.,
p. 41. See Gardiner's distinction of propositions of
policy dealing with "matters of taste and aesthetic
preference." Gardiner, Making of Arguments, p. 23.
222

Baird, Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate.

223F. W. Lambertson, "The Meaning of the Word
'Should' in a Question of Policy," Quarterly Journal of
Speech, XXVIII (December, 1942), 424.
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Meanwhile, propositions of fact came under close
scrutiny.

In 1934, Hayworth and Capel recognized four

classes of argument covered by the term proposition of
fact:

whether or not an entity exists or has existed;

whether or not an action has taken place; whether or not
a relationship exists or has existed; whether or not stated
characteristics may be attributed to a given class or
individual. 224

They further observed that:

Academic debates on questions described in
the first two of these four classes are almost
never held, and seldom on questions covered by
the last two, although these are more possible.
Propositions may be built on questions as to
the existence of a relationship of comparative
desirability. . . . This type of proposition
is excellent for debate and doubtless merits
further use.
More frequently debates are held on
propositions concerned with whether or not
stated characteristics may be attributed to
a given class or individual.^25
Nichols and Baccus,2 2 6 two years later, offered a tripartite
224 Hayworth and Capel, Oral Argument, p. 17.
225Ibid., pp. 17-18.
226
Nichols and Baccus suggested the following tests
for their propositions: "Fact— Is this true? Theory— Is
this sound? Is it acceptable as a belief? Is it reason
able postulation? Policy— Is this the thing to do? Is it
expedient, wise, practicable?" Nichols and Baccus, Modern
Debating, pp. 103-104. They preferred propositions of
policy for debating. They said: "Debates on fact and
theory are often unsatisfactory because it is hard to
establish what the burden of proof of the affirmative is
and when the negative has performed its duty. It is
almost impossible to set the limitations which circumscribe
sufficient or insufficient proof in matters of fact and
theory. In questions of policy, however, it is easier to
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scheme which included "judgment as to a theory or postula
tion" along with fact and policy.

The same year, Wagner

introduced the term "proposition of value" into argumen
tation and debate theory.

This division provided the

basis for most subsequent systems of classification.
Wagner differentiated the three kinds of propositions as
follows:
Propositions of fact are those which are
concerned only with the truth or falsity of
assertions. They involve the existence of
things, the occurrence or classification or
causation of acts or events. They depend
wholly upon the establishing of fact for
proof.
Propositions of value are those which
assess the worth of the subjects in dispute.
They assert that something is or is not bene
ficial; they call for approval or disapproval
of a belief or an idea. . . . Propositions of
value attempt to declare that to be true which
can never be accepted as a fact, but which may
be accepted as probable, if made to conform to
certain approved applicable standards of judg
ment, of taste, or of weight.
Propositions of policy are those which
propose a change of policy, which call for
action. They involve the proof of questions
of fact, they require the assessing of value,
but extend into the realm of practicality and
expediency, and unlike the others, propose
that something shall be done.
Those writers who attempted to subdivide fact or
policy categories were seeking to isolate the evaluative
see the boundary line that establishes a case. The grounds
of argument are drawn more satisfactorily and the goal is
easier to discern," p. 104.
22 7

Wagner, Handbook of Argumentation, pp. 15-16.
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dimension in controversial questions.

Baird, and Gardiner

before him, had looked for it in policy questions.
Hayworth and Capel, Nichols and Baccus, and Wagner saw it
as a factual problem.

A consensus agreed, nevertheless,

that propositions of theory or value, whether derived from
past or present fact or from future policy, were less
suited for debating than practical policy questions.22**
Investigating the Proposition
"Middle period" prescriptions for investigating a
proposition did not differ appreciably from 1917 Foster or
229
230
O'Neill.
Treatments of preliminary analysis
and
briefing, 231 though similar to their earlier counterparts,
228 See Horace G. Rahskopf, "Questions of Fact vs.
Questions of Policy," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XVIII
(February, 1932), 60-70.
229 Though Collins and Morris' text emphasized new
terminology, its specific principles of analysis were, for
the most part, traditional. Discussion centered around the
"two-fold character of analysis": discovery and judgment,
the results of which appear on an analysis chart (sheet
of paper, index cards), and in the brief. Collins and
Morris, Persuasion and Debate, pp. 34-35.
oon
"Middle period" writers agreed on the necessity
of a broad view of the subject; a knowledge of the origin
and history of the question; a definition of terms. They
concurred, moreover, that dictionary definitions are
insufficient. They defined, as had their predecessors, by
explication, example, authority, negation, derivation,
function, and context. For a comprehensive approach to
definition, see Baird, Argumentation, Discussion, and
Debate, pp. 56-59.
23-*-Though "middle period" texts adapted traditional
methods and rules of constructing a brief almost without
question (for rules and examples included by writers of the
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received less emphasis than in "early period" texts.
Chapters on research, on the other hand, retained sugges
tions for research procedure and recording materials and
included detailed information on source materials. 232
Shaw constructed a well-ordered procedure for assembling
proof which he claimed "has been called by hundreds of
students and college debaters the most valuable contribu
tion for one's life work that a training in debate can
ooo
give."
Shaw set out this "Phase-System" of analysis
as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

A Definition of Terms Involved in the
Proposition;
The Construction of a Bibliography;
The Establishment of Guides to Direct
Research;
The Adoption of a Systematic Method of
Note-taking;
A Study of Both Sides of the Question;

period, see Baird, Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate,
pp. 80-88; Crocker, Argumentation and Debate, pp. 235-44),
some differences of opinion arose concerning the philosophy
behind briefing. For Reeves and Hudson, "a brief is a com
plete plan for an argument" which "shows where the dif
ferent parts belong and their relative importance." Reeves
and Hudson, Principles of Argument and Debate, p. 41.
Wagner, on the other hand, viewed the brief in terms of
proof. Authors continued, moreover, to distinguish the
brief from the rhetorical outline. See Baird, Public
Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed., pp. 95-142; Wagner,
Handbook of Argumentation, pp. 71, 84.
23 2See Babcock and Powell, How to Debate,
pp. 30-34; Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed.,
pp. 55-66; Ewbank and Auer, Discussion and Debate, 1941
ed., pp. 93-103; Braden and Brandenburg, Oral DecisionMaking, pp. 58-87.
23 3Shaw, Art of Debate, p. vi.
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6 . The Arrangement of Proof in Chains of
Reasoning;
7. A Trial of Proof in a Preliminary
Discussion; and
8. A Repetition of the Foregoing Process for
Every Subhead in the Various Chains of
Reasoning. ^34
Issues
Continuing to view issues as "the essential points
or subpoints of controversy that evolve in the consideration of a given proposition," 23 5 "middle period" writers
also insisted that the essential work of analysis is to
"discover" these issues.

Traditional argumentation and

debate theory had held that "clash of opinion" provided
the issues of a controversy.
writers agreed. 2 36
234

Certain "middle period"

Though some attempts at alternative

Ibid., p. 24.

235 Behl, Discussion and Debate, p. 57. Most
writers also differentiated "kinds" of issues as had their
predecessors. Toward the end of the period, Behl sum
marized the various types: Potential issues, "all possible
issues that might arise in the investigation of a given
topic," in terms of problems of fact, value, and policy;
main issues, "those essential points of difference which
must be considered in any given situation if we are to find
a satisfactory solution to the problem"; ultimate issues,
the issues around which the final argument centers; and
sub issues, questions concerning the main issue, pp. 59-64.
See also Babcock and Powell, How to Debate, p. 47; Wagner,
Handbook of Argumentation, pp~ 17-19. Crocker added
"issue-of-the debate1' to the list and characterized it as
follows: "In an hour it is impossible to debate the entire
case. The Negative may single out the issue it wants to
debate." Crocker, Argumentation and Debate, p. 42.
^3£>See, for example, Babcock and Powell, How to
Debate, pp. 56-61. Wagner, moreover, agreed with the
"clash of opinion" analysis, but insisted that "a survey of
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systems of analysis appeared, 2 3 7 most "middle period"
writers relied simply on "stock issues" to analyze debate
propositions. 238
the proof requirements" be included. Wagner, Handbook of
Argumentation, pp. 17-23. Wagner also advised the writing
of an argumentative precis "as an aid to the discovery of
ideas and the accurate analysis of argumentative material,"
and also included in his discussion the epitome, "a very
brief statement of the pith of an argument" which "usually
consists of stating the proposition and main arguments, and
the proof of the more important main heads," pp. 23-24.
237
See particularly Shaw's complicated diagram
which demonstrates his "phase" system of analysis. Shaw,
Art of Debate, p. 181.
238 Toward the end of the period, Baird compiled a
comprehensive list of ways of discovering issues, and
discussed them in some detail. An outline of these
"methods" follows:
(1) Read, think, discuss as means of
discovering issues.
(2) Set up the general problem as an
over-all impartial question.
(3) Ask questions related to
the explanation of terms involved in the question as
framed.
(4) Ask questions related to the goals assumed or
set forth by the debaters or discussants.
(5) Ask ques
tions related to a problem of policy. For policydetermining issues you are to consider both the problem
and its solution, the latter phase to be regarded as a
program of action. (6) Ask questions related to a problem
of fact. Such questions usually suggest a division by the
classification of materials, according to economic, social,
political and similar considerations. Where the question
is primarily not one of social or political judgment but
rather one where the facts can be rather accurately dis
covered, the method of analysis and statement of issues
is usually one of classifying the types of argument and
evidence. Baird, Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate,
pp. 63-72. In a review of that work, Joseph F. O'Brien
asserted that Baird's "comprehensive formula for breaking
down of a proposition of policy is, in the reviewer's
opinion, without equal as a stock analytical instrument."
Joseph F. O'Brien, "New Books: Argumentation, Discussion,
and Debate," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXXVI (October,
1950), 431.
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Certain "early period" writers had sought common
questions or issues for propositions of fact and policy.2^9
From an analysis of the historical development of stock
methods, Terris concluded:
The classification of propositions accord
ing to the nature of the matter in dispute
gave rise to stock patterns for analyzing
virtually any argumentative proposition. The
proposition of fact, because it was struc
turally similar to the argumentative proposi
tions used in legal pleadings, was ripe for
the application of Quintilian's doctrine of
status.
Probably by analogy with the proposition
of fact, the proposition of policy was linked
with a system of stock issues. There seemed
no possibility of using Quintilian's pattern
of three statuses (the conjectural, the
definitive, and the qualitative) for the
analysis of propositions of policy or prin
ciple. However Foster developed an analogous
system of five stock issues which attempted
to do for policy what status did for fact.24®
Though Terris was incorrect in assuming Foster to be the
first to develop a system of stock issues for policy
questions,241 his analysis is, nevertheless, relevant.

The

2 *30

See, for example, journal articles published by
J. R. Pelsma and H. B. Gough in 1913 which indicated the
extent of interest in the question. J. R. Pelsma, "The
Special Issues," and H. R. Gough, "Formulas for the Special
Issue," in Public Speaking Review, III (November, 1913),
1-8; Victor A. Ketcham, The Theory and Practice of Argu
mentation and Debate (New York: Macmillan Company, 1914),
pp. 35-36.
^40Terris, "Classification of the Argumentative
Proposition," p. 268.
241 In addition to Pelsma, Gough, and Ketcham, see
George K. Pattee, Practical Argumentation (1915 rev. ed.;
New York: Century Company), pp. 61-72; O'Neill, Laycock,
and Scales, Argumentation and Debate, pp. 56-57. Though
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increasing tendency to classify propositions did, in fact,
influence methods of analysis.

Most "middle period"

writers^^ included standard questions for propositions
of policy in their texts.

Some added common questions

for fact and value.
Whereas stock issues provided the primary method
for analyzing debate propositions for "middle period"
writers, Dewey's pattern of reflective thinking became the
tool for dissecting questions for discussion.

An earlier

section of this chapter suggested the impact of Dewey's
system on the discussion movement in general and on
later lists differed in number and phraseology of ques
tions, they did not stray far from the Pelsma-Gough
inquiries.
242 Baird suggested that propositions of policy
involved cause-effect questions which in turn give rise to
need, advantages, practicability, and justness questions.
Issues for questions of fact, on the other hand, are deter
mined by "the specific types of evidence involved in the
case." Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed.,
pp. 78-81. See also Winans and Utterback, Argumentation,
pp. 36-59; O'Neill and McBurney retained the two issues
of the O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales text: Is the present
system unsatisfactory? Is the proposed action the proper
remedy? O'Neill and McBurney, Working Principles of
Argument, pp. 57-58. The McBurney, 0TNeili, and Mills
revision included the two, but agreed with O'Neill's early
assessment that "it is unsafe" to accept these as the exact
issues in all cases. McBurney, O'Neill/ and Mills, Argu
mentation and Debate, 1951 rev. ed., pp. 37-38. See
Wagner's "surveys" of proof for propositions of fact,
value, and policy. Wagner, Handbook of Argumentation,
pp. 19-23. Ewbank and Auer restricted their discussion to
policy questions. Ewbank and Auer, Discussion and Debate,
1941 ed., pp. 209, 432; 1951 rev. ed., pp. 98-99. Braden
and Brandenburg suggested stock issues for policy ques
tions, but averred that no standard formula can be applied
to fact and value propositions. Braden and Brandenburg,
Oral Decision-Making, pp. 409-413.
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specific argumentation texts.

It is sufficient at this

point to recognize that only Ewbank and Auer unequivocally
applied the specific steps of reflective thinking to the
total process of problem-solving (discussion and debate).
Baird represented the more general view when he observed:
The logical method of division is that of
stating the cause and the results of a proposal.
The method is illustrated by (1) problem and
(2) solution patterns of the typical discussion
and by the (1) need, (2) practicability, and
(3) desirability divisions of the conventional
debate.24^
Case
Though case had been discussed cursorily as early
as Baker's first edition of Principles,244 "middle period"
texts gave the concept a central place in argumentation
and debate theory.

Whereas Baker had considered case to

be one of four steps in analysis, most "middle period"
writers treated it as a result of analysis.

They redefined

case, moreover, not in terms of the traditional brief, but
rather,in terms of a rhetorical outline.

They also deter

mined separate case requirements for the affirmative and
negative.

O'Neill's 1917 revision of Argumentation and

Debate presaged these new directions.

O'Neill distinguished

the rhetorical outline from the brief, perceiving separate
24 3Baird, Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate,
p . 65.
244

Baker, Principles, p. 77.
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functions for the two.24"* He described the affirmative
case in terms of discharging the burden of proof and set
out four negative alternatives (pure refutation, defense
of the present, adjustment, and counter proposition) which
246
became the standard for discussing the negative case.
The traditional procedure of treating the brief as
the outline for a forensic or as the case met with objec
tions both from the point of view of literary composition
and from logic.

Baird summarized the major literary

criticisms as follows:
Elaborate briefing often makes for dull,
uninspired, speech-making, filled with
mechanical summaries, repetition of words
and phrases that make up the brief, many
terms of enumeration, and other earmarks
of a mechanical rather than a literary
foundation.247
Gladys Murphy Graham, one of the most vocal critics of the
deductive framework of the brief, objected that such a
system "does not fit all kinds of arguments."24** Her
alternative, implicative wholes, assumed an expository or
narrative rather than a traditional argumentative form.
2450'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and
Debate, pp. 211-13.
246Ibid., pp. 376-78.
247 Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed.,
p. 134.
24 8Graham, "Logic and Argumentation," pp. 350-63.
Graham believed that the implicative system persuades
eventually since it points to an inevitable "this-ornothing" conclusion. See Graham, "Natural Procedure in
Argument," pp. 319-37.
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Yost also had commented on the deductive character of
briefing but did not advise any major change in procedure.
Why students made briefs, and what they did with them,
concerned her more.

Yost insisted that one should make

briefs "in order to test his own thinking, and not use them
as outline guides to his arguments, written or oral."^®
To the criticisms regarding the logical basis of the brief,
Baird responded:
There is no reason why the rigid brief
should not form the material out of which the
inferential whole could be built up, to the
practical satisfaction both of the debater
and of the logician who sees all argument and
thinking as unitary.
The mature student of briefing need not
be a slave to his rigid document. It becomes
a means to a practical end. Its construction
has sharpened the mental processes, given the
facts, and created a mental alertness which
means a continuation of creative thinking. In
the writing of the argument the elaborate out
line may be put away. ^0
On the other hand, "to meet the need for the inclusion of
the expository or other compositional elements that do
not find a place in the formal brief," Baird advised "the
construction of the rhetorical outline." 251

He set out

its nature and characteristics as follows:
249

Yost, "Argument from the Point of View of
Sociology," p. 122.
250
Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed.,
pp. 135-36.
251Ibid., p. 136.
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This rhetorical outline . . . is in
reality a combination of the analytical or
expository outline, the argumentative brief,
and the speaker's outline for delivery.
The rules for the construction of a brief
will, in general, apply to this other method.
Complete sentences will be used; proper
symbols and indentations will be observed,
one symbol being used for each statement; in
argumentative outlining each subordinate
heading will explain the more general topic
or be a division of it; the material will be
arranged according to the order for delivery
or printing; and the outline may or may not
include the personal elements, including "we"
and "you."2^
Subsequent texts tended also to follow the rhetorical
outline.
In addition to differentiating an outline for the
presentation of arguments from the brief, "middle period"
writers also isolated certain variables relevant to con
structing a case.
works:

Three characteristics appeared in most

a case should be drafted for a particular audience;

it should develop the main issues determined by analysis;
and it should be capable of proof.25^

Some writers set

252Ibid., pp. 136-37.
253 See Wagner, Handbook of Argumentation,
pp. 71-72.
254
Winans and Utterback included one of the more
comprehensive listings. They suggested proof requirements,
types of arguments to be employed, selection and use of
premises, citation of authority, audience attitude toward
speaker, and proposition, interest, and refutation. Winans
diiu ulLcijjdCK, dJLYuiuencacioii, pp.
o—r4 . 'ine audience
seemed to be particularly important. See O'Neill, Manual
of Debate and Oral Discussion, p. 125; Collins and Morris,
Persuasion and Debate, pp. 86-87; Hayworth and Capel, Oral
Argument, pp. 77-92. Braden and Brandenburg included a
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out specific prescriptions for structuring a case.
and Auer included a comprehensive list:

Ewbank

the statements

should be arranged to show a progression of ideas; the
main points should be few in number; the relations between
statements should be clearly indicated; the phrasing of
the statements should have "Headline Value"; and the case
should not attempt to prove too much. 255
It has been suggested that O'Neill's description
of negative alternatives provided the basis for most sub256
sequent discussions of negative case.
The affirmative
case, on the other hand, much modified during the "middle
period," evolved, for the most part, into an explication
of stock issues, particularly in propositions of policy.
Summers and Whan, for example, argued that the affirmative
has little choice, being obliged to include two or three
elements:

"arguments showing need for a change, arguments

showing benefits to be secured, and possibly defensive
257
arguments."
Most writers were more subtle. McBurney,
speaker's social responsibility to an audience, along with
a consistency with facts, and the best possible presenta
tion of a given side of a case. Braden and Brandenburg,
Oral Decision-Making, pp. 433-34.
255Ewbank and Auer, Discussion and Debate, 1951
rev. ed., pp. 407-409.
256
See Courtney and Capp, Practical Debating,
p. 29; McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, Argumentation and
Debate, pp. 166-68. For a different listing, see Summers
and Whan, How to Debate, pp. 125-30.
257
Summers and Whan, How to Debate, p. 124.
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O'Neill, and Mills, for example, noted that except in
"special situations . . . the affirmative case is required
to discharge the burden of proof by affirming the issues
in a logically adequate fashion."258

Their "steps in

developing a case," however, turned on issues of need and
desirability.
Along with discussions of case, many "middle
period" writers set out specific work for individual
speakers in a debate. 260

Though not differing appreciably

from "early period" treatments, most "middle period"
formats reduced team members from three to two and gave
each speaker one constructive and one rebuttal speech. 261
"Middle period" discussions of refutation and
rebuttal, the terms often being used synonymously,
generally followed those of the "early period."

Courtney

and Capp, however, made the following distinction:
Refutation consists of the destruction of
opposing arguments; it is a tearing-down
process. Rebuttal includes both constructive
258 McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, Argumentation and
Debate, p. 165.
259
Ibid., pp. 163-64.
260
For a comprehensive discussion of the work of
the first affirmative and first negative, see Braden and
Brandenburg, Oral Decision-Making, pp. 435-46.
261
Some formats, however, following legal pro
cedures, gave the affirmative and the negative a single
period of rebuttal.
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and destructive work; in it one attacks his
opponents' arguments and rebuilds his own.262
Regardless of philosophical point of view, writers
generally agreed on methodology for refutation; i.e.,
testing of evidence and reasoning; locating fallacies; and
"special" methods (reductio ad absurdum, dilemma, residues,
263
turning the tables).
McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills,
moreover, isolated one "basic rule for all refutation":
"Always make perfectly clear to the audience or reader
just what is the point that is to be attacked, and the
nature of the attack to be made."

264

Most writers agreed,

moreover, that rebuttal speeches should contain no new
constructive arguments.
Constructing a case involved, for some writers, the
use of "strategy."

Though Laycock and Scales had included

the term strategy in their text, Shaw was probably the
first to advocate openly its use in debating.

And, his

"contribution" met with praise, at least in some quarters.
In reviewing The Art of Debate, G. R. Crecraft commented:
The chapter on Strategy is undoubtedly a
helpful and welcome addition to the treatment
of debate. It does indeed "make every reader
wonder why this subject has been neglected
so long by teachers and writers on debate;
zoZCourtney and Capp, Practical Debating, p. 183.
263
McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, Argumentation and
Debate, pp. 243-49. These "special methods varied from
text to text.
264Ibid., p. 240.
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inasmuch as strategy is one of the most
important means by which a debater demon
strates his skill.
Shaw continued to defend the use of strategy in debating,
claiming:
There is no mystery, . . . connected with
the real strategy of debate, and likewise I
believe that there is no foundation for the
criticism that debate strategy is altogether
an art to be practiced by sophists and charla
tans. The truth of the matter is that there
never was a debate in which time limits for
discussion were wholly absent, and the exist
ence of these time limitations always makes
necessary . . . the very best use of all his
skill in debate. He must employ devices to
get at truth quickly or to raise doubts
quickly and postpone decisions. This means
then simply one thing— the honest man, as
well as the charlatan, must employ some arts
of strategy.^66
Strategy quickly fell into disrepute, however,
developing numerous negative connotations.

Wilbur E.

Gilman, for example, objected to Collins and Morris'
inclusion of the concept "because it presents ideas which
0 fi7
might better be left unsaid."^0/

John Pelsma went so far

as to recommend the use of such slogans as "Rum, Romanism
265G. R. Crecraft, "New Books: Art of Debate,"
Quarterly Journal of Speech Education, IX (April, 19 23),
199 .
266
Warren C. Shaw, "The Use of Strategy in Debate,"
Quarterly Journal of Speech Education, XI (November, 1925),
371.
267
Wilbur E. Gilman, "New Books: Persuasion and
Debate," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XIV (June, 1928),
433; see also Emerson W. Miller, "Skill in Debate,"
Quarterly Journal of Speech Education, XI (April, 1925),
156.
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and Rebellion. "2^°

a

reviewer "commended" Courtney and

Capp "for omitting a treatment of strategy."2*^

Some

writers believed in the value of strategy in debating but
"watered" it down.

Raymond Howes commented that in

Harrison Summers' Contest Debating,
strategy has lost most of its fangs. Although
debating is still a game, it is a polite game,
played by gentlemen with at least one eye
constantly on the audience.270
Strategy, for some, became synonymous with tech
niques for winning.

James H. Holms and Robert L. Kent

entitled their book The Strategy of Argument and included
the claim "satisfaction guaranteed." 271
'

And, in his

codification of rules for competitive debate, Musgrave
characterized the strategy of winning as follows:
Strategy . . . is the art of placing one's
opponents at a disadvantage through a case or
an angle of approach that he does not expect.
. . . Intelligent debaters like strategy and
use it more than their less brilliant col
leagues. In strategic debating the emphasis
is on out-witting one's opponents rather than
76ftJohn Pelsma, Essentials of Debate (rev. ed.;
New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1937).
269
Thorrel B. Fest, "New Books: Practical
Debating," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXXV (December,
1949), 543. Courtney and Capp had contended that "the most
effective strategy is careful preparation." Courtney and
Capp, Practical Debating, p. vi.
270 Raymond Howes, "New Books: Contest Debating,"
Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXI (April, 1935), 274.
27^James H. Holms and Robert L. Kent-. The Strategy
of Argument: How to Debate Successfully (Portland:
J. Weston Walch, 1947).
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outplodding them in library work. The natural
result, of course, is that teams employing
good strategy win the tournaments and league
championships, leaving their more conventional
opponents behind.
The alternative to strategic debating is
conventional debating. Teams using this
approach often lose to strong opponents; the
only way they ever win is by presenting
expected cases supported by so much evidence,
such logical reasoning, and with such organi
zation of thought, that the opposing team is
unable to tear down the line of argument.272
Though few authors admitted such emphasis on
strategy, numerous "practical" or "how to" books on
argumentation and debating appeared during the "middle
273
period."
In his review of Hayworth and Capel's Oral
Argument, Arleigh Williamson voiced some widespread doubts
about such texts.

He said:

Oral Argument, as a presentation solely
from the angle of debate, will be recognized
as a departure from the usual treatment of
argumentation. Baker and Huntington, and the
greater number of authors who have followed,
seem to have looked upon argumentation as a
272

George S. Musgrave, Competitive Debate: Rules
and Strategy (New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1945),
pp. 78-79.
273
The following representative works concentrated
on "what to do and how to do it." Carrol P. Lahman, Debate
Coaching: A Handbook for Teachers and Coaches (New York:
H. W. Wilson Company, 1930; rev. ed., 1936); Summers and
Whan, How to Debate; Brooks Quimby, So You Want to Debate
(Portland, Maine: J. Weston Walch, 1948); Brooks Quimby,
So You Are Directing Debate (Portland, Maine: J. Weston
Walch, 1948); Keith E. Case, Basic Debate (Minneapolis:
Northwestern Press, 1936); Harold F. Graves and Carl B.
Spotts, The Art of Argument (New York: Prentice-Hall,
1927); and Waldo Willhoft, Modern Debate Practice (2d rev.
ed.; New York: Prentice-Hall, 1929).
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discipline in straight thinking, as a safeguard
against error in the building of a case for an
audience, and as a method of rendering an
intellectually honest personal conviction con
vincing to others. Considered in the light of
these ideals of liberal arts education, a
course based on such traditional instruction
in argumentation is unassailable. However, it
must be recognized that another widespread
academic attitude towards argumentation exists—
though most certainly not viewed sympathetically
by all debate teams or teachers— that primarily
of preparing debaters and debates to demonstrate
the superiority of the team debating, rather
than the superiority of the affirmative or the
negative of the social question at issue.
Convinced that argumentation had social and educational
obligations, Williamson posed certain criteria and
challenges.

He asked:

Will the text be influential in cultivating
in students, in relation to their speaking, a
sense of social responsibility? Is its disci
pline conducive to intellectual integrity?
Will it stimulate in students such a high
regard for truth, as essential in furthering
the social good, that they will prefer to see
truth triumph, even when advanced by an oppo
nent, rather than win against it? Does it
attempt to stimulate in speakers that sense
of honor and fair play which scorns winning
over an opponent by tricks of strategy or by
appeals to commonly-held false premises? Are
the social and intellectual standards it sets
for students in keeping with the standards of
liberal education?275
Proof
"Middle period" writers who insisted on a balanced
274

Arleigh B. Williamson, "New Books: Oral
Argument," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXI (February,
1935), 106.
275
Ibid., p. 107.
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rhetorical approach viewed ethos and pathos as well as
logos as legitimate forms of proof.

An earlier discussion

of the conviction-persuasion dichotomy demonstrated the
nature and extent of the controversies surrounding the
"proper" relation between emotional and logical proof.
Accordingly, this section will deal exclusively with
evidence and reasoning.
Though Baker, Alden, and Foster had viewed
reasoning as a form of evidence, most "middle period" texts
276
followed Laycock and Scales's analysis
which differ
entiated evidence (the material) from argument (the
machinery).

Some differences arose, however, over the

meaning of the terms reasoning and argument and the rela
tionship between them.

Crocker, for example, declared

that
evidence and argument together provide the
proof of the case. . . . The materials used in
the proof of the case make up the evidence;
the reasons we advance to prove the case con
stitute the argument.^^
Ewbank and Auer, on the other hand, defined the terms
evidence, reasoning, and argument as follows:
Evidence is the body of facts and opinions
bearing on the problem under consideration.
Reasoning is the process of drawing conclusions from evidence. When an individual uses
^^See Ch. II of this study.
277
Crocker, Argumentation and Debate, p. 60.
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reasoning to get others to accept his conclu
sions we have argument.
Braden and Brandenburg indicated that the process of
drawing conclusions basically is referred to as argument,
reasoning, or inference. 279
Regardless of terms or precise definitions, most
"middle period" writers perceived proof to be a process
of drawing conclusions from evidence (usually according
to the rules of Formal Logic) to substantiate a position.
Their texts, moreover, continued to rely on legal treatises
for discussions of evidence

p on

and on Formal Logic for

processes of reasoning.
Evidence
Definition
Though "middle period" writers failed to develop
a consistent definition of evidence, 281 an examination
278 Ewbank and Auer, Discussion and Debate, 19 51
rev. ed., p. 10 4.
279
Braden and Brandenburg, Oral Decision-Making,
p. 109.
280
Best, Greenleaf, and Thayer had provided the
essential distinctions for early period writers. See
William M. Best, On Evidence, Chamberlayne's Ed. (Boston:
Boston Book Company, 1908); Simon Greenleaf, Law of
Evidence, 3 Vols. (1st ed.; Boston: C. C. Little and
J. Brown, 1842-1853); James B. Thayer, A Preliminary
Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law (Boston: Little,
Brown, and Company, 1896-1898). New texts added John Henry
Wigmore, A Treatise on the System of Evidence in Trials at
Common Law (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1904-05).
28lFor a discussion of definitions in terms of
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of their works indicates that they viewed it similarly
to their predecessors.

Differing terminologies and con

stituents simply represented attempts to clarify the
concept.
Best had included components of evidence in his
definition, along with its ultimate use or result. 2 82

Most

argumentation texts took essentially the same approach, the
major difference in "middle period" definitions involving
the constituents of the "material of proof."

Though those

texts written in the first fifteen years of the period
limited their definitions to "facts," they implied and/or
stated the inclusion of "opinions."

O'Neill, for example,

had used Best's designation, "any matter of fact," in his
revision of the Laycock and Scales text. 283

His subsequent

discussion in that work suggests opinion, however, to be a
kind of fact.

O'Neill retained the same distinction in
284
Debate and Oral Discussion,
but in Working Principles
of Argument with McBurney, he defined as follows:
"what evidence is," and "what evidence consists of," see
Annette N. Shelby, "Evidence, A Study of Evidence: The
Great Debates of 1960" (unpublished Master's thesis,
University of Alabama, 1961).
282

See Ch. II of this study.

283

O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and
Debate, pp. 82-83.
284
O'Neill and Cortright, Debate and Oral
Discussion, p. 107.
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"Evidence consists of those matters of fact and opinion
which are used as a basis of argument."285
Many texts, after 1932, clearly labeled two
separate categories, evidence of fact and evidence of
opinion. 9 ft6 Several, however, retained the primacy of
facts.

Baird's revision of Public Discussion and Debate,

for example, continued to cite Best's and Shaw's distinctions.

9R7

Wagner, moreover, suggested:

What are the means of proof? First, there
is evidence— the establishing of facts by
the testimony of witnesses, the citation of
authorities, or the presentation of physical
objects. Then there is reasoning about the
facts.
Braden and Brandenburg treated "statements from authority"
ppQ
as a kind of fact.
A few writers, moreover, subdivided
the "kinds” of evidence in their definitions.

Nichols and

Baccus, for example, averred that "evidence consists of
poc
O'Neill and McBurney, Working Principles of
Argument, p. 95.
286
See Ewbank and Auer, Discussion and Debate,
1941 ed., p. 117. Ewbank and Auer contended, nevertheless,
that "all evidence is based upon matters of fact." See
also Courtney and Capp, Practical Debating, p. 84.
287 Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1937 rev.
ed., p. 109. See also Baird, Argumentation, Discussion,
and Debate.
288
Wagner, Handbook of Argumentation, p. 27.
Wagner, however, considered fact and opinion to be the
two kinds of expert testimony.
2 On

.

Braden and Brandenburg, Oral Decision-Making,

p. 89.
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facts, data, statistics, happenings, and the personal
experiences and comments of persons qualified to testify
and to make judgments." 290
Classification
Most "middle period" writers continued to include
legal classifications of evidence in their texts. In 1923,
291
Ralph C. Ringwalt
suggested three broad general cate
gories:

form; source; and the relation which facts bear

to the conclusion.

Baird incorporated these same distinctions into his Public Discussion and Debate.292 This

analysis provides a comprehensive outline for labeling the
various methods used by "middle period" writers to divide
293
evidence.
I . Form
A.

Spoken or written

B.

Positive or real

C.

Real or personal

D.

General or specific

^^Nichols and Baccus, Modern Debating, p. 111.
291
Ralph Curtis Ringwalt, Brief Drawing (New York:
Longman's Green and Company, 1923).
292 Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed.,
pp. 148-50; 1937 rev. ed., pp. 113-15. See also Baird,
Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate, pp. 94-9 8.
29 3
The subdivisions are not Baird's. This outline
includes a comprehensive list of ways of classifying.
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II.

III.

Source
A.

Expert or ordinary (expert or lay) 2 9 4

B.

Original or hearsay

C.

Primary or secondary

D.

Reluctant or voluntary

E.

Deliberate or casual

Relation to Conclusion
A.

Direct and indirect (testimonial and
circumstantial)

The preceding list of ways of classifying propositions
demonstrates that "middle period" writers progressed, at
295
least in this area, little beyond 1917 O'Neill,
adding
only two categories:
or voluntary.

general or specific; and reluctant

David C. Ralph probably introduced the

general-specific category in the 19 54 Tau Kappa Alpha
sponsored text.

He explained by the following illustra

tion its applicability to debating:
We may say that recent political conven
tions tend to suggest that we need to discover
a better way of determining our national party
294

O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales had differentiated
"ordinary ('fact') witness" from "expert ('opinion')
witness." O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and
Debate, pp. 96-101. In his 1937 revision, Baird said: "A
witness in court is one who gives testimony concerning a
disputed fact, whereas an authority is one competent to
give opinions about the fact." Baird, Public Discussion
and Debate, 1937 rev. ed., p. 119.
29 5See O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales for legal and
argumentative distinctions of these various classifica
tions. O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and
Debate, pp. 88-99.
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candidates. This is a very general use of
evidence. On the other hand, we may argue
that the widely televised Democratic and
Republican national conventions of 19 52 are
examples to prove the need for an improved
method of selecting candidates for the office
of President of the United States. This is
a more specific, direct use of evidence. 6
Ralph also included the categories reluctant and voluntary
to refer to the willingness with which testimony is
given. 29 7

Most other texts included this distinction,

however, under tests of evidence.
Most writers of the "middle period" viewed evidence
from a more lim: ed perspective than these classifications
suggest.

Some, for example, merely listed kinds of

evidence. 29 8

Others outlined divisions of evidence, sub-

ordinating certain classes. 29 9

Ewbank and Auer distin

guished evidence as proof from evidence as vehicle.

They

listed two kinds of evidence— fact and opinion— which could
be presented through examples and statistics.3®®

Crocker

differentiated areas of classification from types of
296

David C. Ralph, "Evidence," in Argumentation
and Debate: Principles and Practices, ed. by David Potter
(New York: Dryden Press, 1954), p. 93.
297
Ibid., p. 96. See also Ewbank and Auer,
Discussion and Debate, 1941 ed., p. 131.
298
299

Babcock and Powell, How to Debate, pp. 105-108.
Wagner, Handbook of Argumentation, pp. 29-31.

^®®Ewbank and Auer, Discussion and Debate, 1941
ed., pp. 133, 117-18.
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evidence— examples, statistics, and testimony.

301

And

Nichols and Baccus divided evidence into fact, data, sta. .
302
tistics, and authoritative writings.
Tests
Texts of the "middle period" included divergent,
and at times contradictory, tests of evidence.

Methods of

evaluation ranged from the reduction of testing to the
303
determinant, consistency, by Nichols
to Baird's twentyfive criteria.

Regardless of which listing^*^ and/or

terminology was used, it is important to note that "middle
period" writers treated similar evaluative concepts.
Courtney and Capp advised:
many.

"The tests of evidence are

In general they may be summed up under three heads-301

Crocker, Argumentation and Debate, pp. 65-71.
£
302
Nichols and Baccus, Modern Debating, p. 10 5.
303
Nichols, Discussion and Debate, p. 309.
304
"*Baird, Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate,
pp. 112-13.
305
Some writers organized their tests of evidence
in terms of the "kind" of evidence to be evaluated.
Pellegrini and Stirling, for example, outlined tests of
evidence pertinent to expert testimony and statistical
evidence. Pellegrini and Stirling, Argumentation and
Public Discussion, pp. 14-24. Ewbank and Auer discussed
evidence evaluation under the headings, testing facts and
testing opinions. Ewbank and Auer, Discussion and Debate,
1951 rev. ed., pp. 109-117. Braden and Brandenburg
included specific tests for statements from authority,
example, and statistics. Their evaluative criteria drew
from contemporary writings in statistics as well as from
traditional sources. Braden and 3randenburg, Oral
Decision-Making, pp. 89-103.
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source, quality, and quantity.

An examination of

various methods of testing evidence corroborates this
conclusion.

7

"Middle period" writers retained traditional tests
of source, of quality, and of quantity.

In examining the

validity of a source, they attended to prejudice, qualifi
cations (physical, moral, mental, training), veracity, and
opportunity to know the facts.

The criterion "can evidence

pass the hearsay test" kept surfacing, moreover.

Posed

first by Laycock and Scales in 190 4, and retained in 1917
by O'Neill, 30 8 the question appeared in the O'NeillCortright text phrased as follows:
First we must ask, is the evidence itself
of such a nature that it is probable that it
can be handed about from person to person
without undergoing considerable change? . . .
The second part of the hearsay test
requires that the hearsay evidence in order
to be good evidence must come through satis
factory channels.
Foster sharply criticized the use of hearsay evidence in
argumentation in his 1932 revision of Argumentation and
^Courtney and Capp, Practical Debating, p. 99.
30 7McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, however, insisted
that "legal tests of evidence are not . . . tests of
logical relevancy, but tests of legal admissibility."
McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, Argumentation and Debate,
pp. 74-75.
308
O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and
Debate, p. 105.
309
O'Neill and Cortright, Debate and Oral
Discussion, pp. 118-19.
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Debating/ setting out two objections:

"(1) the variations

from truth liable to occur during its passage through such
fallible media as human minds and language; and (2) its
irresponsibility." 310

O'Neill and McBurney realized that

"in general argumentation, however, much reliance must be
placed on the experiences and observations of others as
they are told to you, or as they are printed in books and
magazines." 311 And Nichols concluded that "if hearsay
evidence were rigidly excluded, discussion and debate
would be practically impossible." 312

Eventually, however,

most texts dropped the distinction.
"Middle period" writers also generally agreed on
the constituents of "quality."

For example, tests of the

consistency of evidence (with itself, with other evidence,
with human experience, with the laws of logical argument,
with common sense, and with known fact) came largely from
"early period" texts.

The probability of evidence^^^

310 Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 19 32
rev. ed., p. 93.
311
O'Neill and McBurney, Working Principles of
Argument, p. 103.
312Nichols, Discussion and Debate, pp. 275-76.
313

See Ch. II of this study; also, Baird, Public
Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed., pp. 152-53; O'Neill and
McBurney, Working Principles of Argument, pp. 110-12.
314
See Nichols and Baccus, Modern Debating,
pp. 26 4-65; Reeves and Hudson, Principles of Argument and
Debate, pp. 68-72.
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(evaluated in terms of general knowledge or human experi
ence, specific or unusual existing conditions, or sub
sequent or prior known facts) emerged.

And, the timeliness

of evidence became an important method of verifying quality
for some writers.

Sufficiency, on the other hand, lent

itself less easily to specific tests.

Courtney and Capp

pointed out:
There can be no "one and only" answer to
how much evidence is necessary to prove an
argument. Much depends upon the nature of the
argument itself and upon the beliefs of the
audience relative to each argument.
Quantity is determined by the nature of
the argument, audience beliefs, and by the
corroboration of evidence. x5
O

1 f.

In addition to these tests for reliability, XD
appropriated largely from "early period" texts, certain
"middle period" writers examined audience acceptability
of evidence.

Though Winans and Utterback, for example,

omitted a treatment of evidence as such, they, nevertheless,
averred that "to be convincing an argument must rest upon
basic premises which are acceptable to the hearer." 317
•^^Courtney and Capp, Practical Debating, pp. 105,
109.
316

"Middle period" tests of reliability paralleled
early period tests. See Ch. II of this study. In evalu
ating competency of source, questions evolved concerning
opportunity to know facts, capability of understanding
facts, and ability to interpret them, along with physical,
mental, moral, and experience qualifications.
317

Winans and Utterback, Argumentation, p. 140.
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O'Neill and McBurney agreed that both audience accepta
bility and logical adequacy are appropriate tests of
evidence.

"In some cases, it is advisable to be guided

by one test, and in other cases, primarily by the other
test."3^3

They asked:

Is the evidence already a belief of the
audience? . . . Has the evidence been attrib
uted to an authority which the audience
is willing to accept?31^
Though O'Neill retained audience acceptability as a test
of evidence in his text with McBurney and Mills, he gave
it less emphasis.
Reasoning
Traditional applications of logic to argumentation
and debate faced attack from two divergent viewpoints. 321
Baker, relying heavily on Sidgwick, had questioned the
value of a study of "Formal Logic" for practical argumen
tation.

Gladys Murphy Graham, on the other hand, indicted

"current" treatments of logic in argumentation texts as
*5 0 0

insufficient and fragmentary. ^

Believing that the new

318

O'Neill and McBurney, Working Principles of
Argument, p. 99.
319Ibid., pp. 113-16.
320 See McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, Argumentation
and Debate, p. 95.
33^See Ch. II of this study.
3^Graham, "Logic and Argumentation," p. 350.
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logics could provide both new principles and a clarifica
tion of certain currently used, muddled concepts, Graham
wished to adapt Bosanquet's analysis of argument from
implicative wholes to argumentation and debate theory.
Woolbert, meanwhile, having reassessed the place
of logic (the process of inferring) in a system of per
suasion, concluded that the making of inferences occurs
at three general levels of consciousness (the sub
conscious, partly conscious, and conscious).

The nature

of the process is the same for all three levels, being
ultimately reducible to neuromuscular activity.

Woolbert

theorized that past experience operating as opinions,
attitudes, et cetera, are influential at the subconscious
level.

Ethical appeals and testimony are operative at the

partly conscious level; reason at the conscious level.
He categorized the three levels, therefore, in terms of
logical formulae to be used.
applicable at the first level.

Rules of rhetoric are
Few rules have been formu

lated for the partly conscious level.

Rules of logic are

appropriate for the third or conscious level.

Woolbert

extended the levels of consciousness concept when he
interpreted logical fallacies in terms of the Freudian
wish theory; i.e., faulty reasoning results from the clash
of our subconscious and conscious wishes. 323
323Woolbert, "Logic in a System of Persuasion,"
pp. 19-39.
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John Dewey also examined thought as a logical form,
or product, and as a psychological process.

He contended

that logical forms
apply not to reaching conclusions, not to
arriving at beliefs and knowledge, but to the
most effective way in which to set forth what
has already been concluded, so as to convince
others (or oneself if one wishes to recall
to mind its grounds) of the soundness of the
result.324
Dewey argued, nevertheless, that "actual thinking has its
own logic; it is orderly, reasonable, reflective.' 32 6
What of the influence of these critics?

Following

Baker, "middle period" texts paid homage to a "practical"
approach to argumentation.

Practical, however, usually

meant simplified prescriptive texts for contest debating
with a smattering of traditional Formal Logic thrown in
for good measure.

Graham's insistence on applying reason

ing from implicative wholes to argumentation, though
largely rejected, 326 helped to stimulate interest in new
approaches to logic.
The Woolbertian disciples, Collins and Morris,
presented a radical— though not particularly influential—
treatment of argument.
324

Attempting "to present helpful

Dewey, How We Think, p. 74.

325Ibid., p. 75.
32^See, however, discussion of explanation as
argument in McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, Argumentation
and Debate, pp. 130-42; see also Nichols, Discussion and
Debate, pp. 347-48.
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principles from logic and from psychology without drawing
upon the systematic treatment of either," Collins and
Morris ignored both the syllogism and formal induction.

3 9 7

Preferring the "more easily understandable and practical
synthetical methods,"

they examined "the three essential

argumentative materials of reasoning":

propositions

expressing old beliefs of the audience; propositions
expressing new beliefs which the persuader hopes the
audience will accept; and propositions expressing mental
connections between the old beliefs and the new. 329 They
also included "the four essential implicit or impressive
materials of objective reasoning":

propositions expressing

illustrative imagery (presented by use of figure, analogy,
exemplification); rhetorical questions which image and sug
gest responses; bodily-action images (the action of the
330
speaker); and vocal images (the voice of the speaker).
Collins and Morris held that the acceptance-attitudes of
the audience determined the use of these methods. 331
327

Collins and Morris, Persuasion and Debate,

I X .

328T,
Ibid.
329
Ibid., p. 97.
330t,
Ibid., p. 103.
331McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills incorporated the
analysi-^-synthesis terminology into their definition of
explanation as argument: "Explanation is that form of
support in which belief and action are sought by explaining
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Most writers, perceiving John Dewey's paradigm to
be analysis, not proof, or even a process of proof,
examined the elements of reflective thought in chapters
on analysis or in sections on organizational patterns of
discussion.

Nichols and Baccus1 "types of induction,"

however, an atypical approach, combined some of Dewey's
steps with certain of John Stuart Mills's experimental
methods.

Nichols and Baccus labeled three "positive

processes of induction," inquiry or investigation,
generalizing, and analyzing, and one "negative process,"
332
elimination.
Most "middle period" writers, rather than adapting
one of the preceding alternatives, retained edited versions
of "Formal Logic," similar to that found in O'Neill,
Laycock, and Scales's Argumentation and Debate. Their
texts simply updated traditional treatments in terms of
certain contemporary logics. 333

Of particular influence

the data connected with any proposition in such a way as
to cause the audience to accept the proposition by
implication. It is a process of argument in which the
speaker analyzes and synthesizes the materials bearing on
the proposition, thereby leading the audience to imply its
truth." McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, Argumentation and
Debate, p. 130.
332
Nichols and Baccus, Modern Debating, pp. 179-81.
333
Nichols and Baccus presented a representative
view of the relation of logic to argumentation and debate:
"Debate depends so much upon logic that some people have
considered it a game of logic. Debate, however, is not
logic any more than biology is logic. It is not a game of
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were the writings of Max Black and Monroe Beardsley.

*5O A

Black's Critical Thinking: An Introduction to Logic and
OOC
Scientific Method
combined "a cursory introduction to
symbolic logic with the traditional Aristotelian nomenclature" 336 in examining deduction which, incidentally,
Black determined to relativistic. 337 Beardsley's Practical
338
Logic and Thinking Straight
included principles of
logic any more than military tactics are a game of logic.
Debate depends so closely upon logic for the rules of its
thinking, the tests of its reasoning, that it is impos
sible to separate the two, but the same thing may be said
of the dependence of all sciences upon logic. From the
logical methods of thought the debater gets the construc
tive argument needed to develop his case in proper arrange
ment. From the methods of testing thought, he learns what
to use and what not to use in constructing a case. From
the maxim of logic he learns the formulas of refutation and
rebuttal." Ibid., pp. 177-78.
^

j

The influence of Black and Beardsley is
evidenced both by journal reviews and bydirect citations
of their works in numerous argumentation texts of the
"middle period."
335
Max Black, Critical Thinking: An Introduction
to Logic and Scientific Method (New York: Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1946).
336 Solomon Simonson, "Chance, Law and Logic,"
Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXXIV (April, 1948), 249.
337
Black's innovative division of fallacies
included general fallacies, "those whose persuasiveness is
connected with some intrinsic defect of the argument"
(formal, linguistic, and material types) and fallacies of
circumstance, "those whose appeal arises from some features
of the context in which the argument is used." Black,
Critical Thinking, pp. 210-11.
33 8
Monroe C. Beardsley, Practical Logic (New York:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1950): Monroe C. Beardsley, Thinking
Straight (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1950).
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application as well as theoretical distinctions between
fact and opinion, exposition and argument, reasons and
conclusions.

Beardsley described syllogisms, emphasized

statistical data, and discussed style.

James I. Brown

suggested that the "particular contribution" of
Beardsley's two works "lies in bringing into closer rela
tionship, logic and life— that portion of life centering
in communication, in writing and reading, in speaking and
-. . .
,,339
listening.
It was suggested in Chapter II of this study
that the 1917 revisions of O'Neill and Foster provided
the essential framework for "middle period" approaches
to proof.

A summary chart of their positions is shown

on page 219.

An examination of the diagram indicates

that though Foster and O'Neill essentially agreed on
the components of proof, they perceived the relationships
between these elements differently.
for "middle period" writers.

The same was true

Some followed O'Neill‘S ®

in distinguishing rhetorical and logical classes of
339

James I. Brown, "New Books in Review: Practical
Logic and Thinking Straight," Quarterly Journal of Speech,
XXXVII (October, 1951), 386.
340
Shaw felt that "the basis of classifying all
argument rests upon the nature of the inference between
the premises and the conclusion." He included analogy,
along with deduction and induction. Shaw, Art of Debate,
p. 74. See also McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, Argumentation and Debate.
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FOSTER
Classes o f A rg u m en t provided by Logic

Induction

Deduction (logical syllogism)

Example (typical form )

Causal Relation (typical form )

G eneralization (im perfect induction)

Analogy

Effect to Effect

Effect to Cause

O ’NEILL
Logical Classes o f A rgum ent

Rhetorical Classes of A rgum ent

A ntecedent Probability

Sign

Generalization

Cause to Effect

Effect to Cause

Effect to Effect

Deduction
Induction
(process of inference same)

Example

Analogy

Kinds
Perfect

Association
of phenomena in past
quantitative
relations

sorites

enthym eme

Agreem ent
Difference
Joint
Residues
Concom itant
Variations

219

syllogism

Im perfect

M ethod

220

argument.

*3A 1

Others attempted, as had Foster, to

incorporate the rhetorical categories as "kinds" of
induction and deduction.

Baird treated specific instances,

argument from authority, argument from causal relation,
and analogy as forms of induction.
labeled three types of reasoning:

Winans and Utterback
deductive (syllogistic,

but included a forteriori); generalization (included
causal); and analogy. 343

O'Neill and Cortright followed

the O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales distinctions, while
O'Neill and McBurney examined generalization and analogy
as forms of induction; antecedent probability and sign as
kinds of deduction. 344 O'Neill and McBurney suggested,
moreover, "two important thought relationships involved
in induction and deduction":

cause-effect relationships
345
and substance-attribute relationships.
Nichols picked
Babcock and Powell listed as the major divisions
of reasoning, deduction, induction, and estimates of
probability in regard to particular questions, treating
analogy and circumstantial evidence as parts of the third
classification. Moreover, they evaluated effect to cause,
cause to effect, and effect to effect reasoning as kinds
of circumstantial evidence. Babcock and Powell, How to
Debate, pp. 134-64.
342
Baird, Public Discussion and Debate,
pp. 187-204.
343
Winans and Utterback, Argumentation, pp. 64-136.
344
O'Neill and McBurney, Working Principles of
Argument, pp. 125-59. The McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills
text returned to O'Neill's earlier pattern of organization.
345
O'Neill and McBurney, Working Principles of
Argument, p. 123.
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up these distinctions and included them along with nonsyllogistic types of argument, and implication or implicative wholes in his discussion of proof.

346

Whereas Shaw

had treated analogy as comparable to induction and
deduction, Wagner suggested causal reasoning to be a third
347
major division of argument.
Wagner also included
certain other aspects of proof:

accepted premises or

topics; a forteriori reasoning; and the dilemma. 348
Some "middle period" writers simply listed types
of arguments and did not specifically detail their rela
tionships.

Ewbank and Auer included deduction, induction,

analogy, and causal argument.

Baird (19 50) treated

generalization (from specific instances, statistics, and
circumstantial details), analogy, causal reasoning,
^^Nichols, Discussion and Debate, pp. 344-48.
Cf. Graham's distinctions.
347
Summers and Whan discussed proof by classifying
and eliminating. Summers and Whan, How to Debate,
pp. 34-48.
348Wagner, Handbook of Argumentation, p. 44.
Wagner suggested that in form, the a forteriori argument,
a "mode of heightening the argument by analogy . . .
resembles the hypothetical syllogism." O'Neill relied on
Genung's description of a forteriori argument which said:
"A favorite use of the argument from example, especially
in oratory, is the argument technically called a
forteriori, which reasons that if a certain principle is
true in a given case, much more will it be true in a
supposed case, wherein the conditions are more favorable."
John F. Genung, The Practical Elements of Rhetoric (Boston:
Ginn and Company, 1886), pp. 421-22. O'Neill believed
a forteriori argument to be applicable to either generali
zation or analogy. O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumen
tation and Debate, p. 159.
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authority, and deduction. 3 4 9

Braden and Brandenburg listed

arguments from specific instances, circumstantial detail,
causal relations, analogy, and authority.350

Though

recognizing that one usually identifies these as inductive
arguments, they observed that:
Actually, however, the debater or public
speaker almost always uses a deductive order
with these forms. He presents his general
belief or conclusion and then attempts to
prove it by utilizing various kinds of argu
ment in support of it.^51
Though most definitions and tests of the various
forms of reasoning closely followed "early period" dis
tinctions, argument from sign continued to generate
controversy.

Both Foster and O'Neill had included sign

in their revisions.

Foster believed that "we ought to

be able to explain all so-called arguments from sign by
reference to generalization, or causation, or both." 352
O'Neill used the rhetorical classification and divided
sign into arguments from effect to cause, effect to effect,
and association of phenomena in the past. 353

Though Shaw,

349 Baird, Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate,
pp. 115-60.
350 Braden and Brandenburg, Oral Decision-Making,
pp. 113-14.
^ ^ Ibid., p. 133.
352
Foster, Argumentation and Debating, p. 181.
353

O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and
Debate, p. 146.
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Ewbank and Auer, and Nichols included argument from sign
in their texts, it was in the O'Neill co-authored texts
that the concept received most attention.

McBurney,

O'Neill, and Mills's Argumentation and Debate prescribed
the argument as
one which gives an indication that the
proposition is true without attempting to
explain why it is true. It is a ratio
cognoscendi or reason for acknowledging or
recognizing the truth of a proposition as
distinguished from a ratio essendi or
reason why the proposition is
354
t r u e .

Ehninger disagreed.

"As a ratio cognoscendi [method of

knowing], argument from sign is concerned with the what
of a thing," he said, "rather than with the why.”355
"Unfortunately," Ehninger continued, "the difference
354McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, Argumentation and
Debate, p. 96. "All arguments from sign are based on the
assumption (stated or implied) that two or more variables
are related in such a way that the presence or absence of
one may be taken as an indication of the presence or
absence of the other. Such relationships are reciprocal
when either variable may be taken as the sign of the
other. . . . Sign relationships are nonreciprocal when one
variable serves as a sign of the second, but this second
cannot be reliably deduced from the first. . . . These sign
relations are sometimes referred to as substance-attribute
relations. Since every substance (object, thing, person,
event, item, etc.) has certain distinguishing attributes
or characteristics (size, shape, color, speed, number,
etc.) the attributes may be taken as signs of the substance
or the substance as a sign of the attributes. All argu
ments from sign are based on generalizations either stated
or implied," p. 97.
35 5Douglas Ehninger, "The Logic of Argument," in
Argumentation and Debate; Principles and Practices, ed. by
David Potter (New York: Dryden Press, 1954), p. 105.
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between sign and cause is not always easy to grasp," the
reasons being as follows:
The first is that at one point sign and
cause coincide, since among the reasons for
our knowing a thing is an awareness of its
cause. Thus, triangular ripples in the water
are both a sign that a boat has passed and
are also the effect resulting from its having
agitated the water. Second, in English we
commonly employ "because," "hence," and
similar words to express both relationships. 6
McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills expanded traditional
tests of argument from sign.

Believing that "the basic

test of any argument from sign lies in the reliability of
the generalization upon which it is based," 357 they
included, nevertheless, specific tests for "constructing
and appraising" these arguments.
1.
2.
3.
4.

Is the sign relationship accidental or
coincidental?
Is the sign relationship reciprocal?
Have special factors intervened which
alter normal relations?
Is the sign reliable without the
collaboration or concurrence of other
signs?358

Ehninger, on the other hand, suggested the following "three
basic considerations":
1.

That which is alleged to be a sign of a
particular state or condition must bear a
necessary and essential relation to that
state or condition.

357McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, Argumentation and
Debate, p. 98.
358Ibid., pp. 98-99.
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2.

That which at one time and under one set
of circumstances may be a valid sign of
some state or condition is not necessarily
a valid sign of that state or condition
at another time or under altered
circumstances.

3.

While in some instances a single sign may
be sufficient to establish the presence of
a particular state or condition, generally
the corroboration of several signs is
necessary in order to establish its
presence.
Though "middle period" writers retained traditional

tests for formal validity (rules for categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive syllogisms),

they recognized

that:
The essential rhetorical problem in the
syllogism is in the fact that its rules and
regulations contemplate a degree of certainty
which can rarely be achieved in a rhetorical
demonstration. The crucial test of the syllo
gism is that the middle term be distributed in
at least one of the premises. The point here
is that the middle terms in rhetorical syllo
gisms can rarely be distributed perfectly and
completely. The things we talk about in most
public and private debates are variable rather
than discrete and categorical. . . . A series
of syllogisms whose middle terms are qualified
. . . [as usually, frequently, et cetera]
might very well establish an exceedingly high
degree of probability; and yet, logically,
. . . they amount to exactly zero, because the
middle terms are not distributed. . . . In
order . . . to accommodate his syllogistic
doctrine to the kinds of proofs which speakers
and writers must ordinarily use, he [Aristotle]
*3 6 Q

Ehninger, "Logic of Argument," pp. 106-107.

36oSee O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation
and Debate, pp. 176-82.
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invented the "rhetorical syllogism" or the
enthymeme.361
Particularly instrumental in giving the concept a more
central place in argumentation theory,

362

McBurney said:

The syllogism and the enthymeme explain
the structure of argument as it is exhibited
in a properly drawn brief or logical outline
and provide the structural basis, through such
outlines, for the composition of the finished
discourse. They also make it clear that all
(deductive) reasoning proceeds by relating
generalizations to particular cases through
the mediation of middle terms which are common
to both and provide tests which can be used to
check the validity of deductive inferences.363
Consistent with an interest in empiricism and
pragmatism, "middle period" texts also investigated
material validity, primarily in terms of traditional
fallacies.

McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills pointed up the

importance of such a study when they said:
So far as it is possible, the speaker should
attempt to make his arguments both formally
valid and materially true. This amounts to
saying that the deductions from his premises
should be carefully drawn and his premises
should be inductively sound. The rules of the
syllogism are designed to give formal validity
and the rules of inductive reasoning are
designed to secure material truth. In dealing
361

McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, Argumentation and
Debate, pp. 118-19.
362
See James H. McBurney, "The Place of the
Enthymeme in Rhetorical Theory," Speech Monographs, III
(September, 1936), 49-74.
363

McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, Argumentation and
Debate, p. 122.
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with probabilities, we approximate these
conditions as closely as possible.
Some writers included other "obstacles to clear thinking."
Baird listed eleven major problems.-*65

Behl reduced

Baird's categories to six general divisions (inaccurate
use of language, inaccurate use of definition, inaccurate
analysis, misuse of evidence, fallacies in logic, and
special fallacies) and added substitution of speaking
techniques for argument. OD
The Forensic
Whereas Baker

36 7

had perceived the forensic to be

either a written or oral presentation, ''middle period"
writers restricted its meaning to the "spoken debate" 36 8
and to certain forms of public discussion.

In their essay

on "Intercollegiate Debating," Cowperthwaite and Baird
suggested that "by 19 23 college debating had seen most of
its major developments.

subsequent evolution,

they said:
364ibid., p. 126.
363 Baird, Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate,
pp. 163-65.
366
Behl, Discussion and Debate, p. 135.
"^^Baker, Principles, p. vii.
^**See Alden, Art of Debate, p. 187.
^69Leroy Cowperthwaite and A. Craig Baird, "Inter
collegiate Debating," in A History of Speech Education in
America, ed. by Karl Wallace (New York: Appleton-CenturyCrofts, 1954), p. 272.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

228

The forces which established intercol
legiate debate have been vigorous enough to
keep it in good health. International
debating continued to expand. New adapta
tions were introduced . . . and radio enabled
the debater to reach larger audiences. The
most important new direction was the debate
tournament, which allowed debaters to meet sev
eral colleges at one location with minimum
expense. Colleges experimented also with
legislative assemblies as a realistic setting
for the student speaker.
Tournament Debating
The advent of tournament debating,

for Baird

and Cowperthwaite the most significant development of the
period, resulted in textbook attention to, as well as
journal literature on, organizing forensic programs, 372
370
Ibid. Women also were allowed to enter the
fray during the "middle period."
3 71
Ibid., p. 274. The debate tournament
"allegedly originated" in 19 23 at Southwestern College,
Winfield, Kansas. See F. B. Ross, "A New Departure in
Forensics," Forensic of Pi Kappa Delta (November, 1923).
The first National Tournament was sponsored by Pi Kappa
Delta at its national convention in 19 26. See Egbert
Ray Nichols, "A Historical Sketch of Inter-Collegiate
Debating," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXII (April,
1926), 213-22 and (December, 1936) , 59"l-602. Lahman,
Debate Coaching, 1936 rev. ed., referred to tournament
debating not as a type, but rather as an "epidemic" of
debating, p. 62.
3 72

See Gregg Phifer, "Organizing Forensic
Programs," in Argumentation and Debate: Principles and
Practices, ed. by David Potter (New York: Dryden Press,
1954), pp. 345-74; Leonard F. Sommer, "Building the
Debate Program," Central States Speech Journal, IX (Fall,
1957), 24-26.
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forensic l e a g u e s a n d debate tournaments.

It

also influenced and in many ways dictated the structure
of the forensic.

Cowperthwaite and Baird observed further

that:
In order to hold several "rounds" of
debate in one or two days, the length of
speeches was reduced to ten minutes for
constructive and five minutes for rebuttal
speeches. Although early tournaments made
use of the traditional three-speaker team,
tournament efficiency was in large measure
responsible for the advent of the twospeaker system. With the national tourna
ment came the necessity for selecting a
national debate question. Finally, the
tournament brought a renewed emphasis on
contest debating, even though many non
decision or "practice" tournaments were
held. Tournament debating also meant
speaking almost entirely without popular
audiences; indeed, the real audience was
often the critic judge.
070

Paul Carmack, "State Forensic Leagues," in
Argumentation and Debate: Principles and Practices,
ed. by David Potter (New York: Dryden Press, 1954),
pp. 423-53.
374
Nichols and Baccus included one of the first
textbook discussions of tournament debating. See
Nichols and Baccus, Modern Debating. See also F. E.
Lambertson, "The Mechanics of Tournament Debating,"
Gavel, XXIII (March, 1941), 57-58; E. C. Buehler, ed.,
‘'A Symposium: Debate Tournaments Appraised," Gavel,
XXXII (May, 1950), 75, 82, 83.
375
Cowperthwaite and Baird, "Intercollegiate
Debating," p. 274. The national debate tournament
prompted an interest in a common national question.
See James H. McBath and Joseph Aurback, "Origins of the
National Debate Resolution," Journal of the American
Forensic Association, IV (Fall, 1967), 96-102.
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Forms and Formats
Debate coaches and tournament directors
experimented widely with format^** during the "middle
period." 377

Though recommending open forum, 378 split

t e a ms,heckling,^®® d i a l e c t i c , a n d even "mail
382 forms of debating, writers more often emphaorder"°
sized the cross-examination, 383 congressional, and direct
376For an excellent summary of the forms of
debating, see Lahman, Debate Coaching, 19 36 rev. ed.,
pp. 33-40.
377
Nichols attributed the new debate forms to
criticisms being hurled at the discipline. E. R. Nichols,
"Boil and Bubble, Toil and Trouble," Debaters' Magazine,
II (September, 1946), 189-90.
378
See C. L. Menser, "On the Open Forum," Quarterly
Journal of Speech Education, X (November, 1924), 346-49;
D. W. Morris, "The Intercollegiate Forum," Quarterly
Journal of Speech, XXIV (April, 1938), 212-20.
379
See B. I. Wiley, "Bridging the Gap," Quarterly
Journal of Speech, XVI (February, 1930), 114-16. Wiley
deals with the gap between Decision and Non-Decision
debating.
380 Edith M. Phelphs and Julia E. Johnson, eds.,
University Debaters' Annual (New York: H. W. Wilson
Company, 1937), pp. 471-530,
381
E.
L. Hunt, "Dialectic— A Neglected Method of
Argument," Quarterly Journal of Speech Education, VII
(June, 1921), 221-32.
382
See Eric Julber and Warren Christopher, "'Mail
Order' Debating," Rostrum, XVII (September, 1942), 5.
38 3
This was also called the "Oregon Plan." See
J. Stanley Gray, "The Oregon Plan of Debating," Quarterly
Journal of Speech Education, XII (April, 1926), 178-79.
See also D. R. Parker, "The Use of Cross-Examination in
Debate," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XVIII (February,
1932), 97-102. Gray outlined the advantages of the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

231

clash^®^ styles.

In addition to modifications of the

traditional forensic form, "middle period" writers devised
numerous methods for presenting several sides of an issue,
OpC
convention debating being particularly popular. 3 Intercollegiate contests included parliamentary sessions, 386
symposia, 387 and, in some instances, discussion. 388
Oregon Plan. "We have no judge prejudice; no overemphasis
of winning; no refusal of a debater to admit a fact because
it may cause him to lose a judge's vote; no sacrificing of
the welfare of the student for the sake of winning a
debate; no dry academic and technical speeches; and
finally, no shirking in preparation. The period of cross
questioning is sufficient stimulus for thorough prepara
tion. Aside from the first two speeches, memorized
speaking is impossible. The debater must learn to adjust
himself and his ideas to the new situations which every
debate presents." Gray, "The Oregon Plan of Debating,"
p. 179.
384
Lahman called the congressional-style debate
"a combination of the conventional procedure, cross
questioning, and heckling." Lahman, Debate Coaching, 19 36
rev. ed., p. 33. See Edwin H. Paget, "The Direct-Clash
Debate Plan," Gavel, XV (March, 1933), 12-14.
385Arleigh B. Williamson, "A Proposed Change in
Intercollegiate Speaking," Quarterly Journal of Speech,
XIX (April, 1933), 192-206. For a discussion of
Williamson's proposal, see William P. Sanford, "A Proposed
Change in Intercollegiate Speaking," Quarterly Journal of
Speech, XIX (June, 1933), 416-18.
3^See Joseph F. O'Brien, "The Place of ExtraCurricular Speech in the College or University of Today,"
Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXI (November, 1935), 579-87.
387 Grace F. Shepard, "Symposium Rather than Debate,"
Quarterly Journal of Speech Education, LII (December,
1931), 211-13.
^®®See Ray Cowell, "The Problem Solving Debate,"
Rostrum, XI (September, 1936), 6-7; Joseph F. O'Brien,
"Group Discussion as a Substitute for the Conventional
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Pi Kappa Delta sponsored a student legislative assembly as
a regular feature of its national conventions 389 and Delta
Sigma Rho inaugurated a continuing series of biennial
National Student Congresses.
The advent of no-decision debate led to an investi
gation of still other formats.

There was agitation, for

example, for debating on neutral floors.

3Q fl

Radio debating

gained popularity. 391

Students participated in limited
proposition or impromptu clashes, 392 and some tried the
British system. 39 3 Interest, moreover, generated by a few
High School Contest in Extemporaneous Speaking," Gavel
XVIII (January, 1936), 19-20; Earl S. Kalp, "The Discussion
Contest," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XX (November, 1934),
545-47.
■^^Sherod J. Collins, "The Student Assembly,"
Forensic, XXVII (May, 1942), 126-27, 162.
390 See Raymond F. Howes, "Finding Debate
Audiences," Quarterly Journal of Speech Education, XI
(November, 1925), 364-68.
391
See William D. Millson, "Radio Debating: A New
Form," Speaker, XXIV (November, 1939), 9-10; Cowperthwaite
and Baird, "Intercollegiate Debating," p. 273.
392
See J. R. Pelsma, "Advantages and Disadvantages
of Impromptu Debating," Gavel, XIII (May, 1931), 6-7.
39 3See Douglas Ehninger, "Outline of Procedure for
the English-Style of Debate," Gavel, XXX (March, 1948),
51. A. Craig Baird, "Shall American Universities Adopt the
British System of Debating?" Quarterly Journal of Speech
Education, IX (June, 1923) , 215-22; Waldo W. Braden, ‘'The
British Style of Debating," Speaker, XLI (January, 1959),
10-12; Cowperthwaite and Baird observed: "Characterized
by its conventional mode, wittiness, and its stress upon
audience persuasion, the Oxford, or British, style of
debating had a significant and profound effect in tempering
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isolated debates with British teams resulted in the
establishment of an international debating program spon
sored by the Institute of International Education.
Old Issues and New Directions
Though the physical structure of the forensic
changed during the "middle period," the underlying philo
sophical controversies remained essentially the same as
those of the early period.

Affirmative and negative

journal articles appeared on debate coaching, 39 5 debating
both sides of questions, 39 f\ and most particularly on the
the legalistic formalism of American debating."
Cowperthwaite and Baird, "Intercollegiate Debating,"
p. 271. The implications of this issue were discussed
earlier in this chapter.
394
Such problems as constructing the forensic were
discussed primarily in terms of case. Considerations such
as arrangement, style, and delivery (including platform
manners) assumed the central place in argumentation theory
discussed earlier in this chapter. For a summary of some
of the typical indictments lodged at debating, see Ruth E.
Huston, "Debate Coaching in High School— Benefits and
Methods," Quarterly Journal of Speech Education, X (April,
1924), 127-43.
39 5
W. C. Shaw, "The Crime Against Public Speaking,"
Quarterly Journal of Speech Education, VIII (April, 1922),
138-44; "The Coach versus the Professor," an Editorial,
Quarterly Journal of Speech Education, IX (June, 1923),
284-85; Charles A. Marsh, ^'Coaching Debate Teams," Gavel,
XIII (December, 1931), 3-6.
39 6See Williamson, "New Books," p. 19 8; Laverne
Bane, "Discussion for Public Service vs. Debate," Quarterly
Journal of Speech, XXVIII (December, 1941), 546-49; Fritz,
Method of Argument, p. 27; Dayton McKean, "New Books: The
Method of Argument," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XVIII
(February, 1932), 136-37.
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appropriate end of debating, i.e., skill in argumentation
39 7
versus discovery of truth.
The O'Neill-Wells contro
versy, though far from resolved, approached a stalemate in
1918, with the publication of a joint article in the
Quarterly Journal of Speech Education. Wells restated his
earlier position that debate must emphasize reasoning with
truth as the end.

"Art is always dynamic, moving to defi

nite purposes," he said.888
countered:

O'Neill, equally unyielding,

"I want precisely what we get in other kinds

of contests, an intelligent decision on the work done,
399
the ability shown."
Though directed initially towards
differing philosophical ends of debating, the continuing
dispute had deteriorated into a hassel over judging.

In

1918, an article appeared in the Quarterly Journal
entitled "Juryman or Critic; Three Rebuttal Arguments and
a Decision."488

Sarett, the "judge," set out the issues

as follows, his analysis being incisive.
"*87See Ross F. Lockridge, "A New Idea in High
School Discussion Contests," English Journal, IV (January,
1915), 19.
■^88James M. O'Neill and Hugh N. Wells, "Judging
Debates," Quarterly Journal of Speech Education, IV
(January, 1918) , 77.
399
Ibid., p. 83.
488Hugh N. Wells, James M. O'Neill, and Lew R.
Sarett, "Juryman or Critic; Three Rebuttal Arguments and
a Decision," Quarterly Journal of Speech Education, IV
(October, 1918), 398-433.
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The gist of the whole argument is this.
Judge Wells wishes the debate to be judged
primarily on the "weight of evidence" or "the
case"— as I said I infer that by this he means
the fullness and the logical coherence of the
brief, and the preponderance of points; and
secondarily (although nowhere does he make the
definite statement) on skill in debate, and
then only in so far as that skill serves to
make the "weight of evidence" more clear, etc.
Professor O'Neill wishes debate to be judged
primarily on skill in debate as such, in and
of itself, and secondarily on the evidence,—
thus if one side is inherently weaker in
evidence or "case" this misfortune will be no
bar to the possibility of winning the debate
if it is superior as a team of debaters, more
skillful. The ultimate and conclusive answer
to the question that is raised by these con
flicting positions can be found only if we can
agree on an answer to another question which
is in turn created, and which lies at the root
of the discussion, namely, What is the end of
debate? What is its function? What is its pur
pose? Neither Professor O'Neill nor Judge Wells
makes a definite statement on this point; each
bases his argument on a different assumption. I
infer from Judge Wells' attitude— this is merely
an inference— that he believes that the end of
debate is the revelation of "truth." (I use
quotation marks because I believe that "truth"
as it lies in all big public questions is more
or less relative, varying with the temperaments,
prejudices, experiences, and observations of
judges; moreover "truth" is not always truth.)
Professor O'Neill on the other hand believes that
debate is an intellectual combat, a contest in
skill in forensics. Obviously the gentlemen dis
agree in their basic conceptions concerning the
end or purpose of debate. It is and always will
be difficult to reconcile arguments concerning
judges, standards, and so on, if we cannot agree
on this conception of the function of debate;
and our conclusions concerning all other ques
tions of debate policy must vary with it. If the
debate is a game, an intellectual combat, a con
test in forensic skill, then the judge should be
a critic who knows the game, who understands the
art and the arts of debate; and the standard by
which he should judge contests should be the
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standard of skill in the use of that art,—
skill in debate, skill as such. ^
If nothing else, the Wells-0'Neill discussions
pointed up the relativity of standards of judgment.
Writers drafted ballots with varying criteria.
espoused voting by percentages.

Some

No-decision and audience-

decision debates gained popularity and a single arbiter
replaced the three-judge panel.

Henry C. Klingbeil graphi

cally demonstrated the problem when he said:

"The greatest

need of the American brand of debating to-day is some defi
nite, visible scoring scheme."402

Several such "schemes"

appeared, one of the most interesting being the "shift of
opinion" ballot by Woodward and Millson.402

Designed to

replace the formal decision of a judge, this approach
sought rather to assess the effect of debating in terms of
a change in audience response.

Recognizing that "audience

opinion is an elusive thing,"404 Woodward attempted to
401Ibid., pp. 432-33.
402
Henry C. Klingbeil, "Debate or Politics?"
Quarterly Journal of Speech, XIV (April, 1928), 222.
4^Millson adapted Woodward's "shift-of-opinion"
evaluative procedure to the symposium. See William Millson,
"Audience-Reaction to Symposium," Quarterly Journal of
Speech, XXI (February, 1935), 51-52. Monroe, m turn,
investigated the statistical reliability and validity of
Millson's approach. See Alan H. Monroe, "The Statistical
Reliability and Validity of the Shift-of-Opinion Ballot,"
Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXIII (December, 1937), 577-85.
404Howard S. Woodward, "Measurement and Analysis
of Audience Opinion," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XIV
(February, 1928), 94.
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construct a scientific, statistical approach to judging.40^
His scheme4®** follows:
TO THE AUDIENCE
The debaters will
appreciate your interest and
help if you will, both before
and after the debate, indi
cate on this sheet your
PERSONAL OPINION on the IDEA
PROPOSED FOR DEBATE.
Soon as the debate is
finished, opportunity will
be given you to question the
debaters on any matters that
pertain to the question
__
BEFORE THE DEBATE
|_| I believe in the
affirmative of the reso
lution to be debated
1 |I am undecided
1 |I believe in the negative
of the resolution to be
debated.
THE REASONS FOR MY OPINION
ARE:

Date
Place
This blank is filled by a
I 1man
1 1woman,
whose age is
AFTER THE DEBATE
I have heard the entire
discussion and now
| | I believe more strongly
in the affirmative of
the resolution than I
did.
| | I believe in the
affirmative of the
resolution.
1 | I am undecided.
| | I believe in the nega
tive of the resolution.
! |;I believe more strongly
in the negative of the
resolution than I did.
THE REASONS FOR MY OPINION
ARE:

40 5He designed his form, moreover, "to require a
minimum of oral persuasion by the management and of activity
by the audience." Ibid., pp. 95-96. The audience gets all
its information about the debate from a distributed
program.
406Ibid., p. 109.
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Summary
"Middle period" writers developed a fairly consist
ent and generally acceptable approach to and theory of
argumentation and debate.

Philosophically, argumentation

questioned the conviction-persuasion dichotomy and relied
on a total rhetorical approach which emphasized the
audience.

It treated discussion, moreover, as a part of

problem-solving and stressed the importance of discussion
and debate to a democratic society.
The analysis of a proposition closely followed the
system set forth by traditional theory.

Stock issues,

however, came to the forefront; chapters on research became
more prominent; and case appeared as a construct clearly
separated from the brief.
Though proof generally followed "early period"
prescriptions, attention shifted to the relation of evi
dence to reasoning, with detailed listings of kinds,
characteristics, and tests of evidence.

Reasoning in

terms of logical validity continued to rely on the clas
sical syllogism and Mills's system of induction.
The forensic itself also generated a degree of
controversy during the "middle period."

Though justifying

debating in terms of educational values, writers failed to
agree on its immediate goals; i.e., the discovery of truth
versus the development of skills.

That "epidemic" of

debating, the debate tournament, with its emphasis on
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winning a decision (whether audience, juryman, or critic)
intensified the problem.

Numerous "plans" for academic

debating appeared with format determined or at least
influenced by one's predispositions about criteria for
judgment.

Underlying these issues lay broad, philosophical

questions which harkened back to one's view of the nature
and end of debate.

The Wells-0'Neill discussions repre

sented that controversy at its peak.
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CHAPTER IV
CONTEMPORARY THEORY— c. 1955-1970
Building on traditional concepts, "middle period"
writers had amassed a well-developed and widely accepted
body of argumentation and debate theory.^- Their influence,
moreover, did not terminate with the advent of more con
temporary works.

On the contrary, many texts written

during the immediate period, though updating examples and
psychology, have simply extended "middle period" generalizations.

2

During the decade of the 1950's, however, some

writers began to propose new directions for argumentation
and debate theory.

It is with these developments that this

chapter is primarily concerned.
Though demanding a re-examination of philosophical
bases and offering some new prescriptions, particularly in
the area of proof, contemporary works have not rejected
■'"A cursory examination of basic public speaking
texts indicates that many theoretical innovations appeared
first in argumentation and debate texts and then were
transferred to general rhetorical theory.
2

See, for example, Glenn R. Capp and Thelma R.
Capp, Principles of Argumentation and Debate (Englewood
Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965); Robert B.
Huber, Influencing through Argument (New York: David McKay
Company, Inc., 1963).
240
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much traditional theory.

Neither have they belaboured it.

Assuming rather its value, many have shifted (or perhaps
reverted) in emphasis to a redefinition of argumentation
primarily in terms of proving a proposition, usually for
3

a critic judge in a tournament situation.

Arthur Kruger's

Modern Debate represented the advance guard of such a
position.^

Douglas Ehninger and Wayne Brockriede's innova

tive text, Decision by Debate, took, however, an opposite
tack.5

Much splintering of theory has occurred in critical

essays published in books of readings in argumentation and
debate,5 differences serving to reopen certain philosoph
ical questions critical to "early period" writers.
The O'Neill tradition, true to form, has analyzed,
synthesized, and attempted to bring a degree of order into
contemporary theory.

Much as O'Neill's 1917 revision of

Argumentation and Debate had crystallized traditional con
cepts and presaged new developments in theory, James H.
McBurney, James M. O'Neill, and Glen E. Mills's
3
Exceptions include Douglas Ehninger and Wayne
Brockriede, Decision by Debate (New York: Dodd, Mead, and
Company, 1963).
4
Arthur N. Kruger, Modern Debate: Its Logic and
Strategy (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1960).
^Ehninger and Brockriede, Decision by Debate.
£
See, for example, Gerald R. Miller and Thomas R.
Nilsen, eds., Perspectives on Argumentation (Chicago:
Scott, Foresman, and Company, 1966); Jerry M. Anderson and
Paul F. Dovre, eds., Readings in Argumentation (Boston:
Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1968).
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Argumentation and Debate linked the "middle" and "contempo
rary" periods. ^

McBurney and Mills's 1964 revision marked
O
the end of that transition, Mills's subsequent works ven
turing further from the relative security of traditional

constructs.

Mills set out clearly his predispositions
9
toward argumentation m Reason m Controversy, published

the same year as the revision of Argumentation and Debate
with McBurney.

Though Mills's second edition rejected cer

tain of the assumptions of the earlier work, it included
more tightly structured, well-reasoned defenses of the
author's theoretical positions and brought under one cover
what is probably the most comprehensive and precise analysis
of contemporary argumentation and debate theory available.1®
7
James H. McBurney, James M. O'Neill, and Glen E.
Mills, Argumentation and Debate: Techniques of a Free
Society (New York: Macmillan Company, 1951).
g
James H. McBurney and Glen E. Mills, Argumentation
and Debate; Techniques of a Free Society (2d ed.;
New York: Macmillan Company, 1964).
9
Glen E. Mills, Reason in Controversy: An Intro
duction to General Argumentation (Boston: Allyn and Bacon,
Inc., 1964).
10Glen E. Mills, Reason in Controversy: An Intro
duction to General Argumentation (2d ed.; Boston: Allyn
and Bacon, Inc., 1968). Another widely used contemporary
text is Austin J. Freeley's Argumentation and Debate.
Though well-written and comprehensive, the two editions
applicable to this study add little to the development of
theory, Freeley's major contributions being pedagogical
rather than theoretical. Austin J. Freeley, Argumentation
and Debate: Rational Decision-Making (Belmont, Calif.:
Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1961); (2d ed.; Belmont,
Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1966). The third
edition (19 71) is outside the scope of this particular
study.
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In 1964, in a critical review of three new works
in argumentation and debate, Forbes I. Hill summarized
contemporary textbook approaches as follows:
Any argumentation book that is going to
have a market is plagued with finding some
relationship to the highly structured advocacy
of intercollegiate debate. There are three
possible approaches to this relationship: one
may write a book for the intercollegiate con
testant which attempts to generalize its pre
cepts of debating to significant real-life
situations, or one may write a book about
advocacy in real-life situations which works
in just enough commentary about school debate
to be usable to teach contestants, or one may
write a book that is frankly a handbook for
school debaters and leave it largely to trust
that they will later transfer what they have
learned to real-life situations.H
The Nature of Argumentation
Contemporary theorists have been no more successful
than their predecessors in determining a universally
acceptable view of the nature of argumentation. 12

James H.

McBath's analysis pointed up, and Mills's discussion
clarified, the diversity of modern approaches.

Whereas

McBath topically treated critical deliberation, persuasive
argumentation, argumentation as a means of achieving
assent, the social responsibility of the inquirer-advocate,
11Forbes I. Hill, "New Books in Review," Quarterly
Journal of Speech, L (October, 1964), 338.
^■2See William S. Smith, "What Are the Principles
of Argument," Speech Teacher, II (March, 1953), 134-38.
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and argumentation as an instrument of inquiry, 13 Mills
examined argumentation as:

a form of discourse (examining

its rhetorical roots, i.e., grammatical composition); a
critical apparatus (involving concepts of probability,
presumption, burden of proof, burden of rebuttal, analysis,
evidence, et cetera); an academic discipline ("a branch
of communication theory which deals with the analysis,
synthesis, and criticism of primarily reasoned discourse
about controversial ideas").^
gave "more attention . . .

Mills's second edition

to definitions of basic concepts

such as argumentation, debate, and proof.
Despite a lack of continuity in contemporary
texts, a common interest has persisted in the methods
and ends appropriate to argumentation and/or debate and,
secondarily, in the relation of argumentation to other
subjects, much less emphasis being attached to "defini
tions."

Many writers, moreover, have precisely set

out their assumptions and premises.

An examination

13James H. McBath, "Introduction to Argument,"
in Argumentation and Debate: Principles and Practices,
ed. by James H. McBath (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and
Winston, Inc., 1963), pp. 4-6.
^Mills, Reason in Controversy, 1964 ed., pp. 3-4.
Mills suggested further that "the principles of this
subject are applied in order to discover the proof
requirements of an assertion or to make a case for or
against an assertion," p. 6.
•^Ibid., 1968 rev. ed., p. v.
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of certain of these bases reveals much about contemporary
perceptions of the nature of argument.
Assumptions and Premises
As the Baker, Collins and Morris, Baird, and Ewbank
and Auer texts 16 attest, proponents of "new" approaches
often have taken great pains to develop and/or explicate
justificatory rationale. 17

The contemporary period repre

sents an intensification of that trend, particularly in
terms of the humanistic tradition. 18

Its writers have

built on "middle period" generalizations regarding the role
of reasoned discourse in a democratic society.

They have

also emphasized the worth of argumentation in individual
decision-making.
George Pierce Baker, Principles of Argumentation
(Boston: Ginn and Company, 1895); George R. Collins and
John S. Morris, Persuasion and Debate (New York: Harper
and Brothers, 1927); A. Craig Baird,Public Discussion and
Debate (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1928); A. Craig Baird,
Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate (New York: McGrawHill Book Company, inc., 1950); Henry L. Ewbank and
J. Jeffery Auer, Discussion and Debate: Tools of a Democ
racy (New York:
S. Crofts and Company, Inc., 19 41) ;
(rev. ed.; New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1951).
^The preceding chapter pointed out that Collins
and Morris followed closely Woolbert's hypotheses, while
Baird and Auer worked out in journal articles basic
philosophical distinctions.
18

Mills suggested that: "Argumentation qualifies
as humanistic for four reasons: Man in general is an
arguing creature; as a means of social control, argumenta
tion provides a freedom of choice which commands, threats,
and brainwashing do not; nonargumentative procedures bypass
the individual; a completely closed mind shuts one off from
the human race." Mills, Reason in Controversy, 19 68 rev.
ed., p . 7.
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McBurney suggested in the 1951 revision of
Argumentation and Debate that "the study and practice of
argumentation and debate involve four basic assumptions
which merit careful consideration":

propositions can be

proved; truth, justice, and wisdom are more powerful than
their opposites; rational decisions are preferred; and
emotional reactions are more easily enlisted in intellectually defensible causes.
tions in 1964. 20

ig

He reiterated these posi-

Mills's Reason m

Controversy modified

McBurney1s notions and called them assumptions relevant to
the social context of argumentation.
follows:

Mills's listing

a case can be made for either side of a contro

versial judgment; "truth and justice are by nature more
powerful than their opposites"; deliberative decisions are
preferable to emotional reactions, impulsive snap judg
ments, and trial-and-error procedures; and affective
appeals work best when they supplement logical ones.
Mills went further to distinguish "some essential attitudes
and beliefs" relevant to argumentation in general educa
tion:

free competition among ideas facilitating an honest

search for wise conclusions; tolerance and objectivity
19McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, Argumentation and
Debate, pp. 10-11. McBurney was responsible for this
chapter.
20

McBurney and Mills, Argumentation and Debate,

pp. 14-15.
21

Mills, Reason in Controversy, 1964 ed.,

pp. 12-13.
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toward opposing ideas; the constructive value of disagree
ment; and a "reasonable confidence" in one's ability to
think. 22

Mills retained these categories m

his 1968

. •
23
revision.
McBath, editor of the 1963 revision of the Tau
Kappa Alpha sponsored Argumentation and Debate, similarly
had suggested that "underpinning argumentation and debate
are four cardinal assumptions or premises that give direc
tion to our study":

that choices are inevitable in group

and individual life; that responsible group and personal
decisions will be respected; that citizens must enjoy
freedom to test and verify their ideas; and that belief
has intellectual-emotional bases.2^

Within the framework

of these expressed assumptions as well as those implied
elsewhere, contemporary writers have identified specific
methods and goals for argumentation.
The Methods and Ends of Argument
Central to an understanding of contemporary notions
about the ends and methods of argumentation is a recogni
tion of two diverse, though not always mutually exclusive,
22Ibid., pp. 17-18.
Mills, Reason in Controversy, 1968 rev. ed.,
pp. 7-10. Mills added Ehninger's limitations of contro
versy. See Douglas Ehninger, "Debate as Method: Limita
tions and Values," Speech Teacher, XV (September, 19 66),
180-85.
24McBath, Argumentation and Debate, pp. 4-6.
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viewpoints from which texts have approached the subject.
One branch of theory perceives debate to be a vehicle for
the making of rational choices; the other holds that it is
a process by which one defends or advocates a point of
view.

The first circumscribes a broad context for prac

tical argumentation.
academic debate.

The second attends to one species,

The terms inquiry and decision are keys

to an understanding of the first approach; advocacy, logic,
and strategy are keys to the second.
The roots of the inquiry-advocacy contradistinction
go back at least as far as Whately's Elements of Rhetoric.
The Archbishop had written:
Reasoning may be considered as applicable
to two purposes . . . the ascertainment of the
truth by investigation [inquiry] and the
establishment of it to the satisfaction of
another [proof]. . . . The process of investi
gation “must be supposed completed, and certain
conclusions arrived at by that process, before
he [the advocate] begins to . , . prove the
justness of those conclusions.^
The introduction of discussion theory into argumentation
during the "middle period" reinforced that assessment.
Contemporary texts have retained Whately's correla
tion of method with purpose.

While the advocacy-proof

25

Richard Whately, Elements of Rhetoric, ed. by
Douglas Ehninger (Carbondale! Southern Illinois University
Press, 1963), p. 5. In quoting Whately's distinctions,
McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills included the terms inquiry and
proof in McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, Argumentation and
Debate, 1951 rev. ed., p. 7.
^See particularly Ewbank and Auer, Discussion and
Debate.
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relationship has remained substantially the same, writers
have tended to define the end of inquiry in terms of
"decision" rather than "truth." 27

Though Mills, among

others, 28 does not believe inquiry and advocacy to be
"strictly dichotomous," the tendency has persisted in some
quarters to treat them as such. 29

Maurice Natanson carried

the differences probably as far as anyone when he suggested
that philosophical argumentation is a form of inquiry,
on

while rhetorical argumentation is a form of persuasion. u
Inquiry— »Decision-Making
Ewbank and Auer were probably the first to apply
the term decision in terms of goal unquestionably and
27

Bertrand Russell suggested that John Dewey's
"most distinctive philosophical doctrine" was "the substi
tution of 'inquiry' for 'truth' as the fundamental concept
of logic and theory of knowledge." Bertrand Russell,
A History of Western Philosophy (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 19 45) , p. 819. See John Dewey, The School and
Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1899) .
28Mills, Reason in Controversy, 1968 rev. ed.,
p. 31. Mills recognized "four conceptions of the relation
ships among debate, inquiry, and advocacy . . . in the
literature:
(1) Debate is investigation (inquiry), not
propagation.
(2) Debate is both inquiry and advocacy.
(3) Advocacy, including debate, is essentially unlike
inquiry.
(4) Debate and discussion (a form of inquiry) are
complementary processes whose differences can be visualized
on several continua," p. 29. Such positions indicate a
vast "middle ground" between the polar positions.
29

See Ehninger and Brockriede, Decision by Debate;
Kruger, Modern Debate.
^See Maurice Natanson, "Rhetoric and Philosophical
Argumentation," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLVIII
(February, 1962), 24-30.
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emphatically to debate. 3 1

The association gained currency,

moreover, with the publication in 1955 of Oral DecisionMaking by Braden and Brandenburg.

Ehninger used the

phrase, "decision by debate," in a 1959 journal article 33
and carried it into the title of his text co-authored with
Brockriede four years later.
Whereas Braden and Brandenburg had related inquiry
to discussion and advocacy to debate,Ehninger and
Brockriede viewed debate primarily as a critical instrument
OC
of inquiry applicable to everyday life.
Both determined
31Ewbank and Auer, Discussion and Debate, 1941 ed.,
pp. 4-5.
32
Waldo W. Braden and Earnest Brandenburg, Oral
Decision-Making: Principles of Discussion and Debate
(New York: Harper andSons, 1955).
33
Douglas Ehninger, "Decision by Debate: A
Re-examination," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLV (October,
1959), 282-87.
34
Braden and Brandenburg, Oral Decision-Making,
p . 10.
35
The first three of the "ten principles" reflected
in Decision by Debate substantiate the pervasiveness of
this view: "Tl Debate as a method of decision provides
for the rigorous examination and testing of pertinent data
and inferences through the give-and-take of informed con
troversy. Hence, properly employed, it is a means for
arriving at judgments that are reflective and decisions
that are critical. 2. A debater is not a propagator who
seeks to win unqualified acceptance for a predetermined
point of view while defeating an opposing view. Rather,
when he places himself in the highest tradition of debate,
he is an investigator who co-operates with fellow investi
gators in searching out the truth or in selecting that
course of common action which seems best for all concerned,
debaters and public alike. 3. Debate is not limited to a
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inquiry to be a method of decision-making, Ehninger and
Brockriede's assessment harkening back to earlier posi
tions.

In "Decision by Debate:

A Re-Examination,"

Ehninger had contended:
If we will examine its [debate's] rationale
afresh, and without predisposition or preju
dice, we will see (1) that the end and method
of debate are critical, (2) that debate is of
the genre of investigation rather than per
suasion, and (3) that debate is a cooperative
rather than a competitive enterprise.^6
Though certain other writers have recognized that
argumentation does involve inquiry, none have determined
for it as pervasive a role as Ehninger and Brockriede.
Mills, for example, differentiated academic debate from
debate as an analytical-critical instrument but preferred
to view the discipline within the former context.

Freeley

included the term, rational decision-making, in the title
of his text, but his own approach leaned more toward
"educational" than "substantive" debate.

qn

That species of

*3q

argumentation,

academic debate, employing the method of

particular mode of discourse. It is a generic species of
deliberation, the principles and procedures of which are
applicable to informed, responsible controversy however and
wherever it may take place." Ehninger and Brockriede,
Decision by Debate, p. vii.
36Ehninger, "Decision by Debate:

A Re-Examination,"

p. 282.
37See Freeley, Argumentation and Debate, 1966 rev.
ed., Ch. II, for a discussion of the terms.
38In his first edition of Reason in Controversy,
Mills suggested that "it is a mistake to treat argumenta
tion and debate as synonyms, because the former is the
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advocacy with a view toward "proving" a "case," became for
many authors the primary, if not sole,concern.
Advocacy— >-Proof of One's Case
Kruger's publication of Modern Debate;

Its Logic

and Strategy in 1960, one of the first texts dedicated to
the primacy of advocacy in argumentation, raised an immediate furor. 39

Rejecting as essential the total rhetorical
40
construct demanded by "middle period" writers,
Kruger

emphasized analysis, case construction, proof, attack
and defense.
Though many contemporary writers have agreed with
Kruger's predisposition favoring academic debate, 41 few—
theoretical field or the body of principles, while the
latter is a specialized application of the former." Mills,
Reason in Controversy, 1964 ed., p. 7. His attempt to
distinguish the terms more clearly in his revised edition
by treating them in separate sections as major headings
resulted in much repetition, and failed to add significant
clarity to the concepts. See also McBath, Argumentation
and Debate, pp. 6-7.
39See, for example, the inherency argument dis
cussed in a subsequent section of this chapter.
^Kruger contended: "Perhaps the most common mis
conception of academic debate is that it is primarily
training in mass persuasion by means of effective
delivery." Kruger, Modern Debate, p. 4. He also rejected
the notion that debate should be taught as "effective
public speaking," pp. 3-4.
^Many "practical" texts offering realistic
formulae for the winning of tournament decisions have
appeared. This kind of "practical" book had also appeared
during the "middle period." See, for example, George McCoy
Musgrave, Competitive Debate: Rules and Strategy
(New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1945). The point is
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Mills being representative— have been willing to discount
traditional concepts.

Though pointing to "the newer

emphasis upon a less specialized treatment of the subject"
in his second edition of Reason in Controversy/ Mills's
own definitions and prescriptions suggested less diversity
in the scope of argumentation.

He recognized, for example,

such topics as "explanation, ethos, motivation, composi
tion, and delivery . . .

as secondary rather than main

concepts" and preferred to view argumentation as "an
academic discipline which deals with the analysis,
synthesis, and criticism of predominantly reasoned dis
course on controversial i d e a s . " H e did not, however,
reject the "secondary" concepts as irrelevant.

Consistent

with Mills's definition was his delineation of the "core
concepts of argumentation:

proof requirements of a thesis,

that contemporary books stressing such a view have found
a greater degree of acceptability than certain of their
predecessors'.
42Mills, Reason in Controversy, 1968 rev. ed.,
p. 26. This definition did not clarify the end of advocacy
as had the McBurney-Mills statement: "A method of analysis
and reasoning designed to provide acceptable bases for
belief and action." McBurney and Mills, Argumentation and
Debate, p. 82. They had suggested that "the basic principles of argumentation have a wide application in both dis
cussion and debate," pp. 79-83. Ehninger and Brockriede
were forced to admit that "while the ultimate goal of the
philosopher may be to exhibit relationships among ideas
per se, the ultimate goal of the debater is to use ideas
as proofs for influencing the beliefs of listeners or
readers." A commitment to a total view of persuasion led
them to insist that "a knowledge of how belief functions
is . . . an essential part of the debater's study."
Ehninger and Brockriede, Decision by Debate, p. viii.
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propositions, analysis, investigation, evidence, reasoning,
cases, attack and defense, cross-examination, and evaluaA

tion."

O

Such a departure from the persuasion dominated

approach imposed by writers of the "middle period" marked
almost a full circle return to the primacy of reason, if
not logic, in argumentation theory.
Persuasion and Argumentation
The renewed emphasis on "logic and strategy" as the
appropriate methods for establishing a proposition had the
practical effect of reviving, or perhaps extending, the
conviction-persuasion controversy.

Observing various con

temporary views toward this "vexed" question, Mills
suggested that "the answers span a continuum including
separateness, part-to-whole relationships, and over.
lapping." 44 Mills's distinctions constitute the basis
for the following discussion.
Mills contended that the conviction-persuasion
"dichotomizers have not been vanquished," citing the thesis
that:
To convince . . . implies no risk of the self;
it is manipulation without commitment. To
persuade, however, does risk the self and does
imply commitment. 5
^Mills, Reason in Controversy, 1968 rev. ed.,
pp. 25-26.
^^Ibid., pp. 18-21.
4c
Ibid., p. 20. See Maurice Natanson and Henry V.
Johnstone, Jr., eds., Philosophy, Rhetoric, and
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Russel R. Windes and Arthur Hastings' position appeared to
be similar.

"Argumentation," they said, "does not seek to

persuade anybody of anything." 46

Though suggesting that it

"functions to discover and formulate the requirements of
proof for a proposition or a conclusion,11 the authors
recognized, nonetheless, that the advocate uses the results
of his investigation, along with psychological proofs, to
persuade.'*7

In light of the latter distinction, Mills

contended that "viewed in a broader context than a single
page, it [the Windes-Hastings position] comes close to
saying that argumentation is the logos . . . of
persuasion." 48 Mills placed the Huber and the Freeley
49
texts near Windes and Hastings on his continuum.
Mills further observed a trend toward treating
argumentation and persuasion as "coordinate terms," citing
particularly Walter R. Fisher and Edward M. Sayles who
concluded:
Argumentation (University Park:
sity Press, 1965).

Pennsylvania State Univer

46Russel R. Windes and Arthur Hastings, Argumenta
tion and Advocacy (New York: Random House, Inc.'J 1965) ,
p . 24.
^7Ibid.

See also pp. 207, 235.

4R

Mills, Reason in Controversy, 1968 rev. ed.,

p. 18.
49

Ibid.; see Huber, Influencing Through Argument,
pp. 4-6; Freeley, Argumentation and Debate, 1966 rev. ed.,
pp. 2, 7.
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Taken in its whole scope, the study of
argumentation aids one in the discovery of
the most reasonable position to take in
regard to controversial problems, and it
enables one reasonably to attack, to defend,
or to extend his beliefs among men. ®
Mills summarized Gary Cronkhite's explanation, moreover,
which initially set out a coordinate relationship but
ultimately resorted to a part-to-whole approach as
follows:
According to this theory, persuasion
involves relating a proposition ("object
concept") to a stable attitude ("motiva
tional concept") by means of a logical
argument ("concept association"), and this
linkage "must be evaluated from the point
of view of the audience rather than from
that of the critic."51
In Mills's view, "it is but a short step, so to speak, to
the implication that argumentation is mainly concerned
with persuasion."52

As a subsequent section suggests,

sn

Walter R. Fisher and Edward M. Sayles, "The
Nature and Functions of Argument," in Perspectives on
Argumentation, ed. by Gerald R. Miller and Thomas R. Nilsen
(Chicago: Scott, Foresman, and Company, 1966), p. 20; see
also pp. 3-4.
^Mills, Reason in Controversy, 1968 rev. ed.,
p. 19. See Gary L. Cronkhite, “Logic, Emotion, and the
Paradigm of Persuasion," Quarterly Journal of Speech, L
(February, 1964), 13-18.
52

Mills, Reason in Controversy, 1968 rev. ed.,
p. 19. Here Mills cited Ehninger and Brockriede's con
tention that "the concept of proof is meaningless when
divorced from the person to whom the proof is offered,"
proof being "the process of securing belief in one
statement by relating it to another statement already
believed." Ehninger and Brockriede, Decision by Debate,
pp. 99, 201-203.
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Gerald R. Miller approached this position with his
behavioral perspective of evidence. 53
Mills preferred a third, "overlapping," approach
and applied that label to his own system. 54 He cited
McBath's analysis in the revised edition of Tau Kappa
Alpha's Argumentation and Debate^

and pointed to the

drift between the 1951 McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills'^
and the 1964 McBurney and Mills 57 editions of Argumenta
tion and Debate.

In his first edition of Reason in

Controversy, Mills had made this distinction:
Debate, which is an applied form of
argumentation, differs from persuasion in at
least one important respect; it requires com
petition between rival ideas, while persuasion
may mean one-sided advocacy which typically
avoids deliberative thinking by the listeners
or readers. Thus persuasion can become
propaganda, but debate cannot. 8
In the 1968 revision, he said:
Gerald R. Miller, "Evidence and Argument," in
Perspectives on Argumentation, ed. by Gerald R. Miller and
Thomas R. Nilsen (Chicago: Scott, Foresman, and Company,
1966), pp. 24-47.
54
Mills, Reason in Controversy, 1968 rev. ed.,
p. 21.
55
McBath, "Introduction to Argument," p. 8.
5^McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, Argumentation and
Debate, p. 1.
57McBurney and Mills, Argumentation and Debate,
p. 1.
^8Mills, Reason in Controversy, 1964 ed., p. 8.
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Our professional usage has for academic pur
poses narrowed the concept of argumentation
to that part of persuasive communication in
which reasoned discourse is the principal
form of support. This definition in no way
denies or deplores the occurrence of emotional
and personal proofs in advocacy/ but it does
imply the existence of a method for placing
such proofs in a logical framework to give
them some semblance of rigor. Thus we explain
that argumentation is the form of discourse
used in solving problems with a deliberative
method.59
Reason in Controversy "treats popular persuasion as a
peripheral matter . . . but it reinstates to a central
position some principles of dialectic, the long-neglected
method of argument.
Mills summarized the theoretical implications "of
the most familiar definitions" as follows:
Since argumentation serves analytical and
critical functions which are not used to
effect persuasion, and since . . . argumenta
tion has derived its principles from dialectic
and logic as well as rhetoric, it seems proper
to conclude that the process called argumenta
tion is more than a logical part of persuasion.
In fact, if argumentation were defined as per
suasion, its so-called logic would have to be
judged in terms of its persuasive effect instead
of some external standard of reasonableness.
But when argumentation is taken to be a kind of
science of proof, it can be used to test the
reasoning in a persuasive communication,
because . . . it embodies more or less objec
tive standards of critical analysis. 1
Mills's analysis pointed up, moreover, widely disputed
^9Ibid., 1968 rev. ed., p. 15.
60Ibid., p. 22.
61Ibid., p. 21.
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issues of the contemporary period, answers to which
determined one's view of the nature of argumentation.
Analysis
In their introduction to a section on analysis in
Readings in Argumentation, Jerry Anderson and Paul Dovre
editorialized:
The quality of a controversy is contingent
upon how well the disputants understand, or
analyze, the propositions in question. Analy
sis of a proposition requires knowledge about
the causes of the controversy, the history of
the dispute, the specific meaning of the
proposition, and the areas of agreement and
difference between the disputants. The process
of analysis involves all of these matters, but
it culminates in discovery of the issues which
are crucial in resolving the dispute.62
Though Ehninger and Brockriede and Mills have detailed the
traditional elements outlined by Anderson and Dovre, for
most writers, the critical questions of analysis have been
defining terms and isolating issues.

Ronald F. Reid put

it this way:
Even if a debate proposition is well
phrased and contains only one central idea,
62
Anderson and Dovre, Readings in Argumentation,
p. 123.
63
Ehninger and Brockriede, Decision by Debate,
p. 211; Mills, Reason in Controversy, 1968 rev. ed.,
pp. 91-9 5. Many writers, moreover, have not neglected
sources, functions, wording, selection, and nature of
propositions, the main areas of interest being kinds of
propositions. With the exception of the latter category-which is examined elsewhere— most treatments of the propo
sition follow "early" and "middle period" texts. For an
interesting exception, see D. W. Shepard, "Logical Proposi
tions and Debate Resolutions," Central States Speech
Journal, XI (Spring, 1960), 186-90.
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the inherently ambiguous nature of language
and the general nature of debate propositions
require that analysis of debate resolutions
consist of (1) analysis of the language of
the proposition and (2) analysis of the
relevant subordinate propositions. ^
Definition
"Analysis of the language of a proposition," for
Reid, involved "finding definitions for the words and
phrases within the proposition."^

Reid considered a

"reasonable definition," moreover, to be "not only spe
cific and clear-cut but also . . . commonly accepted in
light of the present social context of a debate proposi
tion."^

Kruger added the "complete context— social,
g

political, economic, and historical as well as verbal,"
along with the criterion, equivalence, meaning "that a
64 Ronald F. Reid, "Analysis of the Proposition,"
in Argumentation and Debate, ed. by James H. McBath
(New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1963),
p. 67.
65Ibid. Recognizing the problems raised by faulty
definitions, several writers examined the handling of an
opponent's definition. According to Freeley, "Two methods
are available to the advocates confronted with an unusual
definition:
(1) They may demonstrate, by using the methods
of defining terms already discussed, that their definition
of terms is a more reasonable one than that of their
opponents.
(2) They may accept the definition of terms
offered by their opposition and proceed to attack the case
presented by their opposition." Freeley, Argumentation and
Debate, 1961 ed., p. 29. Freeley noted, moreover, several
problems of the stipulated definition.
^Reid, "Analysis of the Proposition," p. 55.
67
Kruger, Modern Debate, p. 24.
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logical definition must be neither too broad nor too
narrow."68
Most contemporary texts include specific methods
and sources of definition similar to lists compiled by
"early" and "middle period" writers.88

Ehninger and

Brockriede introduced probably the most distinctive method
which they set out as follows:
To select the best method of definition
for any given term, the debater will do well
to consider how that term may be most clearly,
authoritatively, and objectively defined
within the context of the proposition.
Although no formula exists, definition by
classification may best set the scope of the
proposition, definition by necessary condi
tions may best establish criteria, and defini
tion by operational description may best define
the proposal embodied in the proposition. ®
CO

Ibid., p. 25. Kruger presented the following
outline for obtaining logical definitions: "1. What is
the new policy? 2. What type of policy is it? How does
it relate to the status quo? 3. What is the key term, or
essential feature, of the new policy? What is lacking at
present? 4. What does the key term mean? a. What are
the common objectives of the new and present policies?
b. How does the essential feature of the status quo com
pare with that of the new policy? c. How has the key term
been interpreted by professors, textbooks, debate hand
books, publicists, public officials, special dictionaries,
and other assorted experts? What is the underlying context
of the question? 5. Do any other terms require clarifica
tion? 6. How should the definitions be expressed?" p. 28.
See, for example, Freeley, Argumentation and
Debate, 1961 ed., pp. 27-29; Reid, "Analysis of the Propo
sition," p. 56. An interest also continued in the use of
the word should in propositions of policy. See Kruger,
Modern Debate, p. 27; Freeley, Argumentation and Debate,
1961 ed., p. 32.
^Ehninger and Brockriede, Decision by Debate,
p. 217 (italics mine).
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Issues
The second major step in analyzing a debate
proposition involved, for most writers, the "analysis of
the subordinate propositions which must be demonstrated
in order to demonstrate the truth of the general proposi
tion."^

Whereas "early period" analyses had depended on

the clash in opinion provided by the brief, 72 most con
temporary writers have mimed "middle period" stock issues
approaches.

Walter F. Terris pointed out that early

writers had divided propositions according to the motive
of the speaker, whereas later writers classified according
to the nature of the dispute, a procedure which gave rise
73
to stock issues analyses.
Terris suggested a further
relationship between issues and the classification of
propositions when he said:

"After we have classified a

proposition we ought to be able to predict what sort of
71 Reid, "Analysis of the Proposition," p. 54.
72

•
Though most contemporary texts include
material
on research and several include the brief, most do not
emphasize the critical relationship of these elements to
analysis as did most "middle period" texts. For a discus
sion of differing philosophies of briefing, see William A.
Behl, "A New Look at the Debate Brief," Speech Teacher, X
(September, 1961), 189-93.

"^■^Walter F. Terris, "The Classification of the
Argumentative Proposition," Quarterly Journal of Speech,
XLIX (October, 1963) , 266-731 See Hal Howard, "Forum, *' and
Walter F. Terris, "Author's Rejoinder," in Quarterly
Journal of Speech, L (February, 1964), 75-77. Howard,
"Forum," pp. 75-76; Terris, "Author's Rejoinder,"
pp. 76-77.
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treatment will best develop its argumentative potential."^4
A general, though not total, acceptance of this view
suggests a need for attention to contemporary modes of
classifying propositions.
Classification of Propositions
Writing in 1963, Terris observed that "the tri
partite scheme of classification of fact, value and policy
has held stable though not unchallenged for the last
7R
twenty-five years."
This is not to say that writers have
not modified these traditional categories.

Ehninger and

Brockriede, for example, added a fourth classification, the
proposition of definition.^

Kruger included propositions

of explanation, value, and policy and distinguished between
propositions of past, present, and future fact. 77
In addition to expanding existing categories, a
trend toward combining fact and value distinctions
developed.

Citing Freeley's handling of propositions of

74

Terris, "Classification of the Argumentative
Proposition," p. 267. See, however, Gary L. Cronkhite,
"Propositions of Past and Future Fact and Value: A Pro
posed Classification," Journal of the American Forensic
Association, III (January, 1966), 11-16.
^Terris, "Classification of the Argumentative
Proposition," p. 269.
76Ehninger and Brockriede, Decision by Debate,
p. 219. Ehninger and Brockriede applied the following
terms both to issues and to claims: definitive (defini
tion) ; designative (fact); evaluative (value); and
actuative (policy), pp. 218-28.
77Kruger, Modern Debate, pp. 15-16.
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value and fact "similarly," Terris questioned the
"justification for calling them by different names or dis78
tinguishing each of them from a proposition of policy."'0
Concluding that "the fact-value distinction depends . . .
not on the wording or form of the proposition but rather on
79
the type of evidence that must be used to prove it,"
Terris proposed that propositions of fact and value be
classified as "propositions of judgment. 80
°

He retained

"propositions of policy" as a separate class.
In the first edition of Reason in Controversy,
Mills, like Terris, kept the policy classification and
puc the remaining "kinds" into a single category which he
called "propositions of definition and classification." 81
The latter division included as subtypes legal fact, past
fact, present fact, prediction, and value.

Mills justified

"grouping factual claims and evaluative claims under one
heading because of their similarity in relation to
analysis" and because "we can sometimes, but not always,
78Terris, "Classification of the Argumentative
Proposition," p. 270. Bruce Gronbeck treated the
"valuative premise" as "intermediate between 'fact' and
'advice.'" Bruce Gronbeck, "From 'Is' to 'Ought':
Alternative Strategies," Central States Speech Journal,
XIX (Spring, 1968), 38.
^ Ibid., p. 273.
80For a refutation of Terris' analysis, see
Cronkhite, "Proposition of Past and Future Fact and Value,"
p. 12.
81Mills, Reason in Controversy, 1964 ed.,
pp. 43-45.
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distinguish between statements of fact and statements of
evaluation."82
Though Windes and Hastings also subsumed under one
heading fact and value propositions, their rationale for
and labeling of classes suggests a position reminiscent of
"early period" concerns with speaker motives.

Though

recognizing a relationship between classification and the
determination of issues inherent in a proposition, Windes
and Hastings categorized propositions for advocacy accord
ing to "the behavioral response desired by an affirmative." 83

Accordingly, they isolated propositions of belief

(description, establishing existence, and value judgments)
and propositions of action, 84 describing the "close rela
tionship" between the classes as follows:
As a rule, belief represents readiness for
action, and almost always, except in irrational
situations, action is based on belief. The
advocate must pass through propositions of
belief so that he may reach propositions of
action.
In addition to the preceding positions— an expand
ing of the tripartite system of classification on the one
hand and a merging of the fact-value classes on the other—
one other contemporary approach toward classification may

p. 53.

82Ibid., p. 44.
83
Windes and Hastings, Argumentation and Advocacy,
See, however, pp. 24-25.
84Ibid., pp. 53-55, 218-26.
85Ibid., p. 55.
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be identified; that is, an interest in fact and value
propositions to the exclusion of policy questions.

As

early as 1962, Gerald R. Miller, 86 starting with the
premises of Horace G. Rahskopf, 87 set out a definitive
rationale for debating propositions of fact and value.
By 1966, he dismissed the proposition of policy as having
no distinguishing characteristics which set it
apart from fact and value propositions; that
is, I believe that if any meaningful argument
is to occur, a policy proposition must be dis
puted as either a proposition of fact or a
proposition of value.
For Miller, "the key to the choice of a factual or
value orientation lies in the definition of the term
should."^
If should is defined in terms of means-ends
interests . . . then the issue becomes one of
fact, revolving around considerations of whether
or not the stipulated ends would occur. If
should is defined in terms of intrinsic ethical
considerations . . . then the issue becomes one
of value, revolving around the goodness or bad
ness of these moral precepts.
Miller relied primarily on Gustav Bergman's
philosophical distinctions between the kinds of
86
Gerald R. Miller, "Questions of Fact and Value:
Another Look," Southern Speech Journal, XXVIII (Winter,
1962), 116-23.
87
Horace G. Rahskopf, "Questions of Fact vs. Ques
tions of Policy," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XVIII
(February, 1932), 60-70.
®^Miller, "Evidence and Argument," p. 36.

90Ibid., pp. 36-37.
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propositions.

Bergmann defined a statement of fact as

one which "says something about the object or objects it
mentions; and depending only on the properties of these
objects, . . .

is either true or false." 91

Bergmann

suggested further that:
A value judgment is misunderstood if it
is taken to ascribe a property to the object,
act, or situation it mentions in the same
sense in which a statement of fact is such
an ascription; it is, therefore, literally
neither true nor false. What it involves and
misleadingly states as the property of an
object, act, or situation alone is the fact
that this object, act, or situation causes in
the one who makes the judgment a certain
state of mind, say, for instance, of positive
aesthetic appreciation or of moral
2
a p p r o v a l . ^

As Terris, Miller perceived a direct relation
between kinds of propositions and evidential data. 9 3 Gary
Cronkhite, on the other hand, rejected the notion that
proofs for different kinds of propositions "necessarily
demand different types of evidence." 94 Neither did he agree
that one distinguishes propositions of fact and value for
purposes of analysis, arguing rather that "the choice of
a given type of proposition is a rhetorical device
91
Gustav Bergmann, "Ideology," Ethics, LXI (April,
1951), 206.
92t,
.,
Ibid.
93
Miller, "Evidence and Argument," pp. 30-37.
94
Cronkhite, "Propositions of Past and Future Fact
and Value," p. 13.
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designed to prepare the audience for a particular type of
argument." 95
Cronkhite's system of classification, called by
one writer "the most noticeable deviation from the
QC
norm,"
divided propositions into past and future fact
and value.

Cronkhite believed that his scheme "seems to

allow more freedom in moving from one type of proposition
to another and seems to yield at least two dimensions on
which propositions may be narrowed." 97

Though the first

claim is open to question, within the second lies the
distinctiveness of his approach.

Cronkhite began with

the judgmental dimension of classification.

Interested

primarily in listener agreement or disagreement, he
differentiated objective (based on present sensory
stimuli) and subjective (based on previous experience)
judgments, dividing the latter category into beliefs (fact
QO
judgments) and attitudes (value judgments). ° Rephrasing
Wagner's definitions in terms of this analysis, "a
'belief' is a feeling about 'existence' or relationships
of objects or events, while an 'attitude' is a feeling

96Mills, Reason in Controversy, 1968 rev. ed.,
p. 77.
97Cronkhite, "Propositions of Past and Future Fact
and Value," p. 11.
^®Ibid., pp. 12-13.
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regarding the value of an object or an event,"

99

Cronkhite

suggested that:
Propositions of fact and value are related
. . . in that the proposition of value may be
validly (and effectively) supported by proof
of the propositions of fact upon which it
rests. A proposition of fact, however, may
not be given valid support by proof of propo
sitions of value, although a speaker may be
forced to deal with audience values which
prevent its acceptance. 00
The second dimension, temporal, allowed Cronkhite
to integrate within the fact-value categories other
approaches to classification.

Traditional fact-value dis

tinctions became past or present fact or value; policy
propositions, future value; Mills's "prediction," future
fact.

Cronkhite believed that Ehninger and Brockriede's

"propositions of definition" "can be resolved into either
a proposition of fact or a proposition of policy."-^1
Stock Issues
Though some contemporary writers 102 have labeled
"stock issues" for propositions of fact and value, most
have limited them to policy questions.

And, though the

number of stock issues for propositions of policy varies
from text to text, most writers have preferred a three-part
" ibid., p. 13.
^•"ibid., p. 14.
^°^Ibid., p. 11.
■^^See Freeley, Argumentation and Debate, 1961 ed.
and 1966 ed.
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approach, including need-plan-advantages, needpracticability-advantages, or a similar approach. 1 0 3
One of the most original systems in contemporary theory,
that set out by Lee S. Hultz^n, isolates four "stock
issues" (ill, blame, cure, and cost) and three "sub
issues" (conjecture, definition, and quality).^-04
Hultzen's much quoted analysis influenced argumentation
and debate theory through such writers as Ehninger and
Brockriede.
Though differences in systems of stock issues
have not caused particular problems, the rationale for
using standardized questions for various propositions has
raised questions.

One of the more severe critics, Robert

P. Newman, attacked this "artificial and unwholesome
burden" on three grounds:

stock issues are based on a

scientific model inappropriate to the historical data of
rhetoric; they confuse issues with procedure; and they
de-emphasize the integrity of the subject-matter which one
•^•^See Ehninger and Brockriede, Decision by Debate,
pp. 223-28; Mills, Reason in Controversy, 1968 rev. ed.,
pp. 105-107.
104Lee S. Hultzen, "Status in Deliberative
Analysis," in The Rhetorical Idiom, ed. by Donald C.
Bryant (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1958),
pp. 97-123. For a more traditional system, see Ray
Nadeau, "Hermogenes on 'Stock Issues' in Deliberative
Speaking," Speech Monographs, XXXV (March, 1958), 62.
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uses, encouraging the charge of "sophistry." 10 5

Newman

concluded:
This is indeed analysis purchased cheaply,
a "quickie" procedure for dissecting thorny
and intractable problems. But the real issues,
the building blocks of argument, are discovered
only by digging, hard . . . and the more skilled
the rhetorician, the less willing he will be to
rest content with issues provided by a formula.

6

Inherency
Though the notion of an integral relationship
between the issues and a proposition underlay "early
period" systems of analysis, and though the term inherent
has appeared in argumentation and debate literature since
Baker's first edition of Principles of Argumentation,107
the consideration of inherency as an important theoretical
105Robert P. Newman, "Analysis and Issues— A Study
of Doctrine," Central States Speech Journal, XIII (Autumn,
1961), 43. For a reply, see Ray Nadeau, ^ n Defense of
Deliberative Stock Issues," Central States Speech Journal,
XIII (Winter, 1962), 142.
10 fi

Newman, "Analysis and Issues," p. 51.

•^^Having examined the central issue and the rela
tion of the other issues to the main one, Baker contended:
"This analysis . . . gives us the primary inherent struc
ture in our material." Baker, Principles of Argumentation,
p. 79. Subsequent authors related inherency to the need
issue. Ewbank and Auer, for example, asked: "Are these
weaknesses [those in the present system] inherent in the
system?" Ewbank and Auer, Discussion and Debate, 1941 ed.,
p. 430. See also Lionel Crocker, Argumentation and Debate
(New York: American Book Company, 1944), pp. 48-49;
Luther W. Courtney and Glenn R. Capp, Practical Debating
(New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1949), p. 30; Baird, Argu
mentation, Discussion, and Debate, p. 314; William A. Behl,
Discussion and Debate (New York: Ronald Press, 19 53),
p. 60.
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construct is a fairly recent phenomenon.

Its most

vociferous advocate, Kruger, held in Modern Debate that
"proving that the status quo is inherently defective or
defective beyond practical repair constitutes the affirma
tive need."^9®

Though recognizing that "an affirmative

need not contend that it is the entire cause but rather
an important part of the cause or an insurmountable
obstacle to solving the problem," Kruger, nevertheless,
believed that "equating the essential characteristic of
the status quo with the cause of existing or potential
evils . . .

is probably the most important phase of the

affirmative case."^99

In a journal article three years

later, Kruger restated his position:
Thus, it seems clear that the affirmative
must first of all show that a serious problem
exists. . . . Second, to avoid the fallacy of
post hoc reasoning, it must demonstrate that
the problem inheres in, or is caused by the
existing policy. In other words, to demon
strate inherency is simply to demonstrate a
causal relationship.HO
From Kruger's definitions, one might conclude that
inherency involves the need issue in propositions of
policy, that it demonstrates causality, and that it implies
a restrictive view of the prima facie case, excluding, for
example, the comparative advantage alternative.
10 8

Kruger, Modern Debate/ p. 41.

109Ibid., pp. 46-47.
^•■'■^Arthur Kruger, "The Meaning of Inherency,"
Gavel, XLV (March, 1963), 46-47.
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Inherency and Need Issue
Contemporary writers have discussed inherency
primarily in terms of the need issue in propositions of
policy.

Many, moreover, have linked inherency with the

"essential" characteristic of the status quo.

Kruger, for

example, insisted that "in most debates the key point of
the need should be that of equating the cause of existing
evils with the essential characteristic of the status
quo."^^

Despite this predisposition toward the need

issue, Kruger, nevertheless, admitted that inherency "may
also be considered in the area of impracticability." 112
Freeley suggested that "the need portion of the
case consists of arguments to establish the need for
changing the status quo because of its inherent disadvan113
tages or weaknesses."
Baird had implied a similar
position when he advised an affirmative to "show that . . .
111Ibid., p. 47.
112

"When a debater argues . . . that there are
insurmountable obstacles which would block the affirmative
plan, the affirmative should endeavor to show that such
obstacles are not inherently insurmountable and can thus be
overcome." Ibid., p. 51. Kruger labeled the following
"misconceptions11 of the need issue: the "comparative
advantage" need and the equating of need with unrelated
existing evils. He found confusions, moreover, of the need
with "need for affirmative plan," common objectives or
goals, and the "not necessary" argument. Kruger, Modern
Debate, pp. 41-44.
^"^Freeley, Argumentation and Debate, 1961 ed. ,
p. 167.
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the defects are inherent in the system."

114

Ehninger and

Brockriede defined inherency similarly to Kruger.

"An

affirmative debater must show that serious problems,
inherent in the present policy require a fundamental change
of policy," 115 they said.

Reid's less stringent approach

suggested that "inherency involves the question of whether
the failure of a policy is related to the particular phase
of the status quo which the debate resolution proposes to
change."1'*'6

Reid described the analytical process to be

"(1) determining precisely which phase(s) of the status quo
the debate proposition proposes to change and (2) deter
mining whether the existing problems are caused by, or at
least related to, those specific phases of the
status quo."
Such writers as Patrick 0. Marsh, on the other
hand, believed that "no mention need be made of the evils
118

in the status quo."
114

Marsh held that:

Baird, Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate,

p. 314.
115

. .
Ehninger and Brockriede, Decision by Debate,
p. 241. They believed that the task of the debater "is to
’locate1 rather than 'invent1 them [issues], because they
inhere in the proposition itself and are there to be
found," p. 218.
116Reid, "Analysis of the Proposition," p. 61.
117Ibid.
11 s

Patrick 0. Marsh, "Is Debate Merely a Game for
Conservative Players," Speaker and Gavel, I (January,
1964), 50.
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All that can logically be demanded in demon
strating a proposition of policy . . . are the
following contentions:
1. We should adopt the best available policy
(judicial notice).
2. These are the proper criteria for deter
mining which policy is best.
3. The affirmative policy best meets these
criteria.
Inherency and Causality
Warren C. Shaw tied inherency inextricably to
causality in 1922 when he suggested "that, if existing or
threatened evils . . . are to be removed, they must be
traced to their root causes in the present policy." 120
Kruger emphasized this relationship when he concluded that
"inherency in a policy debate is synonymous with
121
causality."
Ehninger and Brockriede implied a causal
relationship when they contended:

"If the present policy

is not to blame for the problem, that problem is not
inherent in the present policy, and accordingly there is
no need to change that policy."

122

Such a position did

not, however, meet with unqualified approbation. 123

120

Warren C. Shaw, The Art of Debate (Boston:
Allyn and Bacon, 1922), p. 161.
121
122

Kruger, "Meaning of Inherency," p. 51.
.
Ehninger and Brockriede, Decision
by Debate,

p. 225.
^•^See Reid, "Analysis of the Proposition,"
p. 61.
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The first major challenge came from Patrick 0. Marsh who
argued:
To demand that the debater show causal
relationships in every affirmative debate . . .
cannot help but lead to superficial treatment
of causality. This seems unwise especially
since isolation of the cause is usually
unnecessary. If a cause be defined as an
event which either completes or breaks the
chain of "necessary conditions" to bring about
an affect (and this appears to me to be the
most defensible definition), then it is unneces
sary for the debater to isolate the one condi
tion which completes or breaks the chain.124
Marsh relied, moreover, on Barzun and Graff's distinctions
between "causation that occurs in a chain of events of
various kinds and causation within a closed system."

125

Marsh was not alone in his rejection of causal inherency.
However, it was he who initially assumed the presumption
or burden of proof (depending on one's point of view) in
the controversy.
Marsh, "Is Debating a Game," p. 50. "In
'comparative advantage' debating the criteria set forth
by the affirmative should include the necessary conditions
for achieving the desired end. The available policies
will either meet the conditions or they will not, and some
will meet them more advantageously than others. If this
is what Kruger means by showing causal relationships, then
he can have no quarrel with the comparative advantage case,
for it is so contained. But if he demands showing the
reason for the absence of certain necessary conditions,
then he is asking debaters to concern themselves with nonessentials which may easily lead to irrelevancies if not
absurdities," p. 51.
125 Jacques Barzun and Henry F. Graff, The Modern
Researcher (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc.,
1962), pp. 151-52.
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Inherency and
the _ Prima
*i o r
_
Facie Case-1-^0
The most vocal antagonists of causal inherency,
proponents of the comparative advantage case, 12 7' saw
"essential causality" as an unwarranted restriction 128 of
the affirmative's alternatives. 17Q After the publication
126For contemporary discussions of the prima facie
case, see Robert L. Scott, "On the Meaning of the Term
Prima Facie in Argumentation," Central States Speech
Journal, XII (Autumn, 1960), 33-34; Kim Giffin and Kenneth
Megill, "A Study of Case Construction in Tournament
Debates," Western Speech, XXVI (Winter, 1962), 52-53;
Donald Terry, "Workability, Topicality, Inherency, and
Prima Facie as Debate Problems," in Modern Debate Case
Techniques (Skokie, 111.: National Textbook Company,
1970), p. 14; Donald R. Terry, "The Traditional Case," in
Modern Debate Case Techniques (Skokie, 111.: National
Textbook Company, 1970), p. 1; Bruce Markgraf, "The Prima
Facie Case: A Modest Proposal," Speaker and Gavel, I
(November, 1963), 27-28, For a discussion of negative
alternatives, see Roger E. Nebergall, "The Negative
Counterplan," Speech Teacher, VI (September, 1957), 217-20;
J. W. Patterson) "The Obligations of the Negative in a
Policy Debate," Speech Teacher, XI (September, 1962),
208-213.
127Musgrave had introduced an advantages analysis
as early as 1945. See Musgrave, Competitive Debate,
pp. 55-60. For a discussion of the modern comparative
advantage case, see Vernon Craven, "Comparative Advantage:
A Classification," Central States Speech Journal, XIX
(Winter, 1969), 243-49; L. Dean Fadely, "The Validity of
the Comparative Advantage Case," Journal of the American
Forensic Association, IV (Winter, 1967), 28-35; Arthur
Kruger, "The Comparative Advantage Case— A Disadvantage,"
Journal of the American Forensic Association, III
(September, 1966), 104-111.
128
Donald R. Terry went so far as to label
inherency one of the three requirements for a prima facie
case! Terry, "Workability, Topicality, Inherency, and
Prima Facie," p. 14.
l^James W. Cheseboro distinguished the two
approaches as follows: "The inherency affirmative must

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

278

of Kruger's Modern Debate, Marsh had asked, "If the
proposed plan has significant advantages, even where
'serious weaknesses1 are not 'inherent' in the system
could not one logically demonstrate that the system should
130
be adopted?"
Kruger denied such a prerogative, reply
ing:

"To suggest that no problem exists, as in the

'comparative advantages' approach, is even worse than contending that a minor problem exists." 131

Marsh's response,

a Speaker and Gavel article entitled "Is Debate Merely a
Game for Conservative Players?" questioned the validity of
four assumptions basic to the "inherency argument":
(1) that a presumption favors the status quo; (2) that
"evils" in the status quo must be demonstrated; (3) that
these evils must be shown to be "causally" related to the
status quo; and (4) that the removal of these evils must
contribute a "major change" from the status quo.-1-22

The

two preceding sections outlined Marsh's position regarding
demonstrate the existence of an evil, indicate the cause
of this evil, propose a plan to correct the evil by
removing the cause, and finally demonstrate how the plan
corrects the problem. . . . On the other hand, the advan
tages case does not devote its attention to either an evil
or the causes of that evil." James W. Cheseboro, "The
Comparative Advantage Case," Journal of the American
Forensic Association, V (Spring, 1968), 60-61. See James
L. Robinson, "Are We 'Overlegalizing' School Debate?"
Speech Teacher, IX (March, 1960) , 109-115.
130patrick 0. Marsh, "Prima Facie Case: The
Perennial Debate Topic," Gavel, XLV (November, 1962), 15.
^2^Kruger, "Meaning of Inherency," p. 47.
^22Marsh, "Is Debate a Game?" pp. 46-53.
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the second and third assumptions.

The fourth will be

treated in relation to the comparative advantage case.
Marsh rejected the first assumption, moreover, that a
presumption favors the status quo on the following
grounds:
Since the traditional presumptions are
inferential, societal, and arbitrary, they
remain debatable and should be incorporated
into the debate— not merely assumed. Thus,
the judge-critic may base his decision upon
the relative strength of the opposing argu
ments rather than to allow the legitimate
issues to be prejudged. 33
In a series of rebuttal articles, 134 Kruger
defended the four assumptions outlined by Marsh, though he
admitted a "minority view of presumption."

TOC

Though

133

Ibid., p. 49. See Gary Cronkhite, "The Locus of
Presumption," Central States Speech Journal, XVII
(November, 1966), 270-76.
134
Arthur Kruger, "Underlying Assumptions of Policy
Questions: I. Presumption and Burden of Proof," Speaker
and Gavel, II (November, 19 64), 2-17; Arthur Kruger,
"Underlying Assumptions of Policy Questions: II. Indict
ment of the Status Quo," Speaker and Gavel, II (January,
1965), 60-62; Arthur Kruger, "Underlying Assumptions of
Policy Questions: III. Inherent Evil," Speaker and Gavel,
II (March, 1965), 79-82; Arthur Kruger, "Underlying Assumptions of Policy Questions: IV. Major Change of the
Status Quo," Speaker and Gavel, II (May, 1965), 134-36.
135
Kruger, "Presumption and Burden of Proof,"
p. 14. Kruger pointed out that Reeves and Hudson had
assumed a similar position. J. Walter Reeves and Hoyt
Hudson, Principles of Argument and Debate (Boston: D. C.
Heath and Company, 1941), pp. 11-12. Kruger said, "In a
word this interpretation entails not just a description
but a favorable evaluation of the status quo in relation
to any proposed extreme change."
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responding at the midpoint of the series,*36 it, neverthe
less, was in his final reply to Kruger that Marsh clarified
his philosophical position.
This controversy began with my effort to
resolve some of the contradictions in the
lists of stock issues found in various text
books on argumentation. Now, I take an
"issue" to be an essential question in a con
troversy which must be answered "yes" by the
affirmative if the affirmative is to demon
strate a prima facie case. The "stock
issues," accordingly, would be the minimum
essential requirements for demonstrating a
proposition. The stock issues will, therefore,
be the same for all propositions of a given
kind. For example, the minimum essentials for
demonstrating a proposition of fact . . . are:
(1) an issue of definition and (2) an issue of
compliance. Likewise, in proposition [sic] of
value the stock issues appear to be:
(1) an
issue of criteria and (2) an issue of compliance.
Certainly we can build prima facie cases for
these two kinds of propositions. In each
instance there is burden of proof on the
affirmative to support these minimum essentials.
But notice that the prima facie cases are
developed without reference to a presumption,
and also without reference to how the proposi
tion must be worded. The question then arises
as to why is it essential in a proposition of
policy to introduce elements that were not
essential in the other two kinds of proposi
tions. . . . These questions become more
pressing when we consider that a proposition
of policy is essentially a proposition of
value.137
Marsh recognized some justification in according
the four assumptive premises discussed if one chose to view
136

Patrick O. Marsh, "Terminological Tangle: A
Reply to Professor Kruger," Speaker and Gavel, II (January,
1965), 54-59.
137

Patrick O. Marsh, "The Terminal Tangle: A Final
Reply to Professor Kruger," Speaker and Gavel, II (May,
1965), 137.
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debate operationally (i.e., as a "mental game" concerned
with "abstract certainty").

If one chose, however, to

define argumentation conceptually, with a concern for
"training students to use their critical capacities to the
greatest advantage in problems resulting from the world
of human affairs," then Marsh was "unwilling to restrict
their freedom by imposing unnecessary limitations upon
Iop
their practices of case construction."
Accordingly,
Marsh opposed "setting down a hard and fast rule which
requires every affirmative policy debate to begin by show1oq
m g the inherent inadequacy of the status quo."
Though
not denying that "some very effective debating results from
such a line of argument, and often encourages its use," he
did, nevertheless, "deny that an inherency argument is an
essential part of every affirmative case." 140 Robert
Newman called the requirement that an advocate show "an
inherent and compelling need for a change" "artificial and
unreasonable,

while Bernard L. Brock argued that "the

affirmative should not be judged according to the standards
designed for traditional . . . cases, but according to how
well it fulfills the obligations which are appropriate to
138Ibid., p. 138.
139Ibid.

141

Robert Newman, "The Inherent and Compelling
Need," Journal of the American Forensic Association, II
(May, 1965), 66.
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the unique characteristics of the advantages analysis.
Interestingly, toward the end of the journal debate, Kruger
explained:
So when I advocate that an affirmative
team "must," or should, carefully analyze the
cause of the problem which it is presenting,
and that it should present only those evils
which are caused by, or are inherent in, the
present policy, I say this not because this
is the only way of presenting a prima facie
case but because I am thinking of the negative
attack which will come and which will puncture
the affirmative case if this analysis has not
been undertaken and heeded. 43
This is not to suggest that Kruger ultimately embraced the
comparative advantage case.

Conversely, he referred in

the same article to the abandonment of "the principles of
logical analysis," and in a subsequent discussion he
treated "The 'Comparative Advantage1 Case:

A Disadvantage,"

conceding merely that:
The comparative advantage approach is suitable
for a proposition not worth debating, or not
debatable in the sense that a significant
change is at issue. . . . When an affirmative
has to support what is basically a negative
position (minor change of the status quo), of
142 Bernard L. Brock, "The Comparative Advantage
Case," Speech Teacher, XVI (March, 1967), 121. For other
defenses of the comparative advantage alternative, see
Cheseboro, "Comparative Advantage Case," pp. 104-111;
Craven, "Comparative Advantage"; Fadely, "Validity of Com
parative Advantage Case"; David Zarefsky, "The Traditional
Case— Comparative Advantage Case Dichotomy: Another Look,"
Journal of the American Forensic Association, VI (Winter,
1969), 12-20.
■'■43Arthur Kruger, "The Inherent Need: Further
Classification," Journal of the American Forensic
Association, II (September, 1965), 113.
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course it has no cause to demonstrate a
compelling need for a change.
Meanwhile, on the debate circuit, as well as in
the professional literature, various alternatives to causal
inherency appeared.

Newman, for example, agreed with Marsh

that:
The true burden of proof carried by every
affirmative . . . is this: he who asserts must
prove. His proof may be causal reasoning or
it may not. He may show a substantial evil in
the status quo, or he may merely show that the
status quo fails to meet its designated goal.
. . . His prima facie case can consist of any
good reason why his proposition should be
adopted, and then he must defend that case. 5
Accordingly, Newman favored a "functional" approach to
inherency in which affirmative teams could present more
realistic solutions.
tive as follows:

David Zarefsky defined this alterna

"To argue functional inherency," he said,

"is not to claim that certain structures are organically
deficient, but rather that, in their functioning, they
prevent the achievement of the desired objective.
Debaters, moreover, argued "structural" and "attitudinal"
inherency. 147 Thomas Mader, proceeding in another
144
145

Kruger, "'Comparative Advantage' Case," p. 106.
Newman, "Inherent and Compelling Need," p. 71.

146

David Zarefsky, The Comparative Advantage Case
(Evanston, 111.: Championship Debate Enterprises, 1970),
p. 2 .
^Conversation with Annabel Dunham Hagood,
Director of Forensics, The University of Alabama, July,
1972. Attitudinal inherency referred to predispositions
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direction, advocated stasis as a point of departure.148
Recognizing that status in time (i.e., that dealing with
conditions that exist) is but one of many possible posi
tions, Mader pointed out that propositions also call for
extending or continuing.

He concluded, therefore, that

the affirmative must demonstrate an inherent need only
when the status quo is the "fixed point"; otherwise, the
affirmative must show need only m principle. 149
Whether viewed as causal, functional, structural,
or attitudinal, whether a necessary requisite or simply
one affirmative alternative, inherency has become a
critical concept in contemporary argumentation and debate
theory.

As a tool of analysis, it has influenced case

construction and criteria for judgment.

As a theoretical

construct, it has prompted a reassessment of such under
lying assumptions of argumentation as burden of proof and
presumption. It has inquired into the defining of propositions lso and into the m a m issues essential to the proof
of a case.

The suggestion that "those theorists who

to view or act in certain ways. See Zarefsky, Comparative
Advantage Case, p. 2.
148 Thomas Mader, "The Inherent Need to Analyze
Stasis," Journal of the American Forensic Association, IV
(Winter, 1967), 13-20.
149
Ibid., p. 13.
^^Most of the controversy over presumption centered
on defining the term should in propositions of policy.
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propose that inherency be present in all debates are, in
effect, proposing that inherency be made another 'stock
issue' in analysis," is probably a valid assessment. 151
Reassessments of prima facie case and presumption,
accompanying contemporary concerns with inherency and com
parative advantages analyses, directly relate to— if they
do not grow out of— a renewed interest in strategy in
debating.

Though "special methods of refutation" appeared

in "early period" texts, and though Shaw popularized the
constructive as well as destructive value of strategy in
the "middle period," "strategy" and "attack and defense"
have become battlecries for those contemporary writers
committed to advocacy in debating.

Kruger investigated

logic and strategy in the development of a debate case as
early as 1954. 152 In 1960, he carried those concepts into
the subtitle of his text, 153 Modern Debate: Its Logic and
Strategy.

By no means alone in his commitment to "the

most logical way to construct or answer arguments, and to
organize many arguments into a unified whole, called the
'case,'" he represents the vanguard of such a position.
^^Kenny Barfield, "A Study of the Nature of
Inherency," unpublished paper, The University of Alabama,
1971, p. 33.
152
Arthur Kruger, "Logic and Strategy in the
Development of the Debate Case," Speech Teacher, III
(March, 1954), 15-19.
153 Kruger, Modern Debate.
154
Ibid., p. 114.
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Proof
By far, the greatest number of contemporary
argumentation and debate theorists, viewing proof traditionally as evidence plus reasoning, 155 have continued to
rely on the canons of legal evidence and on syllogistic
and/or rhetorical inferential constructs.^"5®

Nevertheless,

during the immediate period, at least three identifiable
developments in the theory of proof have emerged:

a

behavioral approach to evidence; the introduction of
Toulmin's structural model into argumentation and debate
theory; and a renewed interest by certain authors in
157
motivation and in ethos
as "proof." That the longrange effects of these "minority interpretations" cannot
now be determined does not deny that they are extensions,
perhaps even "significant" contributions, to argumentation
and debate theory.
See, for example, Capp and Capp, Argumentation
and Debate, p. 135; Freeley, Argumentation and Debate, 1966
rev. ed., pp. 52-118; Kruger, Modern Debate, p. 132. See
Mills's analysis of approaches to proof as needfulfillment; as consonant with a climate of opinion; as
empirical verifiability; as logical demonstration; and as a
combination of substantive and structural factors to
satisfy disinterested, intelligently critical listeners or
readers. Mills, Reason in Controversy, 1968 rev. ed.,
pp. 38-45.
^^Contemporary works, however, have begun to
inquire into historiography and social psychology for new
alternatives. See particularly Robert P. Newman and Dale
R. Newman, Evidence (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Company,
1969); Miller and Nilsen, Perspectives on Argumentation.
157
Writers discussed this concept primarily in
terms of evidence— i.e., "authority-based assertion."
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Evidence
In both editions of Principles of Argumentation,
Baker had treated evidence as the focal point or unifying
factor of proof.

Transmitted to the "middle period"

largely by Foster, this notion has survived in contemporary
argumentation and debate theory.

Paul D. Brandes, for

example, held that:
Evidence is useful in building ethical per
suasion with hostile audiences, skeptical
audiences, and critical audiences, that it
is useful in enforcing legitimate emotions,
and that it can furnish both inductive and
deductive elements in reasoning.158
Mills agreed.

"In rhetorical theory," he said, "there are

three main reasons given for the use of evidence in argu
mentative discourse:

it adds probative force; it tends to

increase the credibility of the communicator; it may add
emotional impact." 159 Various definitions of evidence
suggest, however, that it has been the "probative" dimen
sion which has commanded most attention.
158 Paul D. Brandes, "Ev'dence," in Argumentation
and Debate: Principles and Practices, ed. by James H.
McBath (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc.,
1963) , p. 166.
159
Mills, Reason in Controversy, 1964 ed., p. 98.
The "probative force" of the evidence was most frequently
investigated. Freeley, for example, suggesting that
"evidence may only partially substantiate a matter at
issue, or it may be strong to prove the matter conclu
sively," examined partial proof, indispensible proof, and
conclusive proof. Freeley, Argumentation and Debate,
1961 ed., pp. 65-67.
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Pefinition^ Q
Some contemporary writers have continued to define
evidence as "any factual material or opinion used to prove
a contention. "161

Both Mills and Freeley included "objects"

in their definitions. 162

Brandes was moving toward a

behavioral perspective when he insisted that "evidence is
not any fact or opinion, but those facts and opinions which
163
the audience divorces from speaker bias."
Ehninger and
In an analysis of six contemporary texts,
William R. Dresser suggested that "there seems to be fairly
general agreement, however, on two characteristics of evi
dence:
(a) evidence is something used to generate proof,
functioning as a basic premise in an argument; and (b) evi
dence is something that is external to and independent of
the speaker using it." William R. Dresser, "The Use of
Evidence in Ten Championship Debates," Journal of the
American Forensic Association, I (September, 1964), Toi.
^^Capp and Capp, Argumentation and Debate, p. 103.
Some preferred new or different labels. Kruger, For
example, used the terms "empirical" and "authoritative" to
differentiate types of evidence. Kruger, Modern Debate,
p. 132. Kruger believed that "whenever possible, a debater
should give not only the authority's conclusion but also
the proof used in arriving at it," p. 133.
162 See James M. O'Neill, Craven Laycock, and Robert
L. Scales, Argumentation and Debate (New York: Macmillan
Company, 19l7), p. 867 Mills's statement read: "For the
purposes of general argumentation, let us define evidence
as factual statements, objects not created by the advocate,
and opinions of persons other than the advocate which are
offered in support of his claims." Mills, Reason in
Controversy, 1964 ed., p. 97; 19 68 rev. ed., p. 139. See
Freeley, Argumentation and Debate, 1966 rev. ed., p. 52;
Brandes, "Evidence," p. 159.
16 3
Brandes, "Evidence," pp. 145-46. Brandes
believed, moreover, that "evidence should be material to
the issue, relevant to the argument at hand, and of
probative value without introducing unwanted side issues,"
p. 166.
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Brockriede made the break with a purely "logical" perspective 164 more complete by examining the dimension of audience
belief. Rejecting the fact-opinion dichotomy, Ehninger and
Brockriede observed that "if evidence is considered from
the point of view of the listeners or readers to whom it
is addressed, the 'factual1 character of any information
ultimately depends on the 'opinion' of the audience.
They defined evidence accordingly as "an informative state
ment believed by the listener or reader and employed by an
arguer to secure belief in another statement." 166
Miller objected that in the Ehninger-Brockriede
text "the primary focus still appears to be on the value
aspects of its [evidence's] use."^^^

Assuming that the

Miller distinguished between psychological and
logical aspects of evidence. See Miller, "Evidence and
Argument," p. 26.
^■^Ehninger and Brockriede, Decision by Debate,
p. 100.
^ ^ Ibid. Ehninger and Brockriede believed that in
order to function in a "unit of proof," evidence must be
both germane and believable. They contended, moreover,
that "authoritative proofs made good only certain kinds of
claims. . . . The critical listener or reader does not
accept an authoritative proof designed to establish the
ultimate claim of a controversy. The decision in a debate
is not critically determined merely by acquiescing to the
opinion of an expert, no matter how qualified he may be.
Authoritative proofs are best in establishing intermediate
claims in a chain of argument," pp. 161-63. "Proof by
authority," moreover, "is also limited to establishing
critically designative and definitive claims," p. 162.
•^•^^Miller, "Evidence and Argument," p. 26.
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168
"primary objective"
of using evidence is the "development
. . . of a sense of belief," Miller "offered as a useful,
tentative definition" the following:
Evidence consists of those data that are
Intended to induce a sense of belief in the
proposition which the data purportedly s u p p o r t .

Thus, the term evidence embraces
of diverse and varied materials;
defining characteristic of these
to be found in the function they

a large body
the common
materials is
perform. 69

The three major implications of that definition follow:
Questions regarding the nature and uses of
evidence are essentially psychological and
involve considerations of the bases for people's
beliefs and of the kinds of material most
likely to induce . . . a sense of belief.
The function of evidence in argument is to
induce belief ["a certain kind of state of body
or mind or both"],171 not necessarily to aid in
communicating truth or establishing fact
[empirically ascertainable phenomena that exist
as part of the physical world].
What conclusions may be validly drawn from
certain items of evidence is a question associated
168_,
,. .
Itallics
mine.
169
Miller, "Evidence and Argument," p. 25. Miller
believed that "direct experience is seldom involved in
instances that we would consider argumentation.11 He
limited his discussion of types of evidence therefore to
testimony, designating two varieties: testimony composed
of statistical data and testimony composed of authoritybased assertion, p. 37.
^^Miller believed, however, that "the logical and
the psychological aspects of evidence cannot be separated
into discrete categories." Ibid., p. 29. He wished "to
combine the salient elements of both approaches," p. 26.
171 Miller relied on the definition of Bertrand
Russell, Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1962) , p. 145, cited in Miller,
"Evidence and Argument," p. 27.
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with the logical rules of inference and with
the empirical status of certain related
propositions.
Though Robert Huber, Ernest Bormann, Ehninger and
173
Brockriede,
and, indirectly, Dale Newman and Robert
Newman174 agreed that belief is an appropriate end of
evidence, none minimized— as did Miller— the communicating
of truth or the establishing of fact. 175

Conversely, most

contemporary writers appear committed to conclusions
logically or empirically warranted by evidence.

Or, to

put it differently, whereas Miller defined the function of
evidence as belief, most other writers perceived it to be
proof.
Classification
Those contemporary writers who defined evidence
traditionally tended also to rely on legal classifica176
tions.
Though a few new categories appeared
172Ibid., pp. 25-29.
173
Huber, Influencing through Argument, p. 9 4;
Ernest G. Bormann, "An Empirical Approach to Certain Con
cepts of Logical Proof," Central States Speech Journal,
XII (Winter, 1961), 90-91; Ehninger and Brockriede,
Decision by Debate, p. 100.
174They said: "We also share with historians a
commonsense and non-philosophical definition of truth:
truth is what the evidence, correctly interpreted, obliges
us to believe." Newman and Newman, Evidence, p. viii.
175
Miller, "Evidence and Argument," p. 27.
176Ehninger and Brockriede presented a representa
tive listing. They described evidence as real or personal,
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(i.e., Freeley's distinction of judicial and extra177
judicial),
most lists paralleled those of the "early"
178
or "middle" periods.
More original were the compila179
tions of "sources" of evidence.
Freeley, for example,
included judicial notice, public records, public writings,
testimony of witnesses, and personal inspection. 180
Brandes labeled "functional forms," i.e., that evidence
furnished by witnesses, documents, recordings, pictoriali181
zations and relics.
Mills essentially concurred, though
182
his terminology differed slightly.
Newman and Newman
talked about sources of evidence in terms of government,
the press, pressure groups, and professional scholars.
original or hearsay, direct or circumstantial, pre
appointed or casual, written or unwritten, positive or
negative, eager or reluctant. Ehninger and Brockriede,
Decision by Debate, p. 110.
177
Freeley, Argumentation and Debate, 1961 ed.,
pp. 57-65.
17 8The preceding discussion on definition hints at
the fire to which the traditional fact-opinion categories
were subjected.
179

In some instances these lists of "sources"
superceded lengthy discussions of research. See particu
larly Newman and Newman, Evidence.
180
Freeley, Argumentation and Debate, 1961 ed.,
pp. 54-57.
181

182

Brandes, "Evidence," pp. 153-59.
Mills, Reason in Controversy, 1964 ed.,

pp. 91-101.
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They also included a separate section on statistical
evidence. 183
Perhaps the most important contemporary development
in classification has been an interest in categorizing
evidence in terms of its relation to different kinds of
propositions, issues, or claims.

Terris perceived that

"the fact-value distinction depends . . . not on the
wording or form of the proposition but rather on the type
of evidence that must be used to prove it." 184 This notion
has surfaced in at least four other contemporary works.185
Ehninger and Brockriede, for example, limited "proof by
authority" to designative and definitive claims. 186

Erwin

Bettinghaus contended that "the type of evidence available
depends on the nature of the question to be asked and the
relation of the communicator to the necessary evidence." 187
Newman and Newman related evidential forms to directional,
positional, and predicative statements.

A summary of their

analysis follows:
183

Newman and Newman, Evidence, pp. 91-181,

205-225.
184

Terris, "Classification of the Argumentative
Proposition," pp. 266-73.
185
Cronkhite, however, rejected this position. See
Cronkhite, "Propositions of Past and Future Fact and
Value," p. 12.
186
Ehninger and Brockriede, Decision by Debate,
p. 162.
^^Erwin p. Bettinghaus, Message Preparation: The
Nature of Proof (New York: Bobbs-Mernll Company, Inc.,
1966), p. 56.
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The first step in policy deliberation is
analysis and criticism of goals. This is not
an entirely subjective matter; facts impinge
on policy goals in many ways.
(1) Most goals
incorporate a number of factual assumptions
which must be inspected carefully. . . .
(2) Some goals can be challenged because we
cannot uphold them consistently. . . .
(3) Most goals cannot be achieved without
extracting a "cost" of some sort. . . .
Positional statements are judgments about
the present; they locate us in relation to a
certain goal. The reasoning necessary to
establish them is inductive or evidential.
Such positional statements can never be
certain, and they frequently involve con
siderable inferential risk.
There are three important ways of
supporting positional statements. The first
is descriptive generalization, where specific
historical instances of a phenomenon are
assembled without any claim to know why the
phenomena function as they do. . . . A second
way of supporting a positional statement is
with a causal explanation, where one claims to
know why things happen as they do. . . . The
third way is by historical analogy, where two
phenomena are alleged to be comparable in one
unknown variable since they are comparable in
several known variables. 89
Predictions represent the payoff stage of
deliberation; we approve or disapprove a spe
cific policy because of its anticipated con
sequences. . . . Descriptive generalizations,
causal explanations, and historical analogies
are vehicles by which evidence can be brought
to bear on the future. . . . According to the
epistemological doctrine of Helmer and Rescher,
policy predictions usually involve inarticulatable evidence and imprecise generalization
which call for intuitive evaluation, and this
only an expert can do. How one evaluates
loo

“Newman and Newman, Evidence, pp. 14-15.

^89Ibid., pp. 30-31.
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expertise therefore becomes a major concern of
the student of evidence.-*-9®
Miller also related goals to propositions, but from a
belief rather than probative perspective.

Concluding

that both testimony composed of statistical data and
testimony composed of authority-based assertion are
applicable to fact and value questions, Miller determined
statistical data to have "greater limitations when uti
lized to induce belief in propositions of fact," while
"testimony composed of authority-based assertion . . .
often has its greatest psychological impact in the realm
of value disputes." 191
A final approach which fails to fit into the
preceding categories suggests that the three modes of
proof (personal, emotional, and logical) may be brought
19 2
within a common critical framework.
Accordingly,
Ehninger and Brockriede examined authoritative proof
within a modified Toulmin pattern. 19 3

Those authors

speak best for themselves:
190Ibid., pp. 49-50.
19 1

Miller, "Evidence and Argument," pp. 43, 46.

19 2See Ehninger and Brockriede, Decision by Debate,
Ch. 11.
19 3

The Toulmin Model is explained in a subsequent
section on reasoning.
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The evidence of an authoritative proof is
a factual report or a statement of an opinion,
together with an identification of the source
of the data. . . . The warrant states that the
source of the evidence is credible. The claim
then reiterates the statement appearing in the
evidence as now certified by the warrant. . . .
The support for the warrant evaluates the
source of the evidence by applying three wellestablished criteria and by investigating the
past reliability of the witness's statements
on the same subject covered in the evidence.
1. Is the witness an expert in the
field? . . .
2. Did the witness have an opportunity to get
at the facts? . . .
3. Is the witness reasonably unbiased?
Reservations may be needed in an authorita
tive proof for two reasons. In the first
place, even if the general reliability of a
source is accepted, the idea may be rejected
if a more respected authority presents a
counterclaim. . . . Second, a reservation is
required if a substantive proof of greater
probative force yields a counterclaim. . . .
Claims derived from authoritative proofs almost
always require some sort of qualifier. As with
substantive proofs, claims may need qualifiers
for any or all of three reasons:
(a) If the
evidence is in any way qualified, the claim
must also be qualified. . . . (b) If the
warrant is qualified, the claim must also be
qualified. . . . (c) If reservations are
present, the claim may have to be set aside or
qualified.
Tests
Contemporary argumentation and debate texts have
included essentially the same criteria for testing evidence
found in earlier works.

Some new terminology has appeared,

as have new organizational patterns for discussing specific
19 4Ehninger and Brockriede, Decision by Debate,
pp. 159-61.
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standards.

These tendencies# however# only reinforce

earlier predispositions.

Historically# one might find

as many ways of structuring tests of proof and systems
of labeling these tests as he would find argumentation
texts.

Of particular interest is the inclination of

some contemporary writers to include a behavioral dimen
sion for the testing of evidence, the standard of audience
acceptability being applied to source and substance alike.
Not a contemporary construct, the test of audience
acceptability has appeared in argumentation and debate
texts at least since the publication, in 1932, of O'Neill
and McBurney's Working Principles of Argument.19 5 Subse
quent texts in that line of authors have included the
iqr
concept,
though Mills called it a "lesser" class
"except in popular persuasion, where it is the major
test."'*'^

Yet, Newman and Newman's criticism that

"rhetoric and journalism tend to use credibility and
acceptability synonymously" 19 8 does not seem to apply.
19 5
James M. O'Neill and James H. McBurney, The
Working Principles of Argument (New York: Macmillan
Company, 1932)# p. 99.
196McBurney, O'Neill# and Mills# Argumentation
and Debate# p. 9 5; McBurney and Mills, Argumentation and
Debate, p. 110.
19 7
Mills, Reason in Controversy# p. 107; 1968
rev. ed., p. 152.
19 p
Newman and Newman, Evidence, p. vin.
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Rather, those writers 1 9 9 who have favored evaluating an
audience's acceptance of a proposition have also insisted
on the tests of logical adequacy, or, as Newman and Newman
put it, that evidence be "'worthy of belief,' hence
probably true."200

Such standards as reliability,20^-

accuracy, verifiability, recency, and representativeness
of evidence, along with questions to determine the com
petency of sources, have continued to dominate lists of
tests.202

Even Miller recognized certain of these dimen

sions, concluding that assertions not routinely expected
and unanimity of authorities are tests for testimony com
posed of authority-based assertion, while testimony com
posed of statistical data should describe accurately the
existing empirical state of affairs and should supply
operational definitions of key concepts. 20 3
Though audience acceptability is a common criterion
in contemporary argumentation and debate texts, it is not
a universal one.

Conversely, many writers, seeming to

199
See particularly Freeley, Argumentation and
Debate, 1961 ed., pp. 83-84; 1966 ed., pp. 93-106. See
Bettinghaus, Message Preparation, p. 56.
^°°Newman and Newman, Evidence, p. viii.
201 See Harold A. Larrabee, Reliable Knowledge
(Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1964).
202

See Capp and Capp, Argumentation and Debate,
pp. 114-20. Brandes had suggested that "evidence's only
inherent property is its initial set of freedom from the
bias of the speaker." Brandes, "Evidence," p. 146.
Miller, "Evidence and Argument," pp. 37-47.
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agree with an historiographical perspective, express "no
concern as to whether any specific audience or reader will
in fact believe it [evidence] ."204

Strong adherents of

such an approach, Newman and Newman have investigated
credibility primarily in terms of affect of perceptual
capacities, perceptual distortion, willful distortion,
9flR
and authenticity.
They have, moreover, restructured
traditional tests of evidence into the following indices
of credibility:
SITUATIONAL TESTS
1. Tension. The lower the tension associated with an event, the higher the
credibility of reports about it.
2. Accessibility. The more accessible the
situation being reported on, both to
the reporters and their audience, the
more credible the reports.
3. Freedom to report— absence of gag rule.
The more freedoma witness has to
report things as he sees them, the
greater his credibility.
DOCUMENTARY TESTS
4. Authenticity. The greater the presumption of authenticity, the higher the
credibility of a document.
5. Internal consistency. The higher the
internal consistency of an author, the
more credible his testimony.
6. Carefulness of generalization. The
more careful the generalizations of a
writer, the higher the credibility of
his testimony.
7. Reluctance. The greater the damage of
his own testimony to a witness, the
more credible it is.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE WRITER
8. Expertise. The greater the relevant
204 Newman and Newman, Evidence, p. viii.
^®^See ibid., Ch. IV.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

expertise of an author, the higher his
credibility.
9. Objectivity. The greater the objec
tivity of an author, the more credible
his testimony.
10. Accuracy record. The more accurate the
description and prediction record of a
source, the higher the credibility of
his testimony in general.
TESTS OF PRIMARY AUTHORITIES
11. Eyewitness principle. The greater a
witness1 observation of a matter to
which he testifies, the higher his
credibility.
12. Contemporaneity. The more contemporaneous
the report of a witness the more credible
his testimony.
TESTS OF SECONDARY SOURCES
13. Selection of primary sources. The more
discerning a writer's selection of pri
mary sources, the more credible his
testimony.
14. Accuracy of citation. The more accurate
the citations of a writer, the more
credible his testimony. 06
Though Newman and Newman contended that "there are no
specific tests of credible statistics," they isolated
three questions helpful in an evaluation of statistical
evidence:

(1) Who wants to prove what?

figures really represent?

(2) What do the

(3) What conclusions do the

figures support? 207
One final position deserves mention at this point.
Though Ehninger and Brockriede advocated evaluating
authoritative proof in terms of a modified Toulmin struc
tural model, their specific tests did not differ appreciably
206Ibid., pp. 87-88.
2^Ibid. , p . 224 .
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from those included in other works. 20 8

More noteworthy was

the authors' conviction that evidence must "also be fairly
and effectively presented to those persons with whom the
decision rests." 209 Though other writers had included
standards aimed at an "ethic of evidence," none juxtaposed
more forcibly than did Ehninger and Brockriede a "rhetoric
of evidence„"

"Underlying all rules for the presentation

of evidence in critical deliberation," they argued, "is
this basic test:

Is the evidence set forth in such a way

that the reader or listener is able to assign it exactly
the weight it deserves— no more and no less?" 210 "An
ethic of rhetoric," they contended, "aims to insure that
the evidence entered into argument will be given no more
weight than it deserves." 211

"A rhetoric of evidence seeks

to guarantee that it will not be undervalued." 212
208 Ehninger and Brockriede, Decision by Debate,
p. 160.
209T,
..
Ibid.,
p. 116.

211

Ibid., p. 118. They explained the "ethic of
evidence" as follows: "Deliberate attempts to manipulate
data, so as to give them greater weight than they deserve,
violate what may be termed an ethic of evidence. Such
violations fall into two major classes: selective report
ing and altered or colored reporting," p. 116.
212

The underlying principle of a "rhetoric of
evidence" follows: "1. An effective argument is more than
a string of quotations and statistics. 2. The evidence
used in debate often requires explanation. Readers or
listeners must be told how it applies and, sometimes, what
it means. 3. Facts and figures must undergird each unit
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Believing that these dimensions of evidence "coincide,"
Ehninger and Brockriede said:
If one seeks to write and speak per
suasively, he should write and speak truth
fully and give to each fact or value exactly
the weight it deserves. Only when one is more
concerned with truth than with victory are
his chances for victory at their best. To be
persuasive be truthful; be truthful to be
persuasive.213
Reasoning
In his 1968 revision of Reason in Controversy,
Mills recognized great diversity in recent discussions of
inference.

Having surveyed treatments of reasoning in

approximately a dozen contemporary texts, he concluded:
Many writers have felt obligated to cite the
categorical syllogism on the mortality of
Socrates, to say a little about J. S. Mill's
canons of induction, and to urge students to
avoid an assortment of fallacies. Some have
been more discerning in explaining how logic
may serve in the analysis and criticism of
argument. The most extreme position in this
direction holds that debating is mainly an
exercise in logic. . . . At the opposite
extreme is the view that formal logic and
probability have little to do with logical
proof as we think of it, and that we are left
with style and plausibility as our legitimate
concerns.214
of proof presented. 4. Special care must be taken to
present statistics clearly. 5. Evidence must be entered
into argument in specific and concrete terms." Ibid.,
pp. 118-21.
213
Ibid., p. 121.
^■^Mills, Reason in Controversy, 1968 rev. ed.,
p. 175.
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Logic and Argumentation
Mills's analysis took into account the continuing
controversy surrounding the "proper" role of logic in
argumentation and debate.

William S. Smith's 1962 "pre

liminary investigation into the place of formal logic in
the theory of debate" pointed up the "unequal treatment
215
of formal logic by various debate textbook authors,"
a
phenomenon which Smith contended "suggests that formal
logic continues as a part of debate theory out of tradition
only."

21 fi

However, the notion that "debate . . . tends to

be judged in keeping with the philosophy of inductive
logic" rather than the "formal," deductive variety did not
negate for Smith the value of reason and thought in argu217
mentation.
Rather, his plea for "less concentration on
the formal validity of our logic, and . . . more stress on
the testing of the conclusions that we reach through logic
and reasoning" anticipated resulting extensions of logic
218
useful for argumentation.
215

William S. Smith, "Formal Logic in Debate,"
Southern Speech Journal, XXVII (Summer, 1962), 334.
Smith's investigations showed a lack of completeness of
tenets of formal logic in representative texts, a lack of
consistency in degree of completeness, and a lack of agree
ment on which tenets of formal logic need to be presented,
p. 331.
216Ibid., p. 334.
217Ibid., p. 336.
218Ibid., pp. 337-38. Smith believed that such
extensions might take place in at least two ways: "First,

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

304

Contending that philosopher and logician alike
deem neither formal logic nor probability to be applicable
to rhetorical argument,

2 IQ

3 David W. Shepard concluded that

the role of formal logic in argument is one of style and
plausibility.

Shepard said:

Formal argument makes sense as an element
of style. . . . Well-composed deductive argu
ments, like polished sentences, are an ornament
to the debater and a blessing to the audience,
for both enable the audience to tell where the
speaker is going. Correct logic and correct
grammar are alike in that both are independent
of the facts; neither will guarantee the fac
tual truth or falsity of what the speaker
asserts. As elements of style, grammar and
logic either clarify or obscure what the
speaker is asserting to be true.
Another non-logical function of formal
argument emerges which also holds for proba
bility. By virtue of style, formal argument
creates plausibility. No proof, no genuine
probability, but credible argument, one that
seems worthy of acceptance.220
teachers of reasoning, argument, and debate, might study
the development of scientific thought to discover methods
of thought which might be helpful to our field. . . . A
second way might be to do as the scientist did: begin
with the problem of explaining what actually happens in
debate and other speaking situations and develop our own
methods of thought necessary to explain the phenomena that
we observe," p. 338.
219 Shepard put it this way: "When the philosophers
and logicians dismiss formal argument from having any
bearing on the facts, when they discuss probability and
kick rhetoric out the door, and when they compound the
insult by not applying their probability systems to the
subject-matter of rhetorical argument, where are we?"
David W. Shepard, "Rhetoric and Formal Argument," Western
Speech (Fall, 1966), 247.
220Ibid.
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Ray Lynn Anderson and C. David Mortensen, writing
for "the critic wishing to apply logic to argumentative
discourse," observed an almost exclusive attention to
"legitimate inferential principles and argumentative forms"
in many argumentation texts with "only scant attention, if
any, to the infinite ways in which intricate syntactical
relations may undermine or even rule out any possibility
p p I

of a public logic for reasoned claims.

Suggesting that

"the significant problem becomes one of analyzing the kinds
of connectives and hence the type(s) of logic which can
best explicate the relationships among propositional statements of rhetorical argument" 222 and pointing up problems
with both "context-invariant" (as in Formal Logic) and
"context-variant" (as in the Hastings descriptive classification and the Toulmin structural model) 223 connectives, 9 9 4 Anderson and Mortensen concluded that "the critic
assessing evaluative arguments should expand his conception
of context."225
221

Ray Lynn Anderson and C. David Mortensen, "Logic
and Marketplace Argumentation," Quarterly Journal of
Speech, LIII (April, 1967), 143.
222

Ibid., p. 144.

223

Both the Hastings classification and the Toulmin
model are discussed in a subsequent section.
224
Anderson and Mortensen, "Logic and Marketplace
Argumentation," p. 144.
225

Ibid., p. 151.
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Hence to understand the contextual meanings of
connective terms within rhetorical argument,
the critic, for example, sometimes will find
it useful to study matters of style or, say,
overall structure of discourse. On other
occasions the critic may even explore the
value system of the speaker as a framework for
an analysis of meaning consistency of value
laden propositions.
In a rejoinder to the Shepard, and Anderson and
Mortensen articles, Glen Mills and Hugh Petrie sought "to
restate the relevance of logic to verbal communication and
thereby to prevent the debasement of rhetoric into
227
sophistry."
Granting that "logic may stimulate belief
through external or 'accidental' features of formal argu
ment such as style or emotional involvement, irrespective
of its formal correctness," Mills and Petrie, nevertheless,
maintained that "logic may effect persuasion through its
own 'proper' nature of providing logically compelling
reasons for belief and the concomitant recognition of the
228
rationality of such belief by the audience."
It was
in support of that position that their refutative effort
was addressed.
Patterns of Inference
A cursory survey of contemporary approaches to
226Ibid.
227Glen E. Mills and Hugh G. Petrie, "The Role of
Logic in Rhetoric," Quarterly Journal of Speech, LIV
(October, 1968), 267.
228Ibid., p. 260.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

307

reasoning reveals a continuing interest both in traditional
logical forms (induction and deduction) and in rhetorical
patterns of inference (generalizations, analogy, causal
reasoning), though particular systems differ from text to
text.22^

Some writers have sought to integrate old con-

structs; 230 others have wished to devise new methods of
structuring and labeling arguments.23^- These efforts have
resulted in an investigation of the bases of classifica
tion, reformulations of inferential processes, and in
argumentative structures alternative to the logical
232
syllogism.
Reformulations: Bases
and Classifications
In an early attempt to "reformulate" the modes of
reasoning in argumentation, Arthur C. Hastings identified
three differentiating criteria.

Observing argument in

more than 250 contexts, Hastings derived nine "major
processes" or "modes" of reasoning, the first three of
229 For a summary of a cross-section of these
approaches, see Mills, Reason in Controversy, 1968 rev.
ed., pp. 187-89 .
230
See, for example, McBurney and Mills who label
sign and cause as deductive arguments; example and analogy
as inductive. McBurney and Mills, Argumentation and
Debate, Ch. VIII.
231
See, for example, the following discussion of
Hastings' "reformulation."
232For a discussion of "special logics, set out to
rationalize and systematize advice-giving," see Gronbeck,
"Alternative Strategies," p. 38.
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which he claimed to have a semantic base;

233

the second

three being based on causal generalization; and the last
three supporting either semantic or causal conclusions.
Hastings' "reformulation" follows:
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

Argument from example to a descriptive
generalization, in which factual informa
tion or one or more examples leads to the
conclusion of a general characteristic or
pattern. The typicality of the examples
is important, rather than their number.
Argument from criteria to a verbal classi
fication, in which characteristics of an
event are presented to prove that it fits
into a verbal category or that it should
be labeled in a certain way. The semantic
criteria for the meaning of the conclusion
are included in the premises. This process
of reasoning has not been previously
described.
Argument from definition to characteris
tics, in which an event or principle is
defined and the logical consequences of
the definition are applied.
Argument from sign to an unobserved event,
in which the existence of one event is
taken as an indication that another event
or condition exists. A high correlation
exists between the two events.
Argument from cause to effect. This is a
prediction of the consequences of an
event: if A occurs, B will result. The
cause may be hypothetical or real.
Argument from circumstantial evidence to
hypothesis, in which a fact or facts are
explained or accounted for by a pattern,
event, or other fact. A low correlation
exists between the individual facts in the
premises and the conclusion.
Argument from comparison, in which conclu
sions drawn about one event are asserted
to apply to a similar event. This has

2^^Hastings determined that in these cases the
warrants were semantic or linguistic rules of meaning or
usage. Arthur C. Hastings, "A Reformulation of the Modes
of Reasoning in Argumentation" (unpublished dissertation,
Northwestern University, 1962).
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been called literary analogy, but the two
types of analogy are so discrete that it
is unwise to classify them together under
the same term.
8. Argument from analogy, in which abstract
relationships of one event are compared to
another event, and conclusions about the
first event are asserted to apply to the
second.
9. Argument from authority or testimony, in
which the conclusion is justified because
a person or institution other than the
speaker asserts its truth. 34
In his chapter on argument in Mills's first edition
of Reason in Controversy, Hastings dropped the "semanticcausal" rationale, classifying rather according to the
frequency of usage and the usefulness of arguments. 235
Windes and Hastings offered a similar explanation for their
division of arguments which modified Hastings' original
"reformulation."

Windes and Hastings' inclusion of "other

234Ibid.
235
Arthur C. Hastings, "Reasoning Processes," in
Glen E. Mills, Reason in Controversy; An Introduction to
General Argumentation (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc.,
1964), pp. 128-47. Hastings' earlier "reformulation"
remained essentially intact though he allowed for the
"demands of persuasion." Concerned with the "proof in
advocacy," Hastings had dealt "exclusively" with
"rhetorical reasoning." He described its characteristics
in the Mills text as follows: "The first characteristic
is that rhetorical proof is less demanding than scientific
proof or the proof of formal logic. . . . Secondly, most
rhetorical reasoning leads to probable rather than certain
conclusions as in logic. . . . A third aspect of rhetorical
reasoning is that, if persuasion is intended, the premises
or assumptions in the proof must be drawn from the beliefs
of the audience, pp. 125-26.
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processes" indicated a less pedantic assessment of forms
of reasoning.

236

Beginning with a differentiation between symbolic
237
logic and place or topical logic.
Jack Ray and Harry
Zavos also attempted to sort the "bases" for classifying
patterns of inference.

Interested primarily in place

logic, the authors concluded:
Arguments can be classified in many ways.
. . . One way is to classify them as deductive
or inductive.
Arguments can also be classi
fied according to the form or the substance of
the argument, according to the type of propo
sition involved, according to the kind of
relationship involved (such as class inclusion,
correlation, cause, more and less, similarity,
etc.).238
Ray and Zavos1 own classification which they determined to
be

"more complex"and "more useful" than traditional list

ings included at least two dimensions of differentiation:
a logical-rhetorical distinction and a marshalling of
236

Windes and Hastings modified the original
"modes" as follows: they retained categories 1, 4, 5, 6,
7, 8; redefined categories 2 and 3 to read "reasoning from
characteristics to a description (by criteria of defini
tion)" and "reasoning from characteristics to a value judg
ment replaced category 9; and added a category called
"other processes." Windes and Hastings, Argumentation and
Advocacy, pp. 159-85.
237 Jack Ray and Harry Zavos, "Reasoning and Argu
ment: Some Special Problems and Types," in Perspectives
on Argumentation, ed. by Gerald R. Miller and Thomas R.
Nilsen (Chicago: Scott, Foresman, and Company, 1966),
pp. 93-94.
238Ibid., p. 94. The authors noted that these
"distinctions for classifying arguments are not always
clear and distinct."
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arguments according to logical force.

That system 2 3 9

follows:
Classification of Arguments
1. Analytic proofs
a. Mathematical proofs
b. Arguments from definition
c. Other arguments with analytic
reasons
d. Arguments about consistency
(reduction to absurdity, sense 2)
2. Substantive deduction
a. Deductive arguments
b. Probability deductions

logical arguments

3. Deductive explanations
4. Reduction to absurdity, sense 3
5. A fortiori arguments
6. Inductive arguments
a. By enumeration
b. By elimination
7. Rhetorical arguments
a. Argument from circumstance
b. Argument from example
c. Argument from authority
d. Analogy (used as argument)
e. Nonanalytic arguments to
definition
8. Rhetorical explanations
a. Teleological explanation
b. Series of events explanation

rhetorical
arguments with
logical force

9. Rhetorical clarification
a. Example
b. Stipulative definition
c. Analogy
10. Motivational arguments

rhetorical argu
ments with psycho
logical force

239Ibid., pp. 106-107.
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Mills's six "bases" of classification, similar to
those proposed by Ray and Zavos, included:

traditional

(symbolic) and topical; deductive and non-deductive;
acceptance or rejection of conclusion; cause and sign;
main and justificatory arguments; and classifying according
to the intent of the communicator. 240 His three-level
outline, "an eclectic system of classifying arguments,"
included "the deductive and non-deductive distinction and
the truth-value distinction, together with some lesser
bases which serve to identify the specific subtypes of
arguments."2^'*' That system2^2 follows:
I.

II.

Deductive Arguments
A. Truth conclusions
1. Class-inclusion, exclusion
2. Category to traits
3. Apply hypothesis to cases
4. Apply causal principle to cases
B. Value conclusions
1. Characteristics to evaluation
2. Principle to application
Nondeductive arguments
A. Truth conclusions
1. Circumstances to hypothesis
2. Analogy
3. Induction to generalization
4. To causal explanation

240 Mills, Reason in Controversy, 1968 rev. ed.,
pp. 187-91.
241
Ibid., p. 191.
242
Ibid., pp. 191-92. Bettinghaus discussed
"functional" and "genetic" patterns of inference along with
the more traditional "deductive" and "probabilistic" ones.
However, his discussion is probably outside the scope of
argumentation and debate theory. See Bettinghaus, Message
Preparation, Ch. V.
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B.

Value conclusions
1. Evaluative prediction for one case
2. Evaluative analogy
3. Evaluative generalization
4. Agreement and difference

Mills also distinguished argument from nonargument. He
said:
Conditional statements, which typically
include "if" or "if-then" clauses, often
appear as the first part of hypothetical
syllogisms. The complete syllogism is an
argument, but anything less than a conclusion
and a reason is not. . . .
Simple causal explanation . . . is not an
argument. . . . Giving a reason for an occur
rence is not the same as presenting a reason
for the acceptance of a belief or a causal
principle. . . .
Constructive reasoning . . . is a mental
activity which is used to reach a conclusion
on the basis of reasons. It is quite unlike
argument, which starts with a conclusion or
claim and supports it with reasons for its
acceptance.
Structural Alternatives
It has been suggested that the rhetorical
syllogism, practically taught in most cases as the logical
syllogism with the qualifier "probably" added to the major
premise and conclusion, or as an elided syllogism only
"probably" true, raised critical questions— as did distinctions between material and logical validity.

OA

A

^^Mills, Reason in Controversy, 1968 rev. ed.,
pp. 174-75.
^^See Henry W. Johnstone, Philosophy and Argument
(University Park, Penn.: Pennsylvania State University
Press, 19 59), Chs. V and VI. See analysis by Smith,
"Formal Logic in Debate," pp. 330-38.
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Many contemporary writers have tried to answer, or at
least avoid, certain of the problems by advocating various
alternative strategies.

Some have turned to modern rhe245
torical interpretations of the enthymeme.
Others have
looked for other structural approaches.

Mills named four:

the line diagram; the logical outline; the Venn diagram;
246
and the Toulmin layout,
the Toulmin model being the most
influential contemporary construct.
See Miller and Fausti who argued that the
enthymeme is often neglected. Relying on Bitzer's notion
that the enthymeme is a cooperative affair between speaker
and audience, Miller and Fausti said: "In his deductions,
the skillful debater will advance his arguments so as to
elicit the participation of the listener in constructing
the chain of deduction. This cooperative deduction,
regardless of whether to a probable or a necessary conclu
sion, is called an enthymeme." Arthur B. Miller and Remo
P. Fausti, Elements of Deliberative Debating (Belmont,
Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1969) , p. 28; see
Lloyd F. Bitzer, "Aristotle's Enthymeme Revisited,"
Quarterly Journal of Speech, XIV (December, 1959), 399-408.
^^Mills, Reason in Controversy, 1968 rev. ed.,
pp. 182-85.
247
In their journal article, Brockriede and
Ehninger labeled "seven claims" for the superiority of the
Toulmin model over the traditional syllogism. Wayne
Brockriede and Douglas Ehninger, "Toulmin on Argument: An
Interpretation and Application," Quarterly Journal of
Speech (February, 1960), 46-47. In Decision by Debate,
they reduced the claims to four: "(IT In the Toulmin
model, proofs are displayed in a spatial pattern to help
debaters see a dynamic relationship between evidence and
claim as certified by principles of reasoning actually used
by debaters; in the syllogism, proof consists of a series
of statements that reflect the relatively static relation
ship of compartmentalization.
(2) The Toulmin model pro
vides explicitly for the material support of warrants; the
major premises of syllogisms are supportable only by a sort
of extralogical operation.
(3) The Toulmin model empha
sizes the factual analysis of a unit of proof and material
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In 1958, the British logician Stephen Toulmin
published The Uses of Argument,248 a collection of essays
designed to investigate that "everyday'1 argumentation which
had concerned George Pierce Baker one-half century earlier.
Perceiving a relationship between meaning and function in
argument, Toulmin sought to devise a standard of judgment
by evaluating argumentation in "everyday use."

He based

his spatial model, therefore, on the jurisprudential
analogy rather than on the mathematical logic of the
249
syllogism.
Toulmin isolated six components of an argument and
assigned the following labels:

data (the facts appealed to

as a foundation for the claim); claim (the assertion);
validity by investigating a proof within the context of all
related information; the syllogism, more concerned with
class relationships, emphasizes formal validity and
achieves a sort of factual analysis only through a complex
series of syllogisms.
(4) The Toulmin model provides
explicitly for ways of qualifying and limiting the force of
a claim; the conclusion of a syllogism can often be
properly qualified or limited only through tortuous and
involved propositions. Ehninger and Brockriede, Decision
by Debate, p. 98.
248
Stephen Toulmin, The Uses of Argument
(Cambridge: The University Press, 1958).
249 Ibid., p. 16. Toulmin wished in his work to
emphasize "the contrast between the standards and values of
practical reasoning . . . and the abstract and formal
criteria relied on in mathematical logic and much of
twentieth century epistemology," Preface to the paperback
edition. For a criticism of the approach, see Peter T.
Manicas, "On Toulmin's Contribution to Logic and Argumen
tation," Journal of the American Forensic Association, III
(September, 1966), 83-94.
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warrant (a general proposition which "authorizes the step
from data to claim"); backing (statements of fact which
justify the warrant's authority); qualifier (that element
which modifies the force with which the warrant justifies
the conclusion); and rebuttal (circumstances in which the
authority of the warrant would not be acceptable).
Toulmin examined field-dependent and fieldinvariant elements in argument, labeling data, backing,
rebuttal and criteria for the qualifier, specific and
field-dependent.

He designated the warrant and the force

of the qualifier, field-invariant.

He also differentiated

the meaning or force of modal terms and set out criteria
for their use.^^
Toulmin arranged the components of an argument in
the following way: 251
->So,

Sir. e
W

Q,

Unless
R

On account of
B

250Argumentation and debate writers, however,
generally ignored these latter distinctions.
251

Toulmin, Uses of Argument, p. 104.
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He applied the structural model, moreover, to a sample
argument as follows: 252

Harry was born}
in Bermuda }"

{ Harry is a
►So, presumably,{Britis' subjsct

Since
A man born in
Bermuda will
generally be
a British
subject

Unless
Both his parents
were aliens/he
has become a
naturalized
American/...

On account of
The following statutes
and other legal provisions:

Having described the function of the terms of his
model, Toulmin rejected the induction-deduction categories
in favor of a new system of classification:

warrant-using

(only D-W-C required as the warrant is accepted without
question); warrant-establishing (data and conclusion are
already verified and warrant's authority is established by
applying it to a series of such conclusions),253 substan
tial (backing does not contain information in conclusion);
252
253

Ibid., p. 105.
Ibid., p. 121.
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and analytic (backing does contain information conveyed in
conclusion).254
In 1958, Wayne Brockriede introduced the Toulmin
analysis at the Speech Association of America's annual
convention.2^

Two years later, a more specific adaptation

of that model to argumentation and debate theory appeared
in a joint publication by Brockriede and Ehninger entitled
"Toulmin on Argument:
tion."2^

An Interpretation and Applica

Three years later in Decision by Debate, those

authors extended Toulmin's construct beyond its logical
role and used it as an analytical tool for exploring
authoritative and motivational proof. 257 In an unpublished
Master's thesis, Rita Alvis summarized Ehninger and
Brockriede's modifications and extensions of Toulmin's
theory and structural model as follows:
Ehninger and Brockriede extended Toulmin's
definition of data to include materials of
opinion as well as fact, and changed the term
data to the term evidence in Decision by
Debate. Describing the warrant essentially as
Toulmin had, they distinguished between an
inference (a relationship between evidence and
claim) and the warrant (which certified that
relationship). Backing became support for the
254Ibid., p. 125.
255 James C. McCroskey, "Toulmin and the Basic
Course," Speech Teacher, XIV (March, 1965), 91.
2 56
Brockriede and Ehninger, "Toulmin on Argument."
257

Ehninger and Brockriede, Decision by Debate.
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warrant in Decision by Debate and could be an
entire argument, standards or principles, as
well as Toulmin's statements of fact. The back
ing was not differentiated from the warrant on
any basis other than function. This change in
the concept of backing represented the greatest
difference between the interpretation of the
elements of argument by Ehninger and Brockriede,
and Toulmin. Ehninger and Brockriede agreed
with Toulmin's definition of the qualifier, but
added the possibility that the qualifier could
be a statement of probability or a refutation,
as well as a single term. They placed rebuttal
in a relationship to the claim based on the
force of the warrant. They substituted the
term reservation for rebuttal, moreover, and
described three kinds of reservations.
In the physical layout, Ehninger and
Brockriede added a line which connected the
warrant to the reservation. They also included
the qualifier in the claim statement.2-5®
Various other adaptations of the Toulmin model have
appeared in argumentation and debate texts,2^

most being

modifications of Ehninger and Brockriede's modifications. 260 That Ehninger and Brockriede's pronouncements
were influential is demonstrated by the widespread agree
ment on definition and function of terms, the imitation of
revisions in terminology, and the popularity of their
physical layout of arguments.

Writers who followed did

not, of course, accept all these vicissitudes.

Freeley,

258

Rita Alvis, "A Study of the Toulmin Model of
Argument in Works in Rhetorical Theory" (unpublished
Master's thesis, University of Alabama, 1971), pp. 53-64.
259
For a bibliography, see Jimmie D. Trent,
"Toulmin's Model of an Argument: An Examination and Exten
sion," Quarterly Journal of Speech, LIV (October, 1968),
252-59.
260
See Alvis, "A Study of the Toulmin Model," for
changes in terminology and structural model.
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for example, kept Toulmin's terminology, though he defined
similarly to Ehninger and Brockriede and followed the
physical construct set out in their journal article. 261
Hastings, on the other hand, equivocal in his definitions,
followed Toulmin in defining data and claim and Ehninger
and Brockriede in delineating qualifier and rebuttal.
Hastings viewed the warrant as the reasoning process and
agreed with Ehninger and Brockriede in defining backing
as evidence or reasoning which explained the truth of the
262
warrant. He altered slightly the physical model.
Mills's second edition of Reason in Controversy, on the
other hand, seemed to reflect a preference for the model
263
as an analytical rather than critical instrument.
Not all contemporary texts have accepted
enthusiastically Toulmin's model.

Some writers have

included it in their texts as a supplement to, rather than
264
a substitute for, syllogistic patterns,
Certain others
have ignored and/or rejected the paradigm.

In one of the

more comprehensive analyses published in argumentation
261Freeley, Argumentation and Debate, 1961 ed.,
pp. 115-17.
262

Hastings, "Reasoning Processes," pp. 126-28.
See also Windes and Hastings, Argumentation and Advocacy,
pp. 157-59.
263Mills, Reason in Controversy, 1968 rev. ed.,
pp. 110-11, 184-85.
264
See Freeley, Argumentation and Debate, 1961 ed.,
pp. 115-18; 1966 rev. ed., pp. 139-43; Mills, Reason in
Controversy, 1968 rev. ed., pp. 180-85.
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literature, Peter T. Manicas systematically refuted the
construct both philosophically and structurally. 265

Though

Manicas thought Toulmin "mistaken in the way in which he
wishes to bring logic into practice," he, nevertheless,
granted that "he [Toulmin] is clearly right in insisting
that logic must be brought into practice." 266 Manicas
encouraged more attention to modern logics 267 and "more
sophisticated treatments of the features of non-deductive
arguments."268
Testing Inferences
In contemporary theory, as elsewhere, one's view
of the nature of the inferential process and the patterns
of reasoning involved determine the tests he chooses.
Those who have included syllogistic reasoning as the common
Manicas, "On Toulmin's Contribution," pp. 83-94.
Other comprehensive critical reviews have been published
in philosophical journals. See, for example, J. C. Cooley,
"On Mr. Toulmin's Revolution in Logic," Journal of
Philosophy, LVI (March 26, 1959), 297-319; Joseph L. Cowan,
"The Uses of Argument— An Apology for Logic," Mind, LXXIII
(January, 1964), 27-45.
266
Manicas, "On Toulmin's Contribution," p. 94.
267
Mills and Petrie had also criticized a lack of
attention to works in modern logic. Mills and Petrie,
"Role of Logic," p. 20 4.
268
Manicas, "On Toulmin's Contribution," p. 93.
Manicas suggested that "of recently published texts on
argumentation and debate, the only one which shows any real
sophistication in its grasp of logic and its application to
debate is Arthur N. Kruger's Modern Debate," p. 93.
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deductive form have also cited its traditional tests.
same is true for rhetorical forms.

The

These writers, moreover,

have detailed numerous fallacies in reasoning.

The intro

duction of the Toulmin model into argumentation and debate
theory has occasioned some new criteria (or at least new
terminology) for the testing of proof.

Ehninger and

Brockriede set out specific, though largely traditional,
standards for the "patterns" of proof:

cause; sign;

generalization; parallel case; analogy; classification;
and statistics.

269

More original was their testing of

deficient evidence, unwarranted claims, deficient warrants,
ignored reservations, and overstated claims, though the
specific questions asked appear largely traditional. 270
Windes and Hastings advised the following procedure:
In testing arguments the first step is to
isolate the argument from the surrounding dis
course and to explicitly formulate [sic] the
evidence, warrant, and conclusion. . . . Once
the entire argument is made explicit it may be
identified as one of the types described in
this chapter [9 "modes" plus "others" category],
in which case it should be evaluated according
to the particular requirements of that type of
reasoning. If it is not a process explained
here, then the advocate must determine what
process it involves and what its requirements
of proof are.271
^^Ehninger and Brockriede, Decision by Debate,
Ch. X.
270

Ibid., Ch. XII. For a summary of these tests,
see pp. 186-88.
271
Windes and Hastings, Argumentation and Advocacy,
pp. 185-86.
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The Forensic
Though it is too simplistic to suggest that
contemporary controversies regarding the nature of the
forensic merely repeat those arguments of earlier years,
certainly many issues have been the same.

Of particular

importance is the perennial conflict over the "proper"
end or goal of debate.

Ehninger pointed up the centrality

of this controversy in 19 52 when he observed:
Apparently a few teachers of speech still
believe that the success of a school's forensics program may be measured merely by count
ing the number of cups in its trophy case.
Fortunately, however, the majority are now
more interested in the contribution which that
program makes toward the intellectual, social,
and moral development of the students who
participate in it.
But while the total growth of the student
has generally come to be recognized as the
broad aim of all forensic activities, there is
considerable disagreement as to how this aim
may best be achieved.272
Whereas the classic Wells-O'Neill discussions had
focused primarily on criteria of judgment and dealt with
ethical questions but peripherally, contemporary writers
began with the ethical implications of the "game" approach
to debate.

The widespread practice of debating both sides

of a question caused particular concern.

Called by

Robert M. O'Neill "the single feature of intercollegiate
debate which has probably provoked more criticism and
211

Douglas Ehninger, "Six Earmarks of a Sound
Forensics Program," Speech Teacher, I (November, 1952),
237.
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misunderstanding from the outside than any other,”2 7 3 the
"debating both sides" controversy— rekindled by Brooks
Quimby in 1953 and fueled by articles by Kruger and James
McGregor Burns2^ — reached bonfire proportions with the
publication in 1957 of Richard Murphy's "The Ethics of
Debating Both Sides."275

Insisting that "a public

utterance is a public commitment"

27

and implying that to

speak against one's convictions is an unethical act, Murphy
concluded that:
Debate would be in a stronger position if it
were freed from the anachronistic practice of
multiple positions. And those who believe in
the essential processes of democratic debate,
and wish to extend them, would no longer be
held liable for a dubious practice, if the
debate-both-sides policy were abandoned.277
In a review and analysis of Murphy's and rebuttal
positions,

278

Ehninger pointed out that "the argumentation

Robert M. O'Neill, "In Print: McBath, Argumen
tation and Debate (1963 rev. ed.)," Journal of the American
Forensic Association, I (January, 1964), 40.
27^Brooks Quimby, "But Is It Educational?" Speech
Activities, IX (Summer, 1953), 30-31. For earlier discussions of the issue, see Ch. II of this study. See also
Arthur N. Kruger, "Is It Educational? Yes," Bulletin of
the Debating Association of Pennsylvania Colleges, XXII
(December, 1956), 4-9; James McGregor Burns, "Debate Over
Collegiate Debates," New York Times Magazine, December 5,
1954, pp. 12, 30.
O7C

Richard Murphy, "The Ethics of Debating Both
Sides," Speech Teacher, VI (January, 1957), 1-9.
276T,
.,
a
Ibid.,
pp. 0
8-9.
277
27 8

Ibid., p. 9.
See ibid., pp. 1-9; Nicholas M. Cripe, "Debating
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of neither party will always bear the test of close
scrutiny." 279

Ehninger saw the "change-sides" question

as a "dubious offspring" 280 of the larger, more crucial
issue, "Is school debating a mode of public address or a
pedagogical device— a creature of the platform or of the
classroom?" 281

He concluded, moreover, that "the game

concept of school debating not only embraces serious
pedagogical evils, but it is unacceptable socially and
morally.He

said:

The plain fact of the matter, it seems to me,
is that anything that can be taught by playing
debating as a game can be taught, and taught
better, by practicing it as a mode of "real
life" oral discourse; and, in addition, prac
ticing it in this way will make a far greater
contribution to the total development of the
students who participate in it and to the
salvation of the society in which they live. 83
Ehninger's statement reflected the philosophy set
forth in 1952 that "the general development of the student
is best promoted by a program in which the fundamental
Both Sides in Tournaments Is Ethical," Speech Teacher, VI
(September, 1957), 209-212; Murphy, "Debating Both Sides,"
pp. 255-56; Donald K. Smith, "Debating Both Sides," Speech
Teacher, VI (November, 1957), 336; George W. Dell, "In
Defense of Debating Both Sides," Speech Teacher, VII
(January, 1958), 31-34.
279
Douglas Ehninger, "The Debate About Debating,"
Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLIV (April, 1958), 130.
2 80t,

,,,

Ibid., p. 136.

2 81t, . ■,

l oi
Ibid., p. 131.

282Ibid., p. 135.
283Ibid., p. 136.
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intellectual, social, and moral values are regarded as
paramount." 284

He and Brockriede predicated Decision by

Debate, moreover, on that commitment, 28 5

one.

Ehninger's position was not a particularly popular
286
As the Klopf-McCroskey survey indicated,
directors

of debate were unwilling to reject that "offshoot" of the
contest approach, switch-sides debating.

Rather, renewed

efforts appeared to reinforce O'Neill's original thesis.
Windes, for example, two years after the Ehninger analysis
averred that:
Academic debating is gamesmanship applied to
argumentation. . . . If we set academic
debating in this context, we can then properly
assign to it certain goals and objectives well
within our reach. We can also reject and
refute criticism of academic debating which
stems from a misunderstanding of what this
type of debating actually is.^87
284

Ehninger, "Six Earmarks of a Sound Forensics
Program," p. 241. Ehninger believed such a program would
be integrated with curriculum instruction in public speak
ing and fundamentals of speech; student centered; dependent
on educationally defensible principles regarding participa
tion; a vehicle for teaching social responsibility;
progressive; respected in school, community, and region of
the country where it is carried on, pp. 237-41.
28 5Ehninger and Brockriede, Decision by Debate,
preface.
286

Donald W. Klopf and James C. McCroskey,
"Debating Both Sides Ethical? Controversy Pau!" Central
States Speech Journal, XV (February, 1964), 36-39.
287
Russel R. Windes, Jr., "Part II. Competitive
Debating: The Speech Program, the Individual, and
Society," in "A Symposium on Discussion and Debate," Speech
Teacher, IX (March, 1960), 100.
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On the other hand, John E. Gow agreed with Ehninger
that a "contest" perspective limits debate's potential
contribution both to the participants and to society.

An

emphasis on skills "has the detrimental side effect of
stimulating strategy and tactics that will 'win the
trophy,'" he said.

Gow found the "most unsettling revela

tion" to be unethical practices in tournament debating,
particularly in the use of evidence, 288 though he cited
"other weaknesses that vitiate the efficacy of argument
under tournament conditions."

He complained:

The language of the average debater runs stale
with debate jargon— status quo, prima facie
case, "we find" this and "we find" that; it is
frequently laced with exorbitant overstatement
as well. Further, one wonders about the
instructive value of debate ballots.
Various other similarly negative charges have been
leveled at tournament debating during the contemporary
period.
m

In a symposium, published in the Speech Teacher
1960, 290 James L. Robinson noted "an increasing trend

John E. Gow, "Tournament Debating: A Time for
Changes," Journal of the American Forensic Association, IV
(Fall, 1967), 107-108. See Carl E. Larson and Kim Giffin,
"Ethical Considerations in the Attitudes and Practices of
College Debaters," Journal of the American Forensic Associ
ation, I (September-) 1964) , 88-90; Robert P. Newman and ™
Keith R. Sanders, "A Study in the Integrity of Evidence,"
Journal of the American Forensic Association, II (January,
1965), 7-13.
289
Gow, "Tournament Debating," p. 10 8.
290
The diverse topics considered m that symposium
represent some of the more critical issues surrounding the
contemporary forensic. "A Symposium on Discussion and
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toward artificiality and . . . 'shysteristic'
2Q 1
practices."
Recognizing that lack of audiences, desire
to add hardware to trophy cases, and the hierarchy of
tournaments leading to the National Championship are
probably contributing factors, Robinson laid much of the
blame for such practices on the "overlegalism" of
debate. 292 Merrill Christopherson, in that same series
of discussions, labeled tournament debating "mere exercises
in technique, instead of attempts at meaningful argument." 293 For Christopherson,
A great debater seems to speak from a wisdom
larger than himself, yet in a style wholly his
own. He fills the mind of his listeners with
his subject in a manner peculiar to him. 94
Debate (Glen E. Mills, Part I. "Audiences and Tournaments:
Two Forms of Over-Emphasis," pp. 9 5-98; Russel R. Windes,
Jr., Part II. "Competitive Debating: The Speech Program,
the Individual, and Society," pp. 99-108; James L.
Robinson, Part III. "Are We 'Overlegalizing1 School
Debate?" pp. 109-115; Merrill G. Christopherson, Part IV.
"The Necessity for Style in Argument, pp. 116-20; Austin
J. Freeley, Part V. "An Anthology of Commentary on
Debate," pp. 121-26; Kim Giffin and Brad Lashbrook,
Part VI. "'Group Action' in Perspective," pp. 127-30;
Kenneth Anderson and Jerome B. Polisky, Part VII. "The
Application of the Symposium-Forum to Contest Debating,"
pp. 131-34), Speech Teacher, IX (March, 1960), 95-134.
291
Robinson, Part III in "A Symposium," p. 109.
292Ibid., pp. 109-110.
29 3
Christopherson, Part IV in "A Symposium," p. 320.
29 4 .
Ibid., p. 116.
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Not hesitant to indict certain tournament debate
practices, contemporary writers have been no less deter
mined to find remedies for them.

Suggesting reforms both

within and outside the framework of tournament competition,
writers have revised formats, devised new methods of judg
ing, and advanced techniques for insuring more ethical uses
of evidence.

Certain representative prescriptions follow.

To meet the criticisms of artificiality, Walter
Murrish— among others— proposed that persuasion in debate
would be enhanced by new approaches to judging. 295
Accordingly, he advocated an increased use of lay judges,
I
29
2Q 7
"terminal" ballots,
and ballots cast by debaters.
A
purely statistical alternative to traditional methods of
judging also emerged. 29 8 Robert E. Litke devised a method
295
Walter H. Murrish, "Training the Debater in
Persuasion," Journal of the American Forensic Association,
I (January, 1964), 7-12.
296
This would require a judge to give a tentative
decision after each speech in the debate.
297
For an evaluation of these proposals, see Gow,
"Tournament Debating," p. 109. See also Donald Klopf,
Diana Evans, and Sister Mary Linus de Lozier, "Comparative
Studies of Students, Laymen, and Faculty Members as Judges
of Speech Contests," Speech Teacher, XIV (November, 1965),
314-18; Larry L. Barker, "A Comparative Analysis of
Debater-Judge Ratings," Journal of the American Forensic
Association, I (January, 1965), 16-20.
^®See Jack W. Murphy and Wayne E. Hensley, "Do
Debaters Know When They Win or Lose?" Speech Teacher, XV
(March, 1966), 145-47. See also Roger Hufford, "Tie
Breaking: The Quality Point System," Journal of the
American Forensic Association, V (Winter, 1968), 21-24.
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for selecting winning debate teams in tournament competi299
tion based on matrix algebra.
Litke believed that "the
method may be superior to win-loss and team-point methods
because (1) the number of ties is reduced and (2) 'luck of
the draw' is reduced."3^

The American Forensic Associa

tion ballot represented another attempt at increasing
reliability in judging.3^3Contemporary concerns with ethics gave rise to
various codes of debating.

Robert B. Capel and George

Cariker published a code in the Forensic of Pi Kappa
302
Delta;
Robert P. Newman drafted The Pittsburgh Code
for Academic Debate in 1962, 303 and the American Forensic
Association approved a code in December, 1967, which it
amended in 1969 to include enforcement provisions.^04
299

Robert E. Litke, "Dominance Matrices for Deter
mining Winners of Debate Tournaments," Speech Teacher, XV
(November, 1966), 295-98.
3Q°Ibid., p. 298.
3(33-See Journal of the American Forensic Association,
I (May, 1964), 74-75.
302
Robert B. Capel and George Cariker, "A Debate
Code of Ethics," Forensic of Pi Kappa Delta, XLVII
(October, 1961), 7, 30.
303
Robert P. Newman, The Pittsburgh Code for
Academic Debate (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh
Press, 1962) .
304
See Journal of the American Forensic Association,
V (Spring, 19687"!! 82-84; Journal of the American Forensic
Association, VII (Winter, 1970), 53-56.
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Documented fabrications and misquotations of
evidence3®^ called for further reforms.
suggested three:

Keith Sanders

a requirement for the documentation of

all evidence; better informed coaches, since the responsi
bility for error rests with them; and an increased number
of tape-recorded debates.39^

Ehninger and Brockriede

included an "ethic of evidence" as well as "a rhetoric"
in Decision by Debate.307

Gow recommended the adoption

of an examination and penalty system and felt that
"experimentation in potential avenues of control and
enrichment should be constant." 30 8 He encouraged a
formal "challenge of the evidence" at the end of a debate
and advocated including "an item on the ballot which calls
for the judge to assess the overall ethical practices of
..309
the competitors.
Believing that weaknesses in college debating
often result from the nature of the forensic itself, some
30 5See Newman and Sanders, "Integrity of Evidence,"
pp. 7-13.
306
Keith R. Sanders, "Toward a Solution to the
Misuse of Evidence," Journal of the American Forensic
Association, III (January, 1966), 8-10.
30 7

Ehninger and Brockriede, Decision by Debate,
pp. 116-21. See also earlier discussion of evidence in
this chapter.
30 8
Gow, "Tournament Debating," pp. 110-11.
309Ibid., p. 111.
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writers have investigated audience d e b a t i n g , f o r u m s ,
parliamentary, 312 and problem-solving debating as well as
contest discussion 313 as supplements and/or alternatives
to traditional tournament debate competition.
debating has been of particular interest.

Audience

Questioning the

"seriousness of the charges brought against tournament
debating" and "the values of the intended reforms," Mills,
however, challenged "the wisdom of substituting one kind of
314
over-emphasis for another."
W. Scott Nobles and Herman
Cohen objected, moreover, to "the disjunctive premise about
forensics," i.e., "the assumption that a forensic program
must be based either upon tournament activities or upon
non-tournament, public debating." 315 Though aware of
problems such as budget, administration, number and
capacity of students, Nobles and Cohen concluded that:
310 John K. Boaz and George Ziegelmueller, "An
Audience Debate Tournament," Speech Teacher, XIII
(November, 1964), 270-76.
311
See Owen Peterson, "Forum Debating," Speech
Teacher, XIV (November, 1965), 286-90.
312
See Bruce Markgraf, "The Parliamentary Debate m
Action," Speech Teacher, XII (September, 1963), 219-22;
John Graham, "Something New in Student Legislatures,"
Speech Teacher, XII (January, 1963), 32-33.
313
See Gow, "Tournament Debating," p. 109; Anderson
and Polisky, Part VII in "A Symposium," pp. 131-34; Giffin
and Lashbrook, Part VI in "A Symposium," pp. 127-30.
314

Mills, Part I in "A Symposium," p. 95.

315

W. Scott Nobles and Herman Cohen, "The Dis
junctive Premise About Forensics," Speech Teacher, VIII
(November, 1959), 316.
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Every forensic director must tailor the pro
gram he plans and sponsors to his own local
situation. . . . Whatever the details of his
program, however, it must aim at the fullest
possible training of his students in all
facets of rhetoric. The attainment of this
goal demands, not that he make the proper
dicision about whether to emphasize tournament
speaking or the public forum, but rather that
he make the fullest possible use of these two
valuable and complementary methods of speech
training.
Gow agreed.

"In addition to encouraging forensic directors

to increase the number of non-decision, audience-centered
experiences wherever possible," he said, "a wider variety
of tournament or conference offerings should be stimulated." 317 Otto F. Bauer and C. William Colburn proposed
a challenge debate tournament. 318

Gerald Phillips

suggested that town meetings, festivals, legislative
assemblies, problem-solving tournaments, and student forums
319
be run in conjunction with tournament debating.
Not all the criticisms leveled at debating could
be ameliorated by revisions in judging procedures or in
formats or by a greater concern with ethics.

Rather, some

of the more incisive, more fundamental, barbs grew out of
316Ibid., p. 320.
317Gow, "Tournament Debating," pp. 110-11.
318
Otto F. Bauer and C. William Colburn, "A
Challenge Debate Tournament," Journal of the American
Forensic Association, V (Winter, 1968), 1-9.
319Gerald M. Phillips, "Imagination— The Answer to
Tournament Debate," Speech Teacher, IX (September, 1960),
205-210.
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what Ehninger called "a failure to recognize important
limitations of debate as a generic mode of argumentative
deliberation."

Ehninger recognized that debate is

by nature indecisive, bilateral, verbal, and can deal
only with means, not ends.

Yet, he did not find these

limitations debilitating.

His commitment to the superiority of the debate process 321 rested on a belief in the
reliability and humaneness of debate. 322 Ehninger said:
Besides being self-corrective and hence
reliable in a way that authority and intui
tion are not, debate also is more humane in
the sense that it elevates and dignifies
man while the alternative methods minimize
or degrade him. 3
Summary
Contemporary argumentation and debate writers have
derived no consistent way of approaching their discipline.
Despite a lack of continuity in treatments, a continuing
interest has persisted in the methods and ends appropriate
to argumentation and in the relation of argumentation to
other subjects.

Much justificatory rationale for debating

320

Ehninger, "Debate as Method," p. 180.
321t, .,
Ibid.
322
Ibid., p. 184.
323
Ibid., p. 185. See also Henry W. Johnstone,
Jr., "The Nature of Philosophical Controversy," Journal
of Philosophy, XLI (May 13, 1954), 294-300; Ehninger and
Brockriede, Decision by Debate, pp. 16-18.
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within the humanistic tradition has been stimulated by a
renewed interest in debate as advocacy.

The inquiry-

advocacy dichotomy has pervaded notions about the analysis
of propositions, their proof, and the judgment as well as
the nature of the forensic.
Most contemporary writers have continued to include
definition and stock issues as the major components of
analysis.

Also of interest have been developments in the

classification of propositions:

an expanding of the tri

partite system; a trend toward combining fact and value
propositions; and the exclusion in seme quarters of policy
questions.

Cronkhite presented what has been called the

most radical approach which isolated both judgmental and
temporal dimensions.
Inherency emerged as one of the more controversial
constructs of the contemporary period.

Involving the need

issue in propositions of policy, demonstrating causality,
and implying a restrictive view of the prima facie case,
inherency forced reassessments of burden of proof and
presumption.

Its most vocal antagonists, advocates of the

comparative advantage alternative, rejected its
assumptions.
Most contemporary texts have depended on tradi
tional notions of proof as evidence plus reasoning.

They

have continued to rely, moreover, on the logical syllogism,
Mill's canons of induction, and fallacies.

Some writers,
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however, have investigated other alternatives.

Of par

ticular interest has been reclassification of arguments in
terms of common bases.
worthy:

Three other developments are note

a behavioral approach to evidence in certain

works; the introduction of the Toulmin structural model
into argumentation and debate theory; and a renewed interest
by some writers in motivation and ethos as proof.
The strategy of attack and defense has forced
reevaluations of the "appropriate" ends of argumentation
and debating with controversy centering on the ethics of
debating both sides of an issue, unethical practices in
intercollegiate debating, and standards for judgment.
Predispositions and premises regarding these issues have
tended to follow the inquiry-advocacy dilemma.
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In 1895, George Pierce Baker of Harvard College
published The Principles of Argumentation, the first modern
textbook on argument.

It has been the purpose of this

study to trace the development of argumentation and debate
theory from that work.

Neither a checklist nor an anno

tated bibliography, the immediate study has identified,
described, and analyzed important extensions, deletions,
and modifications of theory.

Central to its organizational

pattern is the assumption that developments in theory may
be isolated within prescribed chronological bounds; i.e.,
"early" (1895-1917), "middle" (1917-c. 1955), and "con
temporary" (c. 1955-1970) periods.

An examination of over

1,500 textbooks and journal articles confirms that these
divisions are not wholly arbitrary.
Though, in a strict sense, Baker's Principles
launched neither the practice nor the theory of argumenta
tion, his commitment to a "practical" application "for
everyday life" gave the discipline new direction and
impetus.

Baker's rejection of a total dependency on Formal

Logic, rhetoric, and rules of law, moreover, and his
337
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emphasis on the analysis of the argumentative proposition
ran counter to Richard Whately's view of argumentation as
the logical demonstration of a priori truth.

Though Baker's

students Raymond Alden, George Pattee, and William Trufant
Foster professed a philosophical interest in a broad scope
for argumentation, they emphasized the spoken debate.

And

though their texts retained Baker's exposition of analysis,
these writers also included more traditional approaches to
proof, derived from Formal Logic.

Less concerned with

"practical" argumentation than with the reality of school
debating, Craven Laycock and Robert L. Scales made no
pretense at minimizing formal distinctions drawn from other
disciplines.

In the rewriting of their text, James M.

O'Neill reemphasized the interrelationships.
The year 1917 may be established as a watershed in
the development of argumentation and debate theory.

The

publication of two landmark works, Foster's second edition
of Argumentation and Debating and O'Neill's revision of
Laycock and Scales's Argumentation and Debate, entrenched
the standard tradition.

That same year, however, grave

dissatisfactions surfaced in the journals.

Mary Yost's

protests for a sociological context for argumentation gave
way to Charles H. Woolbert's restructuring of the dis
cipline from the behavioral psychological perspective.
Gladys Murphy Graham, on the other hand, objected to the
narrow confines of the traditional logics embodied in most
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works.

The Wells-O'Neill controversy emphasized the

prevailing philosophical rift over the "proper" end of
debate, that form of argumentation which had gained
ascendency.
"Middle period" writers responded to the YostWoolbert-Graham criticisms variously and consistently
with their philosophical predispositions.

Whereas George

Collins and John Morris rewrote the theory of argumenta
tion in terms of persuasion and debate, James A. Winans
and William E. Utterback, A. Craig Baird, and Charles
Fritz updated traditional theory in terms of modern
sociological and psychological principles with some
attention to modern logics.

Efforts, moreover, to

restate argumentation's ends in terms of social goals,
reminiscent of Baker's plea for a practical argumentation,
resulted in a broadening of argumentation's scope to
include discussion, an emphasis on a balanced rhetorical
effort including persuasion as well as conviction as
appropriate ends of argument, and expanded treatments of
audience.

Baird, who was instrumental in all these

developments, spanned the entire period, both in his works
and influence.

Henry Lee Ewbank and J. Jeffery Auer's

widely used text reflected Baird's philosophy of discus
sion.

Waldo W. Braden and Earnest Brandenburg's Oral

Decision-Making and William Behl's Discussion and Debate
built on both works.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

340

The standard tradition not only survived, but it
prospered during the "middle period."

Foster's Argumen

tation and Debating continued to be among the most popular
works, going through numerous printings and a "second
revised edition" as late as 1945.

O'Neill, meanwhile,

began to co-author works with Andrew T. Weaver and James M.
McBurney.

These texts retained traditional notions of

argumentation and emphasized the "game" approach to
debating.

W. C. Shaw's open advocacy of strategy rein

forced O'Neill's position.
The philosophical split over the appropriate end
of debate, anticipated by the shift from Whately to Baker
but most clearly exemplified by the Wells-O-Neill contro
versy, had influenced "early" and "middle" period discus
sions of the forensic itself.

During the late 1950's and

early 1960's, in large measure, it also determined one's
view of analysis and proof.

The terms advocacy and inquiry

denote the polarity of the controversy.

Disciples of Baker

and reared in the Baird, Ewbank-Auer tradition, Ehninger
and Brockriede occupy that end of the continuum which
perceives argumentation to be a form of inquiry, an instru
ment of decision-making.

At the other end, one finds

Kruger, heir to the O'Neill-Shaw philosophy, proponent
of advocacy, logic, strategy, attack and defense.

Freeley

and Mills, among others, have attempted to bridge the
intermediate chasm.

Though probably most influential in
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contemporary textbook treatments of the principles and
procedures of argumentation, the critical underlying issue,
the appropriate end or goal of debate, has pervaded most
of the significant controversies and prompted many of the
developments in argumentation and debate theory in all
periods.

A summary of the major areas of investigation

of this study confirms this conclusion.
The Nature of Argumentation
Despite Baker's insistence on a "practical"
argumentation independent of the strictures imposed by
other disciplines, most "early period" writers continued
to rely on prescriptions from Formal Logic, law, and
rhetorical composition.

Rhetoric provided principles

of arrangement, style, and delivery and emphasized per
suasion.

Law included rules of evidence, a method of

analysis (briefing) and a highly structured procedural
system (including the concepts of prima facie case, burden
of proof, and presumption) for the carrying on of argumen
tation.

Formal Logic, moreover, provided the concept of

the proposition and set out specific rules and structures
for its proof.
At one time or another, most of the preceding
elements have been declared inappropriate or unnecessary
for argumentation.

Witness:

Baker's contention that

rules of arguing in law courts are not essential for
"practical" argumentation; a reviewer's astonishment at
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Baird's inclusion of a chapter on delivery; the decreased
emphasis on brief-drawing; Kruger's conviction that
academic debate is not primarily an exercise in public
speaking; a contemporary interest in "deliberative" as
opposed to "forensic" debating; a behavioral approach to
evidence which rejects the quasi-legal perspective.

The

role of Formal Logic in argumentation and the relation
ship— if any— of conviction to persuasion has created,
however, most controversy.
Though Baker had rejected Formal Logic as essential
for "practical" argumentation— preferring "applied logic"
such as that set out by Alfred Sidgwick— most subsequent
writers included detailed sections on the logical syllo
gism, John Stuart Mill's canons of induction, and
fallacies.

"Middle period" writers attempted to update

traditional treatments, moreover, by sandwiching Bernard
Bosanquet and John Dewey between Mill and Aristotle.
Certain contemporary texts included the Toulmin analysis.
Traditional theory came under attack not only from
those who wished to update its logic, but severe indict
ments came from those who perceived persuasion to be within
the scope of argumentation.

Though Baker suggested that

argumentation may be accomplished by either reasoning or
the emotions, and although his revision with Huntington
called the processes "complementary," evidence does not
suggest that most "early period" writers thought a
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separation between conviction and persuasion to be
"artificial."

Rather, their treatments reflected the

prevailing faculty psychology.

Woolbert, a behaviorist,

rejected the conviction-persuasion dichotomy and insisted
that the mind must be viewed as "an organic unit."

His

reformulations— buttressed by "middle period" interests
both in social context and in public discussion, i.e.,
audiences— prompted a reshuffling of priorities, the
result being a more central role for persuasion in argu
mentation and debate theory.

The writings of such con

temporary psychologists as William James, Carl Seashore,
E. B. Tichener, R. S. Woodworth, and Floyd Allport added
new dimensions and, in some instances, new "respectability
to that theory.
accepted

Not all "middle period" writers, however,

such an expanded role for argumentation.

Foster

for example, continued to treat the processes separately
and emphasized conviction in his 1932 revision of Argu
mentation and Debating.
Persuasion's "place" in contemporary theories of
argumentation has been determined largely by one's view
of the nature and end of debate.

Whereas Ehninger and

Brockriede, for example, emphasized motivational proof in
their text, Kruger dismissed such proof as inappropriate
for academic debate.

Contemporary writers have subjected

the role of Formal Logic in argumentation to the same
criterion.

Those who deem advocacy to be the appropriate
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end of argument have returned reason, if not logic, to a
position of primacy in the discipline, though at least one
writer has suggested that such treatments continue out of
tradition only.

At the other extreme is the position that

Formal Logic's role in argumentation is one simply of style
and plausibility.

The contemporary search for alternate

logical structures— most clearly demonstrated by the
interest in bases of classification and the introduction
of the Toulmin model into argumentation and debate theory—
suggests a continuing commitment to an "applied logic" for
practical argumentation.
Analysis
Baker's discussion of analysis, considered by many
his most influential contribution to argumentation and
debate theory, included four major steps in its revised
form— phrasing the proposition, defining the terms,
finding the special issue, and case.

Alden expanded the

concept to include objections to affirmative propositions,
thereby opening the way for a clash on issues.
The concept of the proposition, rooted in Formal
Logic, had been applied to argumentation at least since
the time of Whately.

Alden, among the first writers to

discuss the debate proposition, set out characteristics
of a "good" proposition which other writers expanded.
"Good propositions," typical texts averred, place the
burden of proof on the affirmative, contain an assertion
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about one central idea, and are unambiguous, interesting,
clear, and unbiased.

The comprehensive standards set out

in the Foster and O'Neill texts provided the framework for
most subsequent treatments.
Early period writers began to classify proposi
tions according to subject matter— i.e., propositions of
fact and policy.

Though O'Neill thought such a procedure

"hardly worthwhile," most "middle period" texts did include
fact and policy classifications.
further subdivisions.

Some writers attempted

Baird, for example, separated

theoretically sound policy questions from those involving
practical policy.

Various divisions of propositions of

fact, meanwhile, resulted from attempts to isolate the
evaluative dimension.

Wagner provided the most lasting

label, propositions of value, which he treated as a sepa
rate class.

ihough most contemporary writers have fol

lowed the fact-value-policy distinctions, further attempts
to classify propositions have resulted in an expanding of
the tripartite structure, the combining of fact and value
propositions, and the exclusion of policy questions as a
separate category.
Baker examined definition as a second step in
analysis.

Rejecting dictionary definitions as insufficient,

he discussed one's own experience and a careful examination
of the words themselves as sources of the meaning of
propositions.

Alden added the notion "under the
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circumstances."

The Baker-Huntington revision included a

study of the history of the question and labeled clearness,
convincingness, and brevity as essentials of a good
definition.

Foster advised defining from etymology,

authority, negation, exemplification, and explication.
Subsequent writers, following these general distinctions,
added other "methods":

continuum; comparison-contrast;

function; example; context.

Ehninger and Brockriede's

approach— definition by classification, necessary condi
tions, and operational description— is probably the most
distinctive available in contemporary literature.
Discovering the issues was, for Baker, the third
major step in analysis.

He devised a method of residues

(excluding unimportant, irrelevant, and admitted matter)
for finding the "special" issue, that central idea or
group of ideas around which the controversy centers.
Laycock and Scales located the "stress of the controversy"
by "clash of opinion" and examined primary and subordinate
issues.

O'Neill, furthermore, insisted that issues are

not simply main points or points on which there is a clash
of opinion, but they are the smallest possible division of
crucial points, each one of which the affirmative must
establish to establish the proposition.
Whereas the "clash of opinion" provided the issues
for most early period writers, and though such alternatives
as Shaw's "phase system" of analysis appeared, most "middle
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period" texts tended to rely on stock issues.

Rooted in

the classical doctrine of stasis and discussed in argumen
tation literature at least as early as J. R. Pelsma and
Harry B. Gough, stock issues provided not only a method
of analysis but also an outline of points in partition.
Though O'Neill thought it "unsafe" to accept stock issues
as "the exact issues," most middle period writers did just
that.

Dewey's reflective thinking model, meanwhile, became

the primary tool for dissecting discussion questions.

Most

contemporary writers have continued to rely on standardized
methodology for determining issues.

Lee Huitzen introduced

what is probably the most unique modern system.

He

included four stock issues (ill, blame, cure, cost) and
three sub-issues (conjecture, definition, quality).
Though Baker considered case to be a step in
analysis, most writers who followed him treated it as a
result of analysis.

Whereas the brief, moreover, consti

tuted the points in partition for Baker, most subsequent
writers redefined case in terms of the rhetorical outline.
O'Neill's early comprehensive treatment of case set out
both affirmative and negative prerogatives.

An affirmative

must establish a prima facie case which discharges the
burden of proof and overcomes the negative presumption,
O'Neill averred.

The negative has four alternatives:

pure refutation; defense of the present; adjustment; and
counter proposition.
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Writers had applied the terms burden of proof and
presumption to argumentation at least since the time of
Whately.

Though Baker largely ignored the concepts/ Alden

gave them currency and identified them with debating.
Early the question arose as to whether the burden of proof
shifts.

O'Neill introduced the legal term burden of

rebuttal to denote that part of the responsibility which
does shift.

Wells suggested that it is the burden to

produce evidence which shifts, the burden of the issue.
The contemporary concept of inherency forced reassessments
of traditional notions of burden of proof, presumption, and
the prima facie case.
Though "early period" writers clearly separated
the rhetorical outline, points in partition, or case from
the brief, they continued to rely on brief-drawing both
to provide the issues through the clash in opinion and to
demonstrate the logical relationships between these issues.
During the "middle period," however, the affirmative case
evolved largely into an explication of stock issues, par
ticularly in propositions of policy.

The most radical

departure from this traditional system was the comparative
advantage affirmative which ignored the traditional need
analysis.

Proponents of inherency challenged the validity

of the comparative advantages case, arguing that the
alternative does not discharge the burden of proof,
traditionally an affirmative responsibility.
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Although the use of the term is not new in argumen
tation and debate theory, inherency as an important theo
retical construct is a phenomenon of the contemporary
period.

As discussed by its most avid proponents,

inherency involves the need issue in propositions of
policy, being linked with "the essential characteristic
of the status quo."

It demonstrates causality and implies

a restrictive view of the prima facie case.

Inherency has

inquired into the defining of propositions and into the
main issues essential to proving one's case.
"Middle period," and particularly "contemporary,"
writers have attended more carefully to refutation and
rebuttal than did their "early period" counterparts.
Clarifications of negative alternatives, particularly the
counter-plan, have appeared.

Specific work for rebuttal

speeches has been outlined and techniques of attack and
defense have been detailed.

Much praised and much

maligned, the concept of strategy has served to focus much
of the controversy.

Associated with winning, with placing

an opponent at a disadvantage, with what Musgrave called
"outwitting" not "outplodding in the library," strategy
pervaded the numerous "how to" books of the "middle
period."

Both during that time and in more contemporary

works, strategy has reflected a shift from the traditional
structuring and proof of arguments to the preparing of
debaters for intercollegiate competition.

The contemporary

period includes a fair share of both approaches.
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Proof
Though Best's definition of proof as "anything
which serves . . .

to convince the mind of the truth or

the falsehood of a fact or proposition"^ left the way
clear for the accommodation of ethos and pathos, tradi
tionally most writers have restricted the concept of proof
to logical appeals.

Woolbert's insistence on the totality

of response and Ehninger and Brockriede's application of
Toulmin's structural model of argument to both motiva
tional and authoritative proofs, however, are notable
exceptions.
In an effort to minimize the role of Formal Logic
in argumentation, Baker perceived evidence to be the
integrating factor of proof, reasoning being a kind of
evidence.

Laycock and Scales, on the other hand, set out

evidence and reasoning as the two major components of
proof.

Most subsequent works— Foster notwithstanding—

followed the latter alternative and differentiated evidence
(the material of proof) from argument (the machinery).
The Toulmin structural model represents a contemporary
attempt at integration.
Argumentation and debate texts, regardless of
period, have relied almost solely on legal definitions and
classifications of evidence.

Whereas "early period"

^William Best, On Evidence, Chamberlayne's Ed.
(Boston: Boston Book Company, 1908), p. 180.
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writers limited their definitions to fact, opinion being a
kind of fact, later writers presented fact and opinion as
two correlative parts of evidence.

Some texts defined

evidence, moreover, in terms of its "constituents" (facts,
statistics, objects, et cetera).

More significant, however,

has been the contemporary development of assessing the
function of proof as belief, not proof.

The ramifications

of this behavioral perspective relate, moreover, to one's
view of the nature and end of debate.
Some contemporary writers have examined the rela
tion of evidence to kinds of propositions, issues, or
claims.

Terris, for example, suggested that the fact-

value distinction depends on the type of evidence used to
prove it.

Ehninger and Brockriede limited authoritative

proof to designative and definitive claims.

Robert Newman

and Dale Newman correlated evidential forms with direc
tional, positional, and predicative statements.

Gerald R.

Miller related goals to propositions from a belief, rather
than probative perspective.
Treatments of evidence as the material of proof
stimulated an early interest in research and in the
recording and tabulating of materials.
demonstrate no such continuity.

Contemporary texts

Whereas some writers have

emphasized research materials, others omit them completely.
It has been suggested that traditional applications
of Formal Logic to argumentation and debate theory faced
fire from several directions. Baker dismissed Formal
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Logic's usefulness for a "practical argumentation for
everyday life."
logical bases.

Woolbert attacked Formal Logic's psycho
Graham indicted contemporary treatments

of logic as "insufficient" and "fragmentary."

Dewey argued

that logical forms are essentially rhetorical and proposed
a "scientific method" for the solution of problems.

Most

writers, however, unwilling to reject the methodology and
security of Formal Logic, unable to accept the Collins and
Morris analysis inspired by Woolbert, and uncertain about
the application of Dewey's method of reflective thinking
to argumentation, simply updated their bibliographies and
followed the systems set out by Foster and O'Neill in
1917.
Foster perceived the induction-deduction distinc
tion to be critical.

Within that framework, he examined

the "typical forms" of reasoning— example, analogy,
generalization, and argument from causal relation.

O'Neill,

on the other hand, believed that the real process of
inference is the same in both induction and deduction.
Accordingly, he separated rhetorical classes (antecedent
probability, sign, and example) from logical classes of
argument (induction and deduction).

Both Foster and

O'Neill detailed rules for the syllogism, discussed Mill's
canons of induction (via Jevons' explanations), and set
out fallacies.
In addition to following preceding analyses, some
writers sought to integrate old concepts.

Others developed
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new methods for structuring and labeling arguments.

Of

particular interest in the contemporary period has been a
reformulation of the modes of argument in terms of common
bases of classification and the introduction of the Toulmin
structural model into argumentation and debate theory.
Interpreted initially by Brockriede, the Toulmin model has
been transmitted to subsequent argumentation and debate
texts primarily through the modified constructs set out by
Ehninger and Brockriede.

Various other adaptations and

extensions have appeared, serving both as supplements to
syllogistic reasoning and as a substitute for Formal
Logic.

The Toulmin analysis has not been without its

detractors, however, Peter Manicas constructing one of
the more incisive negative cases in argumentation and
debate literature.
Traditionally one's view of the nature of proof
has influenced his methodology for its evaluation.

Baker,

for example, differentiated external tests of evidence
from internal tests of reasoning.

Writers have appro

priated legal tests of evidence to assess reliability,
accuracy, verifiability, recency, representativeness, and
competency of source.

Audience acceptability has surfaced

as a contemporary test of evidence in some works, though
it is not a universally accepted criterion.

Argumentation

and debate writers have tested reasoning, moreover, by
applying tests of the logical syllogism and by questioning
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the "representativeness" of induction.

Some writers who

included enthymematic reasoning or the Toulmin structural
model have set out appropriate evaluative standards.
Consistent with an emphasis on empiricism and pragmatism,
an interest in material validity has also persisted with
detailed sections on fallacies continuing into contemporary
works.
The Forensic
Whereas Baker had approached the forensic as a
written composition, believing that common principles apply
to both oral and written discourse, most subsequent
writers— disciples and critics alike— emphasized the spoken
debate.

The resulting descriptions and treatments reflect

differing notions about the forensic and its relation
to argumentation.

Some writers perceived debating to be

a form of argumentation.
mously.

Others used the terms synony

Another, less influential, group treated argu

mentation and debating as kinds of persuasion.
Baker's view of the forensic stressed argumentative
composition and demanded attention to rules of arrangement
and style.

Alden emphasized delivery and platform decorum.

Most succeeding texts included discussions of these
rhetorical elements, though certain contemporary theorists
have accorded them less importance.
The carrying on of the spoken debate prompted
dissension among "early period" writers, rules and formats
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differing from one debate to another.

Though the debate

tournament helped to standardize procedures, it did not
dispel anxiety over format.
concern in some quarters.

Conversely, it increased the
The "middle period" emphasis on

social context, moreover, prompted a demand for audiences.
An interest in public discussion stressed cooperation
and minimized the "competition" fostered by tournament
debating.

Reassessments of traditional forms of debating

resulted in revised tournament formats (cross-examination,
direct clash, congressional debating) and in methods for
discussing multi-sided questions (convention debating,
discussion contests).

The advent of no-decision debating

led to still other possibilities, radio debating being
particularly popular.

Coaches and tournament directors

experimented with heckling, dialectic, forums, and British
forms, to mention some of the more obvious.

Concerned with

an overemphasis on "academic" debating and anxicus to
discourage unethical practices in tournament competition,
contemporary writers have offered similar alternatives.
Of particular interest have been non-tournament formats.
Underlying these various alternatives to the forensic have
been varying philosophical predispositions about the nature
and end of argumentation and, more specifically, of
debating.
What is the "proper" or "appropriate" end of
debating?

Should debating be a true to life venture or

is it merely an academic contest, a game?

Is a public
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utterance a public commitment?
pedagogical device?

Is debating primarily a

The Wells-0'Neill discussions brought

this pervasive tneoretical issue into sharp focus while
the contemporary inquiry-advocacy split has given it
currency.

The divisiveness engendered by differing views

of the "proper" end of debating has influenced not only
format, but it has reached into such issues as judging and
ethics.
The 0'Neil1-Wells controversy evolved into a
discussion of standards of judgment.

Wells advocated a

"juryman" who would judge on the merits of competing cases.
O'Neill insisted on a "critic judge" who would decide on
the merit of the debating.

This clash underscored the

relativity of standards of judgment.

Woodward, in an

attempt to place judging on a scientific basis, proposed
the shift-of-opinion ballot.

Other standardized criteria

appeared, the contemporary American Forensic Association
ballot being among the more influential.
Whereas the Wells-0'Neill articles emphasized
judging and dealt with ethical questions but peripherally,
contemporary writers began with the "ethical" implications
of the "game" approach to debating.

The primary issue, the

common tournament practice of debating both sides of a
question, was not new, Foster having raised objections to
the practice as early as 190 8.

The Murphy-Cripe-Ehninger
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articles emphasized the broader implications of that
controversy.
The preponderance of argumentation and debate
theory, 1970, bears little resemblance to that "practical
argumentation for everyday life" envisioned by George
Pierce Baker seventy-five years ago.

Baker perceived no

"academic" debate geared to the demands of intercollegiate
tournament competition.

His commitment, rather, was to

the discovery, selection, and structuring of arguments for
the everyday affairs of men.

This study has traced the

developments which resulted in that philosophical shift.
Various indictments and/or justifications for
argumentation and debate have appeared since 1895 and
numerous alternatives to the structure and evaluation of
argumentation's most persistent form have been advanced.
Ehninger, however, probably expressed the consensus of
writers since Alden when he suggested debating to be
"superior to any alternative method for achieving the end
at which it aims."
been:

2

The critical question, of course, has

Toward what end does debate— or to raise another

problem— should debate aim?

That question remains

unresolved.
O

Douglas Ehninger, "Debate As Method: Limitations
and Values," Speech Teacher, XV (September, 1966), 180.
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